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FBIS-SOV-91-001 CONTENTS *2 January 1991*

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An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Journalist Visits Nuclear Weapons Facility *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 25 Dec]* 1
Commentary Criticizes New UK Nuclear Weapon *[Moscow Radio]* 2
Vasilyev Answers Reader's Criticism on CFE Treaty *[PRAVDA 30 Dec]* 3

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

Gorbachev Sends New Year's Greetings to U.S. *[TASS]* 4

China

Defense Ministry Notes Yazov PRC Visit Plans *[Moscow International]* 4
Power Engineering Contracts Signed With PRC *[Moscow TV]* 4
Easing Tensions Between China, Taiwan Viewed *[Moscow International]* 5

Northeast Asia

Japanese Premier Notes 'Friendly' Relations *[TASS]* 5
Normalized Mongolian-Chinese Relations Praised *[Moscow International]* 6

Near East & South Asia

Envoy to Iraq Leads 'Peace Mission' to Baghdad *[TASS]* 6
Changed Relations With Iraq Viewed *[Moscow TV]* 6
Mideast Envoys to USSR View Gulf Crisis *[TASS]* 7
Iraqi Leader's Appeals for Talks With U.S. Eyed *[IZVESTIYA 29 Nov]* 7
Saudis Plan To Increase Aid for U.S. Forces *[TASS]* 7
Iraqi Linkage of Kuwait-Palestine Issues Cited *[IZVESTIYA 1 Jan]* 8

East Europe

Katushev, Bulgarian Counterpart Sign Trade Accord *[Sofia BTA]* 9

West Europe

Nuclear Modernization in Britain Examined *[Moscow International]* 9
Relations With Finland Viewed on Anniversary *[TASS]* 10

Latin America & Caribbean

Draft 1991 Trade Agreement With Cuba Outlined *[TASS]* 10
Yazov Sends Greetings to Cuban Defense Minister *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 31 Dec]* 11
Dialogue With U.S. on Cuba, Emigres Continues *[IZVESTIYA 15 Dec]* 11
Castro Seeks To Reduce Communist Party's Size *[IZVESTIYA 30 Dec]* 12

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Congress of USSR People's Deputies

Congress Decisions, Resolutions Reported 13
  Decision on Gulf Situation *[TASS]* 13
  Interim Resolution on Budget *[PRAVDA 29 Dec]* 13
  Law on Nationwide Referendums *[IZVESTIYA 29 Dec]* 13
Armenian Deputies Send Message on Dadamyan Case *[Yerevan Radio]* 18
NKAO Deputy Cables Congress on Abduction *[Yerevan Radio]* 18
Azerbaijani Deputies Appeal on NKAO Dispute *[Baku Radio]* 19
Armenian Deputy Discusses Congress Participation *[ARMENPRES]* 19
Greek Paper Interviews Lukyanov on Congress *[Athens RIZOSPASTIS 29 Dec]* 20
Turkmenia's Niyazov on Union Treaty, Referendums *[PRAVDA 23 Dec]* 21
Abalkin Cited on Economic Problems *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 20 Dec]* 21
Agricultural Experts Discuss Food Problems *[Moscow Radio]* 22
Further on Dzasokhov's 22 Dec News Conference *[PRAVDA 23 Dec]* 23
'Conservatives' Said To Triumph at Congress *[TASS]* 23
Empty Seats on Congress Presidium Deplored *[IZVESTIYA 21 Dec]* 24
Information Center Serves People's Deputies *[PRAVDA 20 Dec]* 25

Political & Social

Gorbachev New Year Address to Soviet People *[TASS]* 25
No Deterioration in Ryzhkov's Condition *[TASS]* 26
  Rumors 'Completely Groundless' *[Paris AFP]* 26
Gorbachev Issues Decree on Sales Tax *[Moscow TV]* 26
  Finance Minister on New Tax *[AFP]* 27
Analyst on Decrees To Minimize Transition Cost *[TASS]* 27
Afanasyev: Gorbachev on Verge of Dictatorship *[Jerusalem Radio]* 27
Shatalin: Gorbachev Will Never Backtrack *[Paris LE FIGARO]* 28
Shevardnadze Role in Foreign Policy Assessed *[Moscow TV]* 29
Volovets on Shevardnadze Resignation *[Paris PARIS MATCH]* 30
Group Appeals for Aid to Russian Culture *[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA No 51]* 31
General Lizichev Reviews 'Complicated' 1990 *[Moscow International]* 32
Academics Interviewed on 1990 Reforms *[Moscow International]* 32
Yanayev Receives Credentials of New Ambassadors *[TASS]* 35
Trade Union Council Meets Discusses Property 35
  Official on Shifting Trade Ties *[TASS]* 35
  Property Deemed 'Indivisible' *[TASS]* 35
  More Pay for Teachers Sought *[TASS]* 35
Deputy Speaks on People's Desire for Order *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 25 Dec]* 36
U.S. Funding for Soviet Groups Detailed *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 26 Dec]* 37
Politburo's Dzasokhov Meets Newspaper Workers *[Moscow TV]* 38
Leningrad Reporter Nevzorov on Working Methods *[NEPSZABADSAG 29 Dec]* 38
Conflicting Views on Dropped TV Feature *[IZVESTIYA 30 Dec]* 39
Official 'Persecution' of TV Shows Denied *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 22 Dec]* 39
TRUD Reportedly on 'Verge of Bankruptcy' *[Moscow International]* 40
Officials Leave OGONEK Magazine *[Moscow TV]* 40
Radio Station To Have TV Slot, Change Name *[Moscow Radio]* 41
Leningrad State Ownership Fund Announced *[Moscow Radio]* 41
Encyclopedia Britannica To Publish in USSR *[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA 22 Dec]* 41
Press Law Shortcomings Analyzed *[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA 22 Dec]* 41
TV Chief on New Look for 1991 Broadcasting *[IZVESTIYA 31 Dec]* 42
Railways Minister Evaluates Latest 5-Year Plan *[Moscow Radio]* 43
Some Republics Declare 7 January Holiday *[Moscow Radio]* 43
Comparison of USSR Presidential Decree 44
Comparison of Kryuchkov TV Statement 44

Economic

KGB Finds Large Stocks of Medicines at Depot *[Moscow TV]* 44
Stalled Freight in Moscow Investigated *[IZVESTIYA 24 Dec]* 45
Newspaper's Position on Food Shortages Viewed *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 21 Dec]* 46
Regional Food Supply Variations Noted *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 15 Dec]* 47
Moscow Meat Price Ceilings Challenged *[IZVESTIYA 23 Dec]* 47
Crime in Cooperative Sector Increases *[PRAVDA 2 Jan]* 48
Petrakov on Currency Reform, 'Hard' Ruble *[TRUD 27 Dec]* 48
Aid to USSR Called Investment in Future *[TRUD 19 Dec]* 50
Kucherenko Discusses Union Budget *[Moscow TV]* 51

Agricultural

Stroyev Interviewed on Agrarian Policy *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 20 Dec]* 52
Early December Weather, Crop Conditions Eyed *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 14 Dec]* 56
Yaroslav Farms Show Ongoing Reform Problems *[Moscow TV]* 56

Military

Navy Reports Budget Constraints *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 Dec]* 57
Decision on Officers Carrying Guns Explained *[IZVESTIYA 31 Dec]* 59
Kazakh Official Quashes Nuclear Test Rumors *[IZVESTIYA 28 Dec]* 59
New Kiev Military District Commander Interviewed *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 23 Dec]* 59

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

Troops in Baltics Condemn Anti-Army 'Campaign' *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 23 Dec]* 61
Baltic Statement on USSR Talks, Army Tension *[Tallin Radio]* 61
Yeltsin Cited on Estonia-Russia Relations *[Tallinn Radio]* 61
Soviet Troops Occupy Party Presses in Riga *[AFP]* 61
    'Black Beret' Troops Involved *[Stockholm Radio]* 62
Three More Explosions Reported in Riga *[Riga Radio]* 62
Rights of War Veterans Threatened in Latvia *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 25 Dec]* 63
New Latvian Journal To 'Seek Compromise' *[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH 24 Nov]* 63
Latvian Party Newspaper Editors Named *[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH 28 Nov]* 63
Landsbergis Views Possible Military Resistance *[Vienna PROFIL 31 Dec]* 63
Lithuania Drops Condition for Moscow Talks *[IZVESTIYA 31 Dec]* 65
Lithuania Adopts State Control Department Act *[Vilnius Radio]* 65
Klaipeda Party Official Discusses Union Treaty *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 16 Dec]* 65
Lithuanian Labor Party Official on Treaty *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 Dec]* 66
Snieckus Considers Separation From Lithuania *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 19 Dec]* 67
Australian Minister Affirms Soviet Lithuania *[TASS]* 69
Popularity of Lithuania's Prunskiene Asserted *[Moscow International]* 69

RSFSR

Yeltsin Hopes for Stabilization in New Year *[Moscow Radio]* 69
Yeltsin Appeal to Russians Abroad Reviewed *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 28 Dec]* 70
RSFSR Premier Meets With UK Ambassador *[TASS]* 71
Silayev Congratulates Literary Prize Winners *[TASS]* 71
RSFSR Finance Minister Views Resignation *[IZVESTIYA 28 Dec]* 72
RSFSR Foreign Minister Discusses Role *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 26 Dec]* 73
Dagestan's Reshulskiy Ponders Union Treaty *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 Dec]* 75
Russian Front Leader on Takeover of Power *[Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET 22 Dec]* 76
RSFSR-DPRK Cooperation Agreement Signed *[Moscow International]* 76
Council Lifts White Sea Coast Border Zone *[Radio Rossii]* 77
Tatar Official Sabirov Arrives in Turkey *[Ankara TV]* 77
Tatar Republic Restores Contacts With Turkey *[Moscow International]* 77

- Gasoline Shortage Causing Problems in Far East *[Moscow Radio]* 78
- Russian Unions Council Issues Economic Appeal *[Moscow Radio]* 78
- RSFSR Economic Crime Figures Examined *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 51]* 78
- Leningrad Soviet Discusses Transportation *[Moscow Radio]* 79
- Yelnikovo Rail Disaster Investigation Continues *[IZVESTIYA 30 Dec]* 79
    - Station Partially Reopened *[Moscow TV]* 79
- Central Caucasus TV Transmitter Commissioned *[Moscow Radio]* 80
- Kamchatka TV To Begin Broadcasting *[Moscow TV]* 80
- Leningrad TV Company To Begin Transmission *[Moscow Radio]* 80
- New Murmansk Paper's First Issue Appears *[Moscow Radio]* 80

Western Republics

- Belorussia, Ukraine Conclude Relations Treaty *[IZVESTIYA 31 Dec]* 80
    - Officials Comment *[Moscow Radio]* 81
- Belorussian Foreign Minister Interviewed *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 27 Dec]* 81
- Grodno International Phone Exchange Commissioned *[Minsk Radio]* 83
- Draft Law on Belorussian Enterprises Published *[cross-reference]* 83
- Ukraine To Tighten Commodity Prices Policy *[IZVESTIYA 30 Dec]* 83
- Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Adopts Militia Law *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 23 Dec]* 83
- Ukraine's Kravchuk Views Union Treaty *[Kiev International]* 83
- Communists in Ukrainian Soviet Criticized *[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA 9 Dec]* 84
- 'Democratic Forces' Congress Formed in Ukraine *[Kiev Radio]* 85
- Chernobyl Plant Unaffected by Nearby Explosion *[IZVESTIYA 31 Dec]* 85

Caucasus

- Georgian Supreme Soviet Adopts Deficit Budget *[IZVESTIYA 30 Dec]* 85
- Georgia's New National Guard Status Viewed *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 23 Dec]* 86
- NKAO Deputy Welcomes Gorbachev Remarks *[ARMENPRES]* 86
- New Armenian Party First Secretary Views Role *[PRAVDA 23 Dec]* 86
- New Armenian Government Appointments Reported *[HAYASTAN 8 Dec]* 89
- Azerbaijan KGB Chief on Economic Sabotage *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA 26 Dec]* 89
- Azerbaijan Legislative Election Results Released *[TASS]* 90
- Nakhichevan Supreme Assembly Meeting Detailed *[Baku Radio]* 90

Central Asia

- Turgay Oblast Soviet Meets, Elects Leaders *[Alma-Ata Radio]* 90
- Dzhezkazgan Obkom Elects New First Secretary *[Moscow Radio]* 90
- Kazakhstan TV To Begin Satellite Transmissions *[TASS]* 91
- Government To Lift Dushanbe Curfew 1 Jan *[Moscow Radio]* 91
- Tajik President Signs Leasing Law *[Moscow Radio]* 91
- Tajik Law on Associations Valid 1 Jan *[Moscow Radio]* 91
- Background to Legislative Elections Reviewed *[PRAVDA 12 Dec]* 91

Journalist Visits Nuclear Weapons Facility

91UM0220A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Dec 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel O. Falichev: "'Los Alamos' Near Nizhniy Novgorod"]

[Text]. Azarmas-16—Moscow—**For decades there has been an opposition between the U.S. nuclear laboratory at Los Alamos and its unknown analog in the USSR. We now relate certain information for the first time.**

One might say we have gradually become accustomed to glasnost, and sometimes we fail to take note of dynamic activity in the opening up of our society. After material came out on the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test facility (10 Nov 90), I remember thinking to myself—wouldn't it be nice if we could visit not just the explosion site, but the place where our atomic bombs are manufactured? To talk with scientists and employees and find out what problems the people are having who acquired for our state strategic parity with the United States.

Such an opportunity recently presented itself.

The train left Kazan Station on schedule at precisely 2100 and we were at our destination by morning. I must say, I have never arrived like this at any city. When the conductor announced our arrival, I looked out the window. In a wall to the right and left stood... forest. There were no train station structures, not even a platform. Just a guard with automatic weapon by the tracks, and a little farther up, an access control point.

Up until very recently, this small paramilitary town called Arzamas-16 was a top secret site. I might add that today it is far from being open to all. For it is right here in the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Experimental Physics (VNIIEF) that, figuratively speaking, our nuclear programs materialize. Our first atomic bomb was created here, then the hydrogen bomb. Many, many unique technological achievements and scientific projects were born here.... And so we must not only talk about the institute, but about the multipurpose scientific research center which has been represented by such prominent scientists and physicists as Academicians I. Tamm, Ya. Zeldovich, A. Sakharov....

For many years, unfortunately, we did not know to whom we owed the parity achieved. The necessary super-secrecy of that time in that regard was evidently not limited to what would stand us in good stead. But what's done is done. I do not set for myself the task of digging into the past. It is far more important, I believe, to try to answer the question: What is the institute today, and does the country need it? Because there is some doubt on this score, particularly on the part of certain radically oriented deputies at various levels. What are their conclusions?

This institute constitutes the leading enterprise engaged in the development of nuclear ammunition for all branches of the military. It bears responsibility for their modernization and improvement, impossible without actual testing. And so, with its closure or conversion, the need to conduct nuclear-burst testing fades away. Such logic is not void of justification. It coincides with the principles espoused by activists of the anti-nuclear movement: It is enough to unilaterally put an end to atomic bursts, to show a good example, and everyone will follow along behind us in the end.

One might welcome such a daring and simple approach. But actuality shows us that such hopes are as naive as they are illusory, unfortunately. I am not about to recall when, how many times, and why our testing facilities were silent, how many appeals were made to the U.S. Government, including on the level of people's diplomacy. Alas, they didn't want to listen to us. Not the United States, nor France, nor England, nor China.

But is it possible that one of these countries, that very same America let us say, plans to do this in the near future?

A program for nuclear armaments modernization has been drawn up and approved by the U.S. Congress at a cost of $81 billion. One of its sections states: over the course of more than 40 years, American nuclear forces have been the cornerstone of safeguarding security in the free world.... In any case, in the future, as it was in the past, the arsenal of nuclear weapons must be developed dynamically. Our modern level of knowledge, as rich as it is, cannot guarantee the required level of security in the absence of nuclear testing. As we can see, future prospects diverge greatly from our hopes and the Los Alamos laboratory is to play an important role in this program. Can we fail to take this into account?

"If we fall behind the Americans, it will simply be impossible to catch up," director V. Belugin of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Experimental Physics believes. "I recall that when we asked the Japanese how far we were behind them in electronics, the answer given was 'forever.' Isn't this why in our time we have come to call electronics and cybernetics pseudosciences?"

Professor I. Sofronov, doctor of physics and mathematical sciences, F. Gudin, deputy chief designer for testing, A. Pavlovskiy, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and other scholars have spoken with anxiety concerning U.S. projects on third-generation nuclear weapons. All agree that if the Americans implement SDI and deploy weapons in space, strategic parity will be destroyed and we will deprive ourselves of the opportunity to issue an appropriate response. They stress, therefore, that they can hardly share Academician V. Goldanskiy's view that "full-scale testing, including nuclear-burst testing, is in no way necessary to check nuclear weapons reliability and safety," that mathematical modelling and computer calculations can replace this. How can discussion here proceed when our most powerful computers are an entire order of magnitude behind American computers in memory capacity and number of operations that can be performed per unit of time? This is a well-known fact. In spite of this, the Americans continue to conduct actual testing on a test range in Nevada.

This is why infringing upon the institute would put an end to the efforts of scientists for many years, would bury that which was created by generations of our finest minds and made us strong.

"We have noted a gap in a number of projects because of interruptions in our testing," states R. Ilkayev, deputy chief designer, doctor of physics and mathematical sciences. "People have simply started to leave...."

And really, how can you not leave when the average wage at the institute is not all that high, and cooperatives are immediately offering 600 rubles and more. Whereas before, the almost continuous residence "behind the barbed wire" was compensated for by certain benefits, now, deplorable as it may be, the town has even introduced coupons for... matches.

Let me emphasize that I too am in favor of reduced expenditures for defense, for conversion—including of institutes such as this. But on a basis of adequacy, and taking into account the possible consequences. I have been told of how it was initially proposed to turn this most unique scientific research center into hardly more than scrap and samovars. Yes—to tear down, not to build. Thank God they looked into the matter and came to understand what benefit the institute can provide the economy. And it is already doing so. Here are some examples.

Ten percent of the institute's capacities—and therefore its production output—constitutes consumer goods. And we are not talking about samovars, but products one need not be ashamed to put on the world market and sell for currency. A well-known Soviet ophthalmologist spent considerable funds to acquire complex instruments from abroad, including instruments for measuring the radius of curvature of the cornea. But it turns out they still did not fully meet his requirements. At his request, the institute devised in a short period of time a cheaper and more reliable instrument which can scan the cornea using a laser beam. Today this instrument can be sold successfully on the domestic as well as the world market. The impulse graphite reactor, used in modelling accidental processes and creating safe nuclear energy, has gained world recognition. At a Belorussian request, mobile ecological laboratories and dosimeters have been developed and are being produced. On the order of the Kuybyshev State Bearing Plant, we have a unique device for quality-control monitoring of the surface of ball bearings in the atmosphere.... There are agreements with the Volga Motor Vehicle Plant and other firms and enterprises of the country. A great deal of the production and technology here has "know-how" [rendered in English transliterated into Russian] status; i.e., it is especially unique.

I do not know who or how, but I believe that with the general collapse and chaos we see in the economy, scientific production complexes such as this will provide a stimulus to rebuilding the country's economy and assist in effecting technological breakthroughs.

Then too, this will depend to a great extent on our youth. Unfortunately, whereas previously graduates of the finest institutes of higher education desired to go to Arzamas-16, the situation today is different. But without a stream of young cadres, without continuity, how can we even talk about maintaining school and tradition?

"Physics is an experimental science," stated academician Yu. Khariton, permanent science director of the institute, as we said goodbye. "And without continuity, nothing can be achieved here."

These words from the elder of atomic scientists perhaps best of all reflect the essence of the problem, which must be resolved not on impulse, but on deep reflection, proceeding from the interests of our state and its security.

Commentary Criticizes New UK Nuclear Weapon

LD2712223490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 27 Dec 90

[Aleksandr Malikov commentary]

[Text] The cold war has ended. However, not all the old attitudes have disappeared with it into the past. The British idea of nuclear deterrence seems to be getting a new lease of life. Listen to what our correspondent, Aleksandr Malikov, has to say.

[Malikov] The British newspaper THE INDEPENDENT has reported on the government's plans to begin equipping its nuclear forces with tactical air-to-surface missiles [TASM]. In theory these are supposed to be the replacement in the British nuclear arsenal for the nuclear bombs carried aboard Tornado aircraft. British military experts claim that there will be fewer nuclear warheads on the TASM than the nuclear bombs that there were before. But, as always, they fail to mention the main point—that the power and accuracy of these warheads are incomparably greater.

Now, the question arises, who will supply these missiles? The Americans have two systems. There is also a joint program for a similar Anglo-French system on the drawing board. The choice is eventually most likely to fall on the Anglo-French missile since the Americans have already let it be understood that, because of treaty commitments, they will be obliged to review their promises on the supply to London of other nuclear weapon systems in addition to the Trident-2 missiles. Incidentally, THE INDEPENDENT reported that Britain also intends to continue its program for the deployment of Trident missiles. The final decision on the deployment of the TASM's in Europe is to be made at a NATO meeting at the beginning of next year. This decision, if it is made, will have to be endorsed by the new cabinet.

Representatives of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament are against the plans to deploy TASM's. They say the plans contradict the agreement on the reduction of intermediate-range missiles in Europe and undermine the atmosphere of trust. The Labour Party will also oppose these plans if Great Britain decides to go ahead unilaterally and deploy the TASM's only on its own territory. They regard this as a manifestation of the cold war mentality.

Well, shadows from the past are still capable of emerging from the gloom and casting a cloud over the new day in Europe. Despite the changes on the continent some Western politicians have not lost the habit of keeping an axe under the counter, even if this axe is a nuclear one.

Vasilyev Answers Reader's Criticism on CFE Treaty

PM0101120591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Dec 90 Second Edition p 6

[Article by own political observer Gennadiy Vasilyev under the "Observer to Reader" rubric: "Behind the Treaty"—first two paragraphs are reader's letter]

[Text] "After reading the Treaty on Reducing Conventional Armaments in Europe, published by you, I think that it was concluded to our country's detriment. The treaty was concluded betweeen groups of states belonging to NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but the Warsaw Pact effectively exists on paper only, as the countries belonging to that organization will be leaving it, if not today, then tomorrow. Therefore the number of USSR armaments should be equal to the number of NATO armaments. I would also note that NATO is planning a qualitative rearming of its forces, which actually means a continuation of the arms race.

[Signed] "V. Kazakov, Irkutsk."

Indeed if a complete disintegration of the Warsaw Pact armed organization does take place, there will be a mismatch produced between the levels of conventional arms we have and those in the West—and not to our advantage. In terms of tanks, for example, the ceiling for NATO will be 20,000, for the USSR (without the other Warsaw Pact countries) 13,300; in terms of combat armored vehicles 30,000 and 20,000 respectively... and so forth. This happened, I assume, because when it was decided to set identical levels for the two military-political alliances—and this process took quite a few years—no one could foresee the changes which have recently occurred in East Europe. So that at the final stage, when the draft treaty was virtually drawn up, the question for us was as follows: Either adopt the agreed levels or insist on their being revised, which would in actual fact have meant new and possibly very protracted talks.

I think that we acted correctly in signing the treaty, as do our military (I can cite Lieutenant General F. Ladygin's PRAVDA interview, 7 December 1990); the armaments "allocated" to us will be perfectly adequate for defense, and our new military doctrine is based precisely on this. I think that all international agreements need to be seen in the overall context of the changing political and military-strategic situation in the world. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is only part of the disarmament process that has developed in recent years. The Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles is now almost fulfilled. It is planned that the USSR and U.S. presidents will sign a treaty on a 30-percent reduction in strategic offensive armaments next February. The process of reducing armed forces in Europe will not end with the concluded treaty. There is already an understanding between the sides on Vienna-2—talks at which questions of further reducing levels of military confrontation on the continent will be studied. The Soviet Union considers that it is time to expand the talks.

It is very important to see the whole picture when evaluating agreements in the military sphere. I am thinking of the new political reality developing in the world: the end of the cold war, the move from confrontation to cooperation, and the creation of new security structures in Europe. Simple arithmetic—who has more tanks—is giving way to the higher mathematics of new political thinking, according to which our world is one and indivisible, the security of some peoples cannot be built at the cost of the security of others, and a country's social and economic health is becoming the main element of a state's power.

Of course, reader V. Kazakov is right when he says that it will be necessary some day to address the problem of limiting or even banning the qualitative improvement of armaments rather than just quantitative reductions. I think that the present accords on eliminating already-existing armaments serve as a way of approaching the solution of this task, since they narrow the sphere of the arms race.

United States & Canada

Gorbachev Sends New Year's Greetings to U.S.

LD3112121490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1122 GMT 31 Dec 90

[Text] Moscow, 31 Dec (TASS)—USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev has sent a New Year's message to the American people. It says:

"Estemed citizens of the United States of America!

On behalf of the Soviet people, I send you New Year's greetings. The year 1990 is over, and with it, the 80's. They have been full of events of enormous importance. The cold war has gone. Gone, too, is the direct threat of nuclear disaster. Horizons of peace have begun to open. Europe, together with the United States and Canada, has been first to take advantage of this by collectively agreeing on how it will enter the 21st century.

Much has yet to be completed. Many questions still worry both Europeans and Asians, everyone in this world—in a world awakened to the quest for its future. The nations and states have moved toward new shores. That path will not be without danger or pain. At its very beginning this world community is facing a serious test—aggression in the Persian Gulf. It must find in itself the strength to overcome it in such a way as not to wreck the movement, which has begun, toward a peaceful period of civilization.

The main thing now, at this turning point in history, is to achieve a firmer realization that only by joint efforts, only through cooperation and by taking account of the mutual dependence of interests, can we expect progress and security for all, and therefore also for ourselves.

The many encouraging things which have occurred in the world during these years and in the outgoing year are connected with the improvement in Soviet-American relations. The trust and mutual understanding between the leaderships of our two states have led to an improvement in the international situation. "I will soon meet again with President George Bush, and I am confident that it will strengthen the constructive beginning of our relations even more. Not all the old obstacles have been eliminated. Economic and scientific-technical ties still do not meet with the spirit of the times. Nevertheless, Soviet-American interaction is gaining an ever more reliable basis in contacts between the peoples. In the past it was only our politicians, and sometimes sportsmen, who went to each other's countries. Now, the mood is changing in the business world. Contacts between business people have become regular. Those in the military are conducting a dialogue in a frank manner. Trips by scientists, performers, artists, and writers, and just travel itself are becoming the norm. We have begun to get to know each other better. That is why a beneficial feeling of solidarity is emerging.

The past year has been a hard one for the Soviet people. But this has been a year of fundamental changes in society, and a year of the most difficult, but the most necessary decisions. They will enable our great country—and it will remain great—to overcome the crisis situation and march confidently along the path of steady democratic progress.

Life for us all now is no carefree stroll.

In greeting the citizens of America, I wish you a happy New Year, and I wish you success in everything you do, prosperity to your families, and peace to your great country."

China

Defense Ministry Notes Yazov PRC Visit Plans

OW2612143490 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1000 GMT 26 Dec 90

[Text] Marshal Yazov, Soviet minister of defense, is planning to visit China next year, said Khuzhokov, chief of the External Relations Directorate of the Soviet Defense Ministry and a rear admiral, in an interview with TASS.

Power Engineering Contracts Signed With PRC

LD2812185890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 28 Dec 90

[Interview with N. Solovyev, USSR ambassador to PRC, by correspondent V. Kulikov; place and date not given; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] On the basis of an intergovernmental agreement between the Soviet Union and China, a contract for assistance in construction of a thermal power station with two 800-Megawatt power sets in Suizhong has been signed in Beijing.

[Kulikov] This is one of the biggest such construction projects ever to have been built on Chinese soil. It is not the first contract in the field of power engineering concluded between our countries on the threshold of the new year 1991. Yesterday a contract for construction of a powerful thermal power station in Yingkou was signed. Next will be an agreement on building a powerful power engineering project in Inner Mongolia. The total sum for these and other projects for which contracts have already been concluded has reached over two billion "Swiss francs.

The very geography of these joint projects says a lot. They are being built in the country's industrial heartland, in northeast China. The putting into operation of these power stations, whose construction will be completed in 1994-95, will provide a stimulus for development of this region that neighbors our country. That means that all-round Soviet-Chinese ties will develop even more vigorously. I can foresee the doubts of the skeptics—after all similar major projects were built by us before in our neighboring country. Is this not a return to the old practice, whereby we sometimes forgot about our own house while building for neighbors?

[Solovyev] Well, if you take the results for this year, we are just summing up the results for this year, our trade will exceed something like three billion foreign currency rubles [R]. That is quite a solid amount. If you compare it with our trade with China that existed 10 years ago, then it came to R200 million, so you can imagine what a breakthrough has been made in our trade-economic ties.

Easing Tensions Between China, Taiwan Viewed

OW3012082590 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0700 GMT 28 Dec 90

[By station commentator Mikhaylov; from the "Asia Affairs" program]

[Text] Taibei [Taipei] will make a decision before the end of May, 1991 on the question of ending the state of hostility with Beijing that was declared more than 40 years ago. This was announced recently by Li Denghui [Li Teng-hui], leader of the Taiwan authorities.

Mikhaylov, our station commentator, points out that people will view Li Denghui's announcement as another step toward easing the tense situation across the Taiwan Strait. Observers have discovered that both sides recently have intensified their efforts in this respect. Both Beijing and Taiwan favor the reunification of the nation. They lack an identical viewpoint on the reunification formula, however. Beijing has agreed to practice the principle of "one country, two systems" under which Taiwan would become a special administrative region under the rule of a unified China, and would be allowed to maintain, for a long time, its own social system, which is different from the mainland; possess its own military force; and send its representatives to participate in the work of the central government. Beijing also favors the development of mutual exchanges with Taiwan and holds that the establishment of trade, air, and shipping links would help consolidate understanding between the two sides and lay the foundation for opening negotiations between them.

Taibei, however, is putting forward another reunification formula: the principle of "one country, two regions." It also is demanding that Beijing promote the work of democratization and economic liberalization, renounce the idea of using force against Taiwan, and stop interfering in Taiwan's efforts to develop its international relations. At present, Taiwan is still practicing its "three no's" policy against the mainland; namely, no contacts, no talks, and no compromise. In the meantime, the change in Taibei's stand is bound to be noted. Not long ago, an organization designated to exclusively handle exchanges with Beijing was established in Taiwan. Taiwan has finally recognized the inevitability of holding negotiations with the mainland on reunification. Now, Taiwan has announced its intention to end the state of hostility that has been continuing for more than 40 years. In recent years, trade and economic exchanges between the two sides have developed rapidly and direct, bilateral trade volume has increased continuously. The investments in the mainland by Taiwan entrepreneurs have become bigger and bigger in scale. Some 1,000 enterprises have been incorporated in China with the participation of Taiwan capital reaching $1 billion in total value.

Beijing leaders have pointed out that it is the hope of all the people in the world that an early reunification will be realized across the straits. They also have expressed the belief that there are no external obstacles to national reunification. Nowadays, the majority of nations around the world support the concept of one China. These nations have established diplomatic relations with Beijing, while simultaneously maintaining their nongovernmental contacts with Taiwan for mutual benefit. The USSR also is following this stand.

Northeast Asia

Japanese Premier Notes 'Friendly' Relations

LD0101145691 Moscow TASS in English 1439 GMT 1 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondents Vadim Yegorov and Anatoliy Krasnov]

[Text] Tokyo January 1 TASS—"The establishment of stable friendly relations between Japan and the Soviet Union is in the interests of the Japanese people," Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu told a news conference here.

The prime minister particularly noted the historic importance of the forthcoming visit to Japan by President Mikhail Gorbachev.

"A peace treaty and the territorial issue are the most important issues in Soviet-Japanese relations. I am planning to call on the Soviet president to resolve these problems during his visit," Kaifu said.

He wished success to the Soviet people in implementing perestroyka tasks and said Japan was ready to render humanitarian assistance to the Soviet Union. At the same time, he recalled that the Japanese Government's course to "indivisibility of politics and economics" cannot be changed.

On the eve of the 21st century, Japan should offer its economic and technological knowledge in order to help establish new world order emerging after the cold war epoch, Kaifu said.

Speaking about his last year's visits to Eastern Europe, South East Asia and the Middle East, he noted that he "had a presentiment of Japan's great participaton in activities of the international community".

Taking this into account, the prime minister said he intended to pursue an active foreign policy in 1991 aimed to promote peace and prosperity on the planet. He said it is necessary to continue the policy of global partnership with the United States.

Speaking about prospects for a settlement in the Gulf, Kaifu called on the Iraqi leadership to use its last chance for a peace settlement, promising to render economic assistance to Iraq in this case. "Time has come to reach peace and prosperity in Asia," Kaifu said, noting the need to lessen tension in all regions of Asia, including the Korean peninsula and Cambodia.

Normalized Mongolian-Chinese Relations Praised

OW2712153890 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0700 GMT 26 Dec 90

[Commentary by station observer Mikhaylov]

[Text] We already have reported that representatives of China and Mongolia recently signed a scientific and technological cooperation plan for 1991-1992 in Beijing. Mikhaylov, an observer of this station, has the following comments on the event:

The document on scientific and technological cooperation between China and Mongolia in the near future is the result of a smooth development of Sino-Mongolian relations in the past year. A major event in the development of these relations was the visit to China by Ochirbat, chairman of Mongolia's People's Great Hural, in May. During his visit, both sides unanimously pointed out that the development of bilateral relations was stable and constantly progressing. Relations are developing on the basis of mutual benefit, equality, and independent of changes in the domestic political situation of either side.

The development of Sino-Mongolian relations has not always been smooth. Because of various reasons, the relations between the two countries had been frozen since the middle of the 1960's. The thaw in relations did not begin until the middle of the 1980's. In 1984, China and Mongolia completed marking of their approximately 4,600-km common boundary. In 1986, the two countries signed a long-term agreement and consular treaty, and restored airline service between Ulaanbaatar and Beijing. In 1988, the Mongolian foreign minister visited Beijing. In 1989, Beijing and Ulaanbaatar announced the complete normalization of bilateral relations. The development of Sino-Mongolian relations has been promoted to a great extent by the normailization of Sino-Soviet relations and by the withdrawal of a large number of Soviet troops from Mongolia, which began not long ago.

At present, China and Mongolia are constantly expanding their contacts in various fields. The development of Sino-Mongolian friendly relations not only conforms to the interests of the Chinese and Mongolian people, but also contributes to peace and stability in Asia and in the world as a whole, just as Ulaanbaatar and Beijing have pointed out.

Near East & South Asia

Envoy to Iraq Leads 'Peace Mission' to Baghdad

LD3112124190 Moscow TASS in English 1218 GMT 31 Dec 90

[Text] Nicosia December 31 TASS—The delegation from the Soviet legislative committee for the affairs of soldiers-internationalists arrived on a peace mission in Iraq on Sunday, reports reaching here say. The delegation includes USSR people's deputies Rizoali Odzhiyev, Ruslan Aushev and Aleksandr Kolodeznikov.

The delegation was met by members of the commission on Arab and international relations of Iraq's National Council (legislature) led by commission chairman 'Adil 'Abdallah, Soviet Ambassador to Iraq V.V. Posuvalyuk and other officials.

The delegation is expected to meet today Iraqi National Council chairman Sa'di Mahdi Salih.

Changed Relations With Iraq Viewed

LD2912232290 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2030 GMT 29 Dec 90

[Video Report from Baghdad by unidentified correspondent; from the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Aircraft fly empty into Baghdad from Moscow, as we have already said. They fly back again, though, with lots of passengers. These are primarily oilmen and other Soviet specialists, who are now being evacuated. We felt quite at home at Baghdad airport that day: a Soviet is very easily recognized abroad.

Muhammad Salih, Iraqi minister of trade, told us that the Soviet Union's decision to join in the economic sanctions, and later the ultimatum, against Baghdad, was extremely unexpected for Iraq. Iraq long enjoyed close cooperation with our country. Incidentally, in Iraq we seemed everywhere to be seeing the characteristics of our own system—from the cult of the supreme leader to our propaganda ruses and our terminology.

Previously, Muhammad Salih says, the USSR was a mighty buttress in the struggle against America. The Soviet Union and Iraq were close allies. We still have a cooperation treaty. The sanctions against Iraq have had a negative impact first and foremost on the Soviet Union, since Baghdad cannot now fulfill its debt obligations. Experts estimate Iraq's debts to us as $10 billion: the Iraqis mockingly point out that this is almost exactly as much as we are currently borrowing abroad.

There was an interesting mutual understanding between Baghdad and Moscow: Iraq obtained weapons and used them to fight against Iran. Iraq responded by being probably the only Muslim regime to maintain a shamed silence. Threatening now to use rockets to attack Israel, Iraq means the Soviet rockets in its possession.

By the time our cameraman had tired of filming the packing and re-packing of the goodies earned in Iraq, some Danes appeared in the departure lounge. They were seized in Kuwait, and now, five months later, had ceased to be hostages and were leaving for home. One really cannot deny Saddam Husayn's inventiveness, by the way: The majority of the hostages lived in the most chic hotels. Their lives were indeed endangered, but the fact that they were not in prison but in three-roomed luxury apartments put them in a rather comic situation.

Now for our specialists. Many of them do not want to leave Iraq. The philosophical question of the impermissibility of aggression frequently worries them less than the advantages of working abroad. The Iraqi customs officers know our weaknesses, and painstakingly examine the bundles, cardboard boxes and packages, removing video recorders, rolls of English fabric, and other useful things, on exit.

Mideast Envoys to USSR View Gulf Crisis

LD2812184190 Moscow TASS in English 1741 GMT 28 Dec 90

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Postanogov]

[Text] Moscow December 28 TASS—"The escalation of tension on Israeli-occupied lands makes prospects for settlement of the Palestinian problem distant and vague," Ambassador of the State of Palestine to the USSR Nabil 'Amr said at a round-table conference, held here today. Ambassadors from Arab countries to the Soviet Union, specialists in oriental studies, Soviet and foreign journalists attended.

Nabil 'Amr pointed out that the Gulf crisis, the deportation of Palestinians, the growth of Jewish emigration and the settlement of immigrants on Israeli-occupied lands are new factors destabilising the situation. Speaking about the Middle East crisis in general and its core, the Palestinian problem in particular, he supported a comprehensive settlement.

Soviet specialists in oriental studies believe that it is possible to use the Gulf crisis as a "basis for the settlement of the Middle East problem as a whole".

Political observer Eduard Volodin believes that the Gulf crisis should be settled without the participation of the United Nations, the United States and the Soviet Union. "This is the business of the Arab world," he said.

Nabil 'Amr and Eduard Volodin agree that the U.S. military presence will hardly promote the establishment of peace in the Middle East. Despite the variety of views, all participants in the round-table conference supported a peaceful political settlement to the conflict.

Iraqi Leader's Appeals for Talks With U.S. Eyed

PM2812192190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Dec 90 Union Edition p 1

["IZVESTIYA Press Service" report: "The Persian Gulf: Are Hopes of Peace Running Out?"]

[Text] According to a UPI report filed from Cairo, Saddam Husayn stated at a meeting with ambassadors of his country specially recalled from Washington and West European capitals that he wants "serious" talks with the United States. In the diplomatic circles of Arab countries this new appeal for dialogue by the Iraqi leader has received a mixed response. Some want to see it as evidence of a real desire to find a way out of the crisis that has been going on for almost five months now. Others regard it as another Saddam Husayn ruse. The Kuwaiti foreign minister in exile stated on Thursday that it is already "too late" for peace initiatives.

The U.S. State Department has recommended that its citizens evacuate from Sudan, Jordan, Bahrain, the United Arab Emitrates, Qatar, and the eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia and Mauritania "long before 15 January." A concentration of troops in regions adjoining the Israeli borders has begun in Jordan, according to foreign news agencies. TASS has reported from Washington the Pentagon's plans to immediately start vaccinating servicemen in case of bacteriological warfare. Britain has started the compulsory drafting of Army reservists for dispatch to the crisis region. B. Moskvichev, our correspondent in Brussels, reports that replacement crews for Belgium's naval minesweepers on combat duty in the Persian Gulf zone have just been transferred there from that country.

The buildup of U.S. troops in the conflict zone is going on at the same time. REUTER reports the dispatch there of a new assault formation, comprising two 2,200-strong brigades. UPI reports from Norfolk the dispatch there of the aircraft carriers America and Theodore Roosevelt with 15 support vessels and 16,000 servicemen.

As our correspondent S. Tosunyan has reported from Vienna, the Austrian newspapers are now keenly discussing the possibility of a new meeting between Austrian President Kurt Waldheim and Iraqi leader Saddam Husayn.

Saudis Plan To Increase Aid for U.S. Forces

LD3112142590 Moscow TASS in English 1352 GMT 31 Dec 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Yefremov]

[Text] Cairo December 31 TASS—Saudi King Fahd agreed at a meeting with U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle to increase Saudi financial aid for the upkeep of U.S. troops stationed in the kingdom, Radio Monte Carlo reported this morning.

Quayle, who arrived in Saudi Arabia on Sunday, requested Fahd and the Kuwaiti leaders to increase their appropriations for the upkeep of the multinational forces due to possible prolongation of their stay in the region.

The radio report does not specify the sum of additional contributions. It notes, however, that earlier Riyadh agreed to pay $9 billion for this purpose in addition to $3.9 billion allocated as a compensation to countries in the region, which suffered losses due to the crisis.

According to estimates of banking experts in Manama, Bahrain, oil revenues of Gulf countries (except occupied Kuwait) more than doubled this year as against last year thanks to price hikes for oil, totalling $70.5 billion. Saudi Arabia's revenues, however, amounting to $16 billion are less than its total losses and expenditures due to the crisis, which are estimated at $21 billion.

In addition, the Kingdom supplied gratis great quantities of oil and petroproducts to the multinational forces. Therefore, the Saudi budget will have a $6.6-billion deficit this year. Last year the kingdom's budget was also in the red.

Iraqi Linkage of Kuwait-Palestine Issues Cited

PM0101152191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Jan 91 Union Edition p 5

[Article signed "Palestinian Journalist Rami al-Sha'ir": "How Baghdad Looks After the Palestinians"]

[Text] Finding itself politically and economically isolated, Iraq is resorting to maneuvering and is attempting to use demagoguery to split the international coalition that has taken shape against the Arabs. Initially the Iraqi leaders asserted that that the aggression was in the interests of the people of Kuwait themselves, which is fundamentally absurd. Then it claimed that the aggression was in the interests of all Arabs, although most of the Arab world unequivocally condemns it. But when it became obvious that all these efforts did not stand up to criticism, the card which Baghdad regarded as its trump—the Palestinian card—was produced out of its sleeve.

If Baghdad had obtained this card in an honest game it might possibly be worth heeding it. But the history of Iraqi-Palestinian relations testifies differently. Back in the 70's attacks on many Palestinian leaders started to appear in the Iraqi press, following which the best Palestinian cadres working in various countries died in unexplained circumstances. Essentially the start of the present Iraqi leader's "reign" saw the start of the routing of the most effective centers of the PLO's political struggle, including the Fatah centers located on Iraqi territory. Fatah property was seized and not returned for many years. Instead Baghdad cultivated the groups that worked hardest to present the PLO in the international community's eyes as an organization of unprincipled terrorists.

Meanwhile, exploiting the presence of Palestinian fighters on Iraqi soil, Baghdad essentially made them hostages to its policy—especially deprived hostages at that, since they could find themselves—against their will—on the front line of a war to preserve the fruits of aggression in defiance of decisions by the world community. Furthermore the participation of Palestinians in a war on the aggressor's side would undermine the sympathy which people worldwide feel toward the fighters for genuine Palestinian interests.

Therefore, military support for Baghdad by Palestinians can be regarded as an act of political suicide. But it is by no means solely a question of the physical presence of Palestinians in the ranks of the Iraqi Army. It is a question of whether the Iraqi regime has the right to play the Palestinian card at all.

Let us start with the fundamental issue—the principles of international law. If Iraq is using the law of the strong to make territorial acquisitions, why should this law not also be used elsewhere? What would Palestinians' demands for an end to Israel's occupation of their lands look like then? Iraq's territorial ambitions cannot be encouraged since this would set a precedent enabling aggressive regimes to recarve recognized borders as they see fit.

Another illogical aspect of Baghdad policy is the attempt to directly link the Kuwait problem and the problem of the Palestinians. It is clear that all the conflicts in the Near East zone are certainly interconnected. But in these two conflicts the main connections are missing—the cause and effect connections—and therefore the solution of one can in no way be dependent on the solution of the other, particularly in the international situation that has taken shape. I described Baghdad's policy as illogical although it does have its own internal logic—the logic of the aggressor. Linking the Kuwait problem with a conflict of such complex dynamics and content as the Arab-Israeli conflict is an attempt to delay the elimination of the consequences of the Iraqi aggression. Furthermore, this linkage has a kind of attractiveness for the Palestinians and other Arabs who are weary of the Arab-Israeli conflict and want to find any way out—even an illogical one—of the situation that has developed.

Yet it is obvious that retarding one process means simultaneously retarding the other, and with serious consequences. Let us note that today the Arab-Israeli conflict, which the world community had moved very close toward resolving this year, has again receded into the background. This situation will hardly change until not only the consequences of the Iraqi aggression are eliminated but also a formula is found for security in the region under which a repetition of aggression will be ruled out.

I think that what I have said is sufficient for people to see how dangerous and lethal this game, in which Baghdad is trying to play the Palestinian card along with others, is for the Palestinian people and their national liberation movement. But the very fact that this is regarded as a trump card in this game suggests important and exceptionally serious conclusions.

First, the importance of the Palestinian factor in all Near East affairs is obvious. Therefore we Palestinians must not stand aside from what is happening. But our task today is to state clearly and unambiguously that we support an end to the occupation and the immediate restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty and independence. Only this will prove that we are adherents of the new political thinking and that we will be guided by these same principles in future movement toward a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Second, as part of the Arab world we must step up the efforts in the direction of a political settlement of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict and conduct a vigorous search for a formula of our own, an Arab formula, for getting out of the crisis. If the PLO leadership acts in precisely this way, Baghdad will have to heed the Palestinian people's voice. Because we are talking about preserving the security of the Near Eastern home, about a formula acceptable to the Arab world and the entire world community alike.

East Europe

Katushev, Bulgarian Counterpart Sign Trade Accord

AU2912154690 Sofia BTA in English 1415 GMT 29 Dec 90

[Text] Sofia, December 29 (BTA corr.)—Last night the ministers of foreign economic relations of Bulgaria and the USSR, Mr. Atanas Paparizov and Mr. Konstantin Katushev, signed an agreement on the countertrade between the two countries and an agreement on payments.

At a meeting with journalists Mr. Aleksandur Tomov, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria, said that next year Bulgaria's relations with the USSR in the economic sphere will be stabilized in the conditions of a stepped up transition to a market economy in the two countries, which will be a serious precondition for the realization of the economic reforms in Bulgaria. The possibilities for the promotion of the economic relations between the two countries are preserved.

Mr. Aleksandur Tomov pointed out that with the agreement they have signed the two countries will proceed to new principles in bilateral relations, both within the framework of centralized deliveries and within the framework of other payments—a gradual transition from payment in convertible rubles to market economy relations.

The meetings we had in Moscow have shown the consideration and the attitude of the Soviet leadership to the new Bulgarian Government. An agreement has been reached for the delivery of 6.5 million tons of Soviet oil next year, 1.5 million tons of which will be within the framework of a secondary agreement between organizations of the two countries and in exchange for Bulgarian goods. A transitional period will be introduced for the Bulgarian workers in the USSR till mid-1992.

The minister of foreign economic relations of the USSR Mr. Konstantin Katushev stressed that both countries have shown a desire to further and perfect their economic relations.

Mr. Aleksandur Tomov met Mr. Gennadiy Yanayev, vice president of the USSR and member of the Politburo of the CC of the CPSU. Both sides stressed that Bulgaro-Soviet cooperation should be restructured on the principles of complete equality, mutual benefit and recognition of the right of every people to a free choice.

The Bulgarian deputy prime minister, who is also deputy chairman of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Supreme Council, met Mr. Vladimir Ivashko, deputy secretary general of the CC of the CPSU. Both sides stressed that the CPSU and the BSP will continue to promote their cooperation on a business-like basis and free of the stereotypes of formalism.

West Europe

Nuclear Modernization in Britain Examined

LD2812223590 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 28 Dec 90

[Sergey Sayenko commentary]

[Text] The INDEPENDENT reports that the obsolete types of tactical weaponry will be replaced with new airbased missiles. These air-to-ground rockets are to substitute (?for nuclear) bombs numbering 700 in UK. British military experts claim that modernization will make it possible to cut down the number of nuclear warheads in Britain, but, as they often do, they make no mention of the most important point—the new warheads are much superior to the air bombs in yield and accuracy. (?So the) new airbased tactical missiles will be capable of reaching targets inside the territory of the USSR, although NATO'S military strategists prefer to keep silent about this.

It looks as if the modernization of Britain's tactical nuclear arsenal is a settled affair. What is not clear yet is who will supply these new weapons. Earlier this year there have been press reports that the supplier will be the United States, but now, as evidence suggests, the Americans have made it clear for their ally that due to contractual pledges to the USSR they will have to reconsider the promises to supply Britain, in addition to Trident-2 missiles. other systems of nuclear weapons. In this connection Major's cabinet is inclined to cooperate with France. Independent estimates say it will cost almost $2 billion for France and Britain to design a new tactical air-to-ground missiles. The final decision on siting new nuclear missiles in Britain is to be adopted at a conference of NATO early next year. If such a decision is adopted, it is to be endorsed by the new British Government and, as observers believe, Major's cabinet is not going to abandon plans to deploy new tactical weapons in UK, even dispite the fact that 60 percent of Britons, as a poll by CND [Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament] indicates, censure plans to site new nuclear arms in the country.

There is every indication that the world recognition that the cold war between the East and the West is over is not fully realized in NATO, nor obsolete notions have gone, otherwise what can explain the fact that the ideas to modernize Britain's nuclear potential seem to be taking effect? London's decision to acquire new missiles totally disagrees with the statements earlier made by the defense Ministry to cut the military budget. Britain's new step towards building up nuclear potential will hardly contribute to easing world tension and further bettering East-West relations.

Relations With Finland Viewed on Anniversary

LD3112120690 Moscow TASS in English 1139 GMT 31 Dec 90

[By TASS commentator Yuriy Mikhailov]

[Text] Moscow December 31 TASS—The 31st of December is a memorable date in the history of Soviet-Finnish relations. On this day in 1917, Vladimir Lenin signed the decree to recognise the state independence of the Republic of Finland. Three years later, the Russian Federation and Finland ratified the Tartu (Yuryev) Peace Treaty. The history of bilateral diplomatic ties has been counted exactly from the date of the ratification of this treaty.

There are few examples of relations demonstrating such a vitality and effectiveness in the history of world diplomacy. Actually, it is a unique phenomenon.

But to be more impartial and accurate, it should be recalled that over the 70 years of their existence, these diplomatic relations were suspended twice: in November 1939 in connection with the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish or the so-called Winter War (restored in March 1940) and in June 1941 after Finland entered the world war on the side of Nazi Germany. These relations were restored for the second time in August 1945 and the terms for their fundamental restructuring were defined.

The 1948 treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance laid the political groundwork for the present-day range of ties between the USSR and Finland. Actually, any long-standing and serious unresolved problems have never emerged in bilateral relations since then.

The treaty became the bedrock of Soviet-Finnish good neighbourliness and multifarious cooperation that does not hinge on swings in the international situation. President Mikhail Gorbachev's official visit to Helsinki in 1989 was a watershed event in relations between the two countries. The joint declaration— new thinking in action— signed there (all in all, over 30 bilateral agreements and documents were signed in Helsinki) defined the priorities in the USSR and Finland's actions in a variety of areas.

Personal contacts between the two countries' statesmen play an important role in Soviet-Finnish ties. Such contacts are maintained on the regular basis between the Soviet and Finnish foreign ministers.

Consultations along the line of the two countries' foreign ministries cover the widest range of international issues, which are most pressing to the two states. These are the processes of interaction and European integration, verification of the chemical weapons ban, U.N. peacekeeping operations, the ecology of the Arctic and others.

Having opted for peaceful cooperation, the USSR and Finland vigorously worked for international detente, mapped out the guideposts for the peaceful policy of eastern and western states and for building a common European home.

It was not by chance that Finland was chosen as the venue for the Soviet-U.S. summit in September, 1990. The term "the spirit of Helsinki" entered the lexicon of world politics.

The good neighbourly, sound and stable relations between the USSR and Finland became a political reality in modern-day Europe, which is of immense international importance.

Latin America & Caribbean

Draft 1991 Trade Agreement With Cuba Outlined

LD2612123990 Moscow TASS in English 1224 GMT 26 Dec 90

[Text] Moscow December 26 TASS—"Close economic ties between the Soviet Union and Cuba are an objective reality, a result of 30 years of cooperation. Breaking them may lead to negative consequences for both countries," Soviet specialists working in Cuba say in a letter published in the latest issue of the PRAVITELSTVENNY VESTNIK (GOVERNMENTAL HERALD) weekly.

Recalling that Cuba exports to the USSR a wide variety of goods and receives more than 70 percent of its imports from the Soviet Union, the authors stress the need to diversify bilateral trade and develop mutually beneficial economic cooperation.

Commenting on the letter, V. Benediktov, a secretary of the inter-governmental Soviet-Cuban Commission for Eonomic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation, writes that Soviet Government bodies are working to radically change economic relations between the two states. They have worked out a package of proposals on bilateral trade in 1991 to be put forward at forthcoming negotiations with Cuban partners.

According to the proposals, approved by the Presidium of the Soviet Council of Ministers, both countries will begin using current world prices to settle their payments in trade. Oil and petroleum products as well as other Soviet-made goods will be delivered in exchange for raw sugar, citrus fruits, nickel, cobalt and other products on a value-balanced basis.

"During negotiations on the transition to market relations in our cooperation and the discussion of the protocol on the turnover between the USSR and Cuba in 1991 we hope to reach an agreement on key issues," Benediktov said.

"We [words indistinct] sure they will lead not to the decline but to the expansion and perfection of mutually advantageous ties," he said.

Yazov Sends Greetings to Cuban Defense Minister

PM3112165590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Dec 90 First Edition p 1

[Message from USSR Defense Minister D. Yazov's congratulating Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro on Cuban national day; date not given]

[Text] To Comrade Army General Raul Castro Ruz, minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba

Personally and on behalf of the USSR Armed Forces I congratulate you and the personnel of the Revolutionary Armed Forces on the national holiday—Liberation Day.

Soviet people pay tribute to the heroic struggle of the Cuban people, who carried out the January 1959 revolution, and to their successes and achievements.

We are profoundly convinced that the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation between our countries' peoples and armies will continue to develop in the name of peace and progress.

We wish all Cuban servicemen new successes in their military labor in the interests of strengthening the defense capability of the Republic of Cuba.

[Signed] Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov, USSR minister of defense.

Dialogue With U.S. on Cuba, Emigres Continues

91UF0267A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Dec 90 Union Edition p 5

[Report on an interview with Jiri Valenta, director of the University of Miami Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, and Francisco Hernandez, president of the Cuban-American National Foundation, by IZVESTIYA correspondent Yevgeniy Bay in Moscow; date not given: "Miami-Moscow: The Dialogue Will Continue"]

[Text] Well-known Soviet and American diplomats, scholars, publishers, and journalists met this May in Miami, Florida. This was the brainchild of Jiri Valenta, director of the University of Miami's Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, who is of Czechoslovak extraction. He was supported by his Soviet colleagues from the United States and Canada Institute.

J. Valenta has now come to Moscow to take part in the preparation of the second round of the dialogue, which is planned to be held in the USSR. An IZVESTIYA correspondent met with him and Francisco Hernandez, president of the Cuban-American National Foundation (a Cuban emigre organization in Miami), who also acted as organizer and sponsor of the meeting.

[Bay] What, in your view, are the main results of the meeting in Miami and what do you expect of the new round in Moscow?

[Valenta] Two parties which had never previously been in contact met in Miami. Just five years ago, when I arrived there, having won a national competition to fill the office of director of the institute, Miami was the least suitable city for Soviet-American meetings. This was most likely fruit of the "cold war."

[Hernandez] The image of Florida among Soviet people had also been shaped to a large extent under the influence of Havana propaganda concerning the "gusanos"—saboteurs and terrorists (the mercenaries' Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 afforded the Cuban authorities grounds for this—Yevg. B.). Establishing relations with the United States, Soviet representatives would head for Washington, New York, Los Angeles, and Seattle. The South remained on the sidelines. Yet the state of Florida is fourth in the United States in terms of economic potential.

The first meeting on Florida soil showed that previously implacable enemies can find a common language. Beneath two flags alongside Cuban emigre leaders were prominent Soviet diplomats, scholars, and journalists. This was the fruit of the new political thinking displayed by the two parties. Ultimately we leaders of the Cuban-American National Foundation were running a certain risk also. True, during the meeting there were none of the expected pickets and boycotts, and there were few ringing articles in the press demanding no contacts with the Russians at all until they ceased helping Castro. We believe that 90 percent of Cuban emigres now support the development of relations with the USSR.

[Bay] A central topic at the meeting was that of regional conflicts, and the focal point thereof, the Cuban question, which gave rise to the parties' serious disagreements. It is perfectly obvious that if now categorical demands for an immediate termination of any Soviet assistance to Havana are heard once again, dialogue might not result. We are prepared to discuss any questions, but on a realistic basis.

[Valenta] The Soviet Union is a great country, which, it seems to me, will return in the 21st century to the positions of a superpower. We intend talking with you only as partners and should not demand or counsel anything. My concept is that the Soviet Union and the United States must come to some agreement on Cuba. Thus it was in the case of Nicaragua. Initially high-ranking representatives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the State Department agreed in general outline on a termination of any military assistance to the combatants, then this arrangement was consolidated by a decision of the heads of these departments. Of course, Cuba occupies a considerably greater place than Nicaragua in the USSR's foreign policy plans. But I am speaking of the actual principle and approach to a settlement of conflicts. The joint actions in Angola and Afghanistan also set a good example. The Cuban question should be a subject of negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

[Hernandez] We realize that Moscow and Havana are linked by strong interstate relations. We distinguish between economic and military assistance here, however. Economic assistance and cooperation are determined by the USSR Government and the Soviet people depending on their possibilities. Although we do not understand what global interests have in the final analysis brought about such a tremendous volume of subsidies. Soviet military assistance began in response to the aggressive actions of the United States against Havana in the 1960's. There is no danger of aggression against Cuba now. We believe that the two countries could perfectly well come to an arrangement as follows: the USSR suspends military assistance to Havana, and the United States officially gives assurances of its nonaggression.

[Valenta] The Soviet Union and the United States could interact. In line with a termination of Soviet military supplies, the United States could reduce its presence at the Guantanamo Base, winding down military maneuvers around the island. All this lends itself to agreement.

There is another sphere also—human rights. Without interfering in Cuba's internal affairs, we believe that the Cuban people have every right to obtain truthful objective information via Radio Marti and TV Marti. We have raised here and will continue to raise the question of the human rights situation on Cuba.

[Hernandez] Cuban emigres are not hatching any plans of forcible actions against F. Castro. We believe that Cuba also needs reforms and political and economic perestroyka, however.

[Bay] Aside from the Cuban issue, what further questions will be discussed at the Moscow meeting?

[Valenta] Questions of the United States' economic assistance to the Soviet Union. There are many businessmen in Florida among the sponsors of the dialogue who would like to establish business cooperation with the USSR. There are plans to build hotels in Moscow and other cities. There are proposals concerning food aid. The Cuban-American National Foundation has proposed medical assistance for Soviet children who were affected by the Chernobyl accident. We are specifying plans for air traffic. As you know, an Aeroflot representative was present at the meeting in Miami, and we agreed in principle that Aeroflot aircraft en route to cities of Latin America will make a stopover in Miami.

[Hernandez] Negotiations are more useful than ideological confrontation, which has gone on for more than 30 years. We believe that it is in the Soviet Union's interests to revise its attitude toward the Cuban emigres. There is no basis now for dislike and enmity. We would like to invite to this dialogue representatives of Havana also. We believe that Moscow is a good place for such negotiations.

Castro Seeks To Reduce Communist Party's Size

PM0101133991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Dec 90 Union Edition p 1

[TASS, REUTER, UPI roundup report: "F. Castro Statement"]

[Text] The Cuban leader F. Castro, speaking at a session of the National Assembly of People's Power, stated that the ruling Communist Party's Central Committee has turned into a bureaucratic monster and that its size must be reduced. In his words, two-thirds more people are working there than are needed. At the same time, F. Castro said that Cuba will never renounce the one-party communist system.

Congress of USSR People's Deputies

Congress Decisions, Resolutions Reported

Decision on Gulf Situation

LD2812213690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1840 GMT 28 Dec 90

[Text] Moscow, 28 Dec (TASS)—Below follows the text of the decision of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies regarding the Persian Gulf situation:

The congress expresses its grave anxiety over the current turn of events in the Persian Gulf.

The congress confirms that it supports the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, adopted after Iraq invaded Kuwait, and it especially stresses its adherence to the search for a peaceful settlement of the crisis in accordance with those resolutions. The congress urgently appeals to the Iraqi leadership and people to display a sense of high responsibility for the destiny of their motherland and for world peace, and to meet the demands of the world community which are based on the norms of civilized society and legality. Iraqi troops should leave Kuwait, and that country's independence and sovereignty should be restored.

The congress approves the political line and practical steps undertaken by the Soviet state leadership and the USSR Government in connection with the crisis in the Persian Gulf area, and the measures undertaken to guarantee security and to repatriate Soviet citizens from Iraq.

The congress firmly comes down in favor of the consistent continuation of efforts to achieve a political settlement of the crisis in the Persian Gulf and recommends that before the middle of January 1991 the USSR Supreme Soviet should examine the situation which is developing with regard to this problem.

The congress thinks it necessary for the state leadership to keep the USSR Supreme Soviet constantly informed about the development of events. Decisions, which in accordance with the USSR Constitution demand the approval of the highest legislative power, should be made only with the consent of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Signed] A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Moscow, the Kremlin, 27 December 1990.

Interim Resolution on Budget

PM2912165090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Dec 90 Second Edition p 1

[Text of "Congress of USSR People's Deputies Resolution 'On an Interim Agreement on Economic Questions for 1991 and the Formation of the Union and Republic budgets,'" adopted 27 December 1990]

[Text] 1. The USSR president's information regarding the preparation of an interim agreement on economic questions for 1991 and on the crisis situation prevailing with respect to drawing up the budgets of the Union and the republics is noted.

2. The USSR President and the Council of the Federation are instructed to complete this work by 10 January, with a view to ensuring the unfailing fulfillment of the congress decisions on the given question.

[Signed] A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The Kremlin, Moscow, 27 December 1990

Law on Nationwide Referendums

PM2812181190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Dec 90 Union Edition p 2

[Law adopted by Congress of USSR People's Deputies in Moscow on 27 December: "USSR Law on Nationwide Vote (USSR Referendum)"]

[Text] **Chapter I: General Provisions**

Article 1. Concept of nationwide vote (USSR referendum)

In the USSR the people exercise state power both through the soviets of people's deputies and directly, including by means of the referendum.

In this law a referendum is understood as the means whereby citizens of the USSR adopt by a nationwide vote laws of the USSR and other decisions on the most important questions of state life.

Article 2. Principles for holding a USSR referendum.

A USSR referendum is held on the basis of the following principles:

participation in the referendum is free;
the vote is voluntary and secret and is on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage;
USSR citizens take part in the vote directly and in person according to their place of residence;
each participant in the referendum has one vote.

Glasnost, including during the counting of votes, and the participation of the public are ensured when holding a referendum.

Article 3. Right to take part in USSR referendums

USSR citizens who have reached the age of 18 and who have the right to vote in accordance with USSR legislation may take part in USSR referendums.

Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of USSR citizens to take part in a referendum is intolerable and punishable by law.

Mentally ill citizens deemed incapable by a court, people detained in prison by a court sentence, and people with restrictive custodial measures in force against them under the procedure established by criminal procedure legislation may not take part in referendums.

Article 4. Questions put to a USSR referendum

Proposals on questions referred to USSR jurisdiction by the Union Treaty and USSR Constitution can be put to a USSR referendum.

The topic of a referendum can be:

1) the adoption of a new USSR law;
2) an alteration to or repeal of a USSR law or individual clauses of such a law;
3) the making of a decision which predetermines the basic content of USSR laws and other acts;
4) the ascertaining of public opinion on some very important issues within the authority of the USSR.

USSR referendums are held throughout the territory of the USSR.

When necessary a USSR referendum can be held in an individual territory.

The following questions are not put to a USSR referendum: the borders of the USSR and the borders of republics; a change in the status and territorial integrity of republics, autonomous oblasts, and autonomous okrugs; the ensuring of the state's defense and security; the adoption of extraordinary and urgent measures to safeguard public order and to protect the health and security of citizens; questions connected with the appointment and release of officials that are within the competence of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and USSR Supreme Soviet; and also questions concerning the fulfillment of commitments stemming from the USSR's international treaties.

Article 5. Right to schedule a referendum

The right to schedule a USSR referendum belongs to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and, in periods between congresses, to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The congress of USSR People's Deputies schedules a referendum on questions which, under the USSR Constitution, are exclusively within the authority of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

Article 6. Language of USSR referendum

In preparing and holding a USSR referendum the language of the republic, autonomous oblast, or autonomous okrug or the language of the majority of the population of a particular area and Russian—the official language of the USSR—are used.

Article 7. Financing USSR referendums

The preparation and holding of a USSR referendum scheduled by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet are paid for out of the budget.

Article 8. Legislation on referendums

Legislation on USSR referendums consists of the USSR Constitution, the present law, and the USSR Law "On the Election of USSR People's Deputies" insofar as it does not contradict this law or other USSR laws.

The procedure for holding republican and local referendums is defined by the laws of the USSR and the laws of the republics.

Chapter II: Preparation and Scheduling of a USSR Referendum

Article 9. Initiative for holding USSR referendums

The initiative to hold USSR referendums is exercised by:

citizens of the USSR;
the Congress of USSR People's Deputies;
the USSR Supreme Soviet;
the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities;
the USSR President;

The republics as represented by their supreme organs of state power.

Citizens of the USSR exercise the right to initiate the holding of a USSR referendum provided that a request for referendum is signed by at least 2 million citizens having the right to take part in referendums. Citizens of the USSR cannot initiate the holding of USSR referendums in individual territories.

Article 10. Action group for holding a USSR referendum

In the event that the initiative to hold a USSR referendum is being exercised by citizens, a group for holding the referendum is formed comprising at least 100 persons—the referendum action group. The action group list gives the family name, first name, and patronymic and the place of residence of each group member. The question to be submitted to a referendum must be precisely formulated by the action group so that an unambiguous answer may be given to it.

The referendum action group files with the Central Commission for USSR Referendums an application to register the question proposed for submission to a referendum. The question's formulation may be further edited for accuracy with the action group's consent.

The question proposed for submission to a USSR referendum, taking into account any conclusions by the relevant USSR Supreme Soviet committee or standing commission of either of its chambers or by action group members, is registered by the Central Commission for USSR Referendums. The relevant information and the address where signed petitions are to be forwarded are published in the newspaper IZVESTIYA SOVETOV NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR.

The formulation of the question proposed for submission to a USSR referendum is included in the petition form to be signed.

The referendum action group is issued with a registration certificate within 30 days of the day of application for registration. Registration may be refused only in cases when the requirements of this article or of Article 4 of this law are breached.

An appeal against refusal of registration may be filed by the action group with the USSR Supreme Court.

Article 11. Procedure and time limits for the collection of signatures

The referendum action group organizes the collection of citizens' signatures from the moment it receives the certificate of registration.

The collection of signatures is effected by citizens of the USSR having the right to vote.

Each petition form, indicating the family name, first name, and patronymic and the place of residence of the person collecting the signatures, must—prior to the start of the collection of signatures—be certified by the executive and administrative organ of the city, settlement, or rural soviet of people's deputies in the location where signatures will be collected not later than seven days from the moment the certificate of registration is presented. Uncertified petition form sheets are invalid.

The person collecting signatures need not present any other document, apart from the petition form, when collecting signatures. Each citizen is entitled to sign the petition form sheet only once. When doing so, the citizen presents his passport or other document attesting to his identity. The citizen's signature is accompanied by his family name, initials, place of residence, [identity] document details, and the date when the petition form sheet was signed.

Whenever necessary, the executive and administrative organ of the local soviet of people's deputies may verify the authenticity of citizens' signatures on petition form sheets.

The total time taken to collect signatures on the question of holding the referendum must not exceed three months from the day the referendum action group's certificate of registration is issued.

Article 12. Forwarding the petition forms and the final protocol on the results of the collection of signatures

The completed petition forms are forwarded to the referendum action group. The action group compiles summary data on the result of the collection of signatures and, not later than four months after the day its certificate of registration is issued, forwards the completed petition forms and summary data to the Central Commission for USSR Referendums.

The Central Commission for USSR Referendums verifies compliance with the provisions of Article 9 Paragraph 2 and Article 11 Paragraph 5 of this law and records the results of the collection of signatures in a final protocol. The request to hold a referendum and the final protocol on the results of the collection of signatures are forwarded to the USSR Supreme Soviet within 30 days from the moment the documents are received from the referendum action group.

Article 13. Inclusion of the question on the referendum in the agenda of a Congress of USSR People's Deputies or a USSR Supreme Soviet session

The Congress of USSR People's Deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet shall include the question of the referendum in the agenda of the next Congress of USSR People's Deputies or the next USSR Supreme Soviet session.

Article 14. Adoption of decision on a request to hold a USSR referendum

The Congress of USSR People's Deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet makes one of the following decisions on a request to hold a USSR referendum:

1) on setting a date for the referendum and backup measures for it;
2) on the need to adopt a law or other decision suggested in the request for the referendum without holding the referendum.

The Congress of USSR People's Deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet is empowered to turn down the request to hold a referendum only if the present law has been breached.

A decision on the question of a USSR referendum is adopted if more than one-half of the total number of USSR people's deputies at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies or more than one-half of the members of each USSR Supreme Soviet chamber in a USSR Supreme Soviet session vote in favor.

The Congress of USSR People's Deputies or USSR Supreme Soviet resolution on scheduling a USSR referendum gives the date when it is to be held, quotes the formulation of the question to be asked at the referendum as registered by the Central Commission for USSR Referendums for subsequent inclusion in the ballot paper, lays down the procedure for financing the referendum, and decides other questions associated with the holding of the referendum.

The resolution on holding the referendum, the draft USSR law, or the text of any other draft decision submitted to referendum are to be published by the press and other mass media not later than 10 days after the adoption of the resolution on holding a USSR referendum.

Article 15. Time limit for holding a USSR referendum

A USSR referendum is held not earlier than two months and not later than six months from the moment the Congress of USSR People's Deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet adopts a resolution scheduling it.

In exceptional cases, the Congress of USSR People's Deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet can set different time limits for holding a USSR referendum.

Chapter III: Procedure for Holding a USSR Referendum

Article 16. Guarantees of the right to participate in discussing proposals on questions of a USSR referendum

The state guarantees USSR citizens, political parties, mass movements, trade unions, other social associations, labor collectives, collectives of secondary specialized and higher educational institutions, and military servicemen's meetings in military units the right to unhindered campaigning for or against demands to hold a USSR referendum as well as for or against a draft law or other decision submitted to a referendum. On polling day no campaigning is allowed on the question submitted to the referendum.

The public discussion of proposals submitted to USSR referendums shall be conducted in accordance with the legislation on the procedure for the holding of meetings, rallies, street processions, and demonstrations.

The discussion may be suspended and the referendum postponed in the event of the introduction of a state of emergency in accordance with the USSR Constitution.

Local soviet executive and administrative organs and referendum commissions shall ensure that citizens and social associations are granted premises for the public discussion of proposals submitted to the referendum and shall help to notify citizens of such discussions.

Article 17. Commission for USSR Referendums

The following referendum commissions shall prepare and conduct the USSR referendum:

the Central Commission for USSR Referendums;
central republican commissions for USSR referendums;
precinct [uchastkovyy] commissions for USSR referendums;
district [okruzhnyy] commissions for USSR referendums may be formed in republics.

The powers of the Central Commission for USSR Referendums and the central republican commissions for USSR referendums shall be exercised respectively by the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of USSR People's Deputies and, by agreement with the republics, by the central electoral commissions of the republics.

Precinct referendum commissions shall be formed in the manner prescribed for the formation on the corresponding electoral commissions for the election of USSR people's deputies.

Article 18. Powers of the commissions for USSR referendums

The Central Commission for USSR Referendums shall determine the time of the vote, monitor the execution of the present law and ensure its uniform application throughout USSR territory, when necessary make representations to the USSR Supreme Soviet on the interpretation of provisions of this law, direct the activity of referendum commissions, distribute money among them, determine the form of the ballot paper and registers of voters taking part in the nationwide vote and other documents, summarize the results of referendums, determine the procedure for the storage of documents, and exercise other powers in accordance with the present law and other USSR laws.

The central republican commissions for USSR referendums monitor the execution of the requirements of the present law, direct the activity of inferior referendum commissions, and count the votes on the respective territory and report the results to the Central Commission on USSR Referendums.

District referendum commissions organize the activity of precinct commissions, verify that the registers of citizens entitled to take part in the referendum are correct, determine the results of the voting in a district, and exercise other powers to ensure the observance of the present law.

In the manner prescribed by the USSR Law "On Elections of USSR People's Deputies," precinct referendum commissions shall compile registers of citizens entitled to participate in referendums, settle related questions, notify citizens of polling day, ensure the preparation of premises for voting and organize the voting in precincts on polling day, and report the results of the vote to the district referendum commission (if one has been formed) or the central republican commission on USSR Referendums.

The decisions of referendum commissions adopted within the limits of their powers shall be binding on all state and social organs, enterprises, institutions and organizations, officials, and citizens.

Article 19. Ensuring the conditions for the activity of USSR referendum commissions

The chairman, deputy chairman, secretary or a member of the referendum commission as decided by that commission may be released during the period of preparation and holding of the USSR referendum from production or official duties and retain average pay provided out of the resources allocated for holding the referendum.

State and social organs, enterprises, institutions, organizations, and officials are obliged to assist referendum commissions in the exercise of their powers and grant in the prescribed manner the premises, equipment, information, and materials needed for their work.

Article 20. Lists of citizens having the right to participate in a USSR referendum

All citizens living on the territory of an electoral precinct at the time the lists are compiled are included on the lists of citizens having the right to participate in a USSR referendum. Lists of servicemen stationed in military units, as well as members of servicemen's families and other persons if they live in regions where military units are stationed, are compiled on the basis of data provided by commanding officers of military units. Servicemen living outside military units are included in lists at their place of residence on a universal basis.

A citizen having the right to participate in a referendum may be included on no more than one list.

Lists are presented for universal scrutiny 15 days before the voting day.

Every citizen has the right to state that he has been incorrectly included on a list or excluded from a list and also that there are inaccuracies on a list. A statement of irregularities on a list is examined by the precinct referendum commission, which is obliged, after examining the statement without delay, either to make the necessary corrections to the list or to provide the claimant with a copy of the justified decision to reject his statement. It is possible to appeal against this decision of the commission to a rayon (city) people's court.

Article 21. Notification of the time and place of voting

The precinct referendum commission notifies citizens of the time and place of voting no less than 15 days before the voting day.

The text of the draft law or the text of another decision put to a referendum must be displayed in the voting premises.

Article 22. The voting paper

The form of the voting paper in a USSR referendum is approved by the Central Commission on Referendums no later than 30 days before the voting day.

The wording of each question put to a referendum and the options for the voter's answer—for and against—are cited on the voting paper.

Article 23. The voting

Voting in a USSR referendum is conducted in precincts. Precincts are formed according to the procedure laid down for the formation of electoral precincts for elections of USSR people's deputies.

Papers are issued to citizens according to the voters' lists on presentation of a passport or other document certifying identity. On receiving a paper, the citizen signs against his surname on the list.

When voting, citizens cross out one of the answers indicated on the paper—for or against. If a voter has crossed out the words for and against on the paper or has not crossed out either word, that paper is deemed invalid in the relevant section.

Article 24. Summing up the results of a USSR referendum

On the basis of the returns sent in on the voting results, the Central Commission for USSR Referendums establishes:

the total number of USSR citizens included on the voting lists;

the number of citizens who participated in the voting;

the number of citizens who voted for and who voted against, and the number of papers deemed invalid separately for each proposal put to the vote.

Returns on voting results and other referendum documents are submitted to the Central Commission for Referendums in Russian—the official language of the USSR.

A decision (law or other decision) put to a referendum is considered adopted if more than half the citizens included on the voting lists participated in the voting and, as a result of the referendum, it was approved by more than half of the citizens who participated in the voting.

The voting results are summed up at a session of the Central Commission for USSR Referendums, drawn up in the form of a protocol signed by the commission members, and published as an official notification of the results of the USSR referendum.

Article 25. On holding a repeat vote

Following a submission from the USSR general prosecutor on violations perpetrated in the holding of a USSR referendum which might have influenced its results, the USSR Central Referendum Commission has the right to adopt a decision either to hold a repeat vote within one month in those precincts (districts) where there were violations or to hold a repeat vote within one year on the whole territory of the USSR.

Article 26. Other regulations for voting on questions put to a USSR referendum

Where the present law contains no regulation on organizing a vote, on voting procedure, on counting votes, or on establishing the results of a vote on a USSR referendum, then such regulations are determined in conformity with the regulations on elections of USSR people's deputies.

On individual questions put to a referendum the voting results may be determined in accordance with the regulations laid down when scheduling the specific USSR referendum.

Article 27. The publication of decisions on the results of a USSR referendum

A decision (law or other decision) adopted by means of a USSR referendum is to be published by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium within seven days of being officially notified of its results.

Chapter IV: The Validity of Decisions on the Results of USSR Referendums. Responsibility for Violating Legislation on USSR Referendums

Article 28. The entry into force of decisions adopted by USSR referendums

A USSR law adopted by means of a USSR referendum comes into force through the procedure established for acts of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet. Other decisions approved by a referendum are binding as of the date of publication unless another date is envisaged in the decision itself.

Article 29. The binding nature of decisions on the results of USSR referendums

A decision adopted by USSR referendum is final and is binding on the whole territory of the USSR, and may be repealed or changed only by means of a referendum.

The results of a referendum held to establish public opinion in accordance with Article 4 Paragraph 4 of the present law must be respected during the adoption of decisions by the relevant state organs

Article 30. Responsibility for violating legislation on USSR referendums

People who prevent USSR citizens from freely exercising their rights to participate in USSR referendums by means of force, deceit, threats, bribery, or other methods, as well as officials in state or public organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and members of the referendum action group and commission, and people collecting signatures who forge documents, create distortions in the results, or knowingly count votes incorrectly, or who violate the secret ballot are punishable by up to five years' imprisonment, up to two years' corrective labor, or a fine of up to 5,000 rubles.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev, president of the USSR.

Moscow, the Kremlin, 27 December 1990.

Armenian Deputies Send Message on Dadamyan Case

NC3012141090 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 28 Dec 90

[Text] The Press and Information Center of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation reports that the Armenian delegation, which is not participating in the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies, has sent an appeal to the congress in connection with the illegal detention of USSR People's Deputy Dadamyan. The appeal specifically says: The Armenian deputies have on many earlier occasions drawn your attention to the fact that inadmissible (?incidents) are taking place in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. The absence of legal constitutional organs in the oblast is fraught with serious dangers, and, unfortunately, experience has shown the accuracy of our predictions. Bloodshed is continuing in the NKAO, Armenians are being subjected to oppression, and human rights are being blatantly violated. A new arbitrary act was committed when USSR People's Deputy Boris Dadamyan was illegally detained.

Despite the statement by the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet that the detachments of Azerbaijan's special purpose militia have been withdrawn from Stepanakert's airport, (?these detachments) are continuing to commit illegal [word indistinct].

The USSR people's deputies demand from the congress the protection of their rights in the NKAO and of the dignity of the deputies elected by the people of the NKAO, the implementation of the decisions of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the fulfillment of the promises of the president of the USSR. The congress should also do everything it can to normalize the situation in the NKAO.

NKAO Deputy Cables Congress on Abduction

NC2812114290 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1950 GMT 27 Dec 90

[Cable sent by USSR People's Deputy Boris Dadamyan to the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies, USSR President Gorbachev, and USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Lukyanov; date and place not given]

[Text] Members of Azerbaijan's special purpose militia detachments stationed at Stepanakert airport forcibly abducted me on 25 December 1990. I was taken to the Azerbaijani town of Agdam at gunpoint and forced to sign a paper under threats of torture and death and after being subjected to inhuman (?ridicule). When night fell, I was left on an Agdam street and went to the office of the military commandant.

After surviving this ordeal, I was deeply upset to learn that USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Lukyanov has been unwilling to inform the Congress of USSR People's Deputies about this infamous incident. Such a position leads one to conclude that this provocation was organized with the knowledge, if not the consent, of the country's leadership.

I demand the creation of a commission of the congress to investigate this crime, for it was committed not against me alone but against all deputies of the congress.

[The same newscast in a follow-up item reports that the collective at Stepanakert's Artsakh Avtotrans Production Association, of which Dadamyan is director, has also sent a cable to Gorbachev, Lukyanov, TASS, and central television. The cable says: "The AZERINFORM and TASS report (?aired by "Vremya") on (?26) December on the kidnapping of USSR People's Deputy Boris Dadamyan once again confirms that (?these) news agencies obstinately continue to mislead the country's people. The entire report is a total lie." The collective's cable demands that "'Vremya' immediately retract the provocative report and tell the people the truth about the incident involving the USSR people's deputy."]

Azerbaijani Deputies Appeal on NKAO Dispute

NC2712123090 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 25 Dec 90

["Text" of appeal by Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic deputies to the participants of the Fourth Congress of the USSR People's Deputies; date not given, read by announcer]

[Text] Esteemed USSR people's deputies, the Armenian deputies have refrained from participating in the work of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies for the second time to pressure the congress and President Gorbachev to force the USSR Supreme Soviet to debate the Nagorno-Karabakh [NKAO] problem. In an action which continues to strain public opinion, the Armenian deputies have created the impression that the NKAO situation is complex and can turn into an explosive state of affairs. Furthermore, they have tried to use the mass media to promote their viewpoint.

It is common knowledge to those who are concerned with developments in the NKAO, however, that in 1990 a significant amount of work was done to normalize the situation there, in this part of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR].

Undoubtedly, the assurances given to the individuals who pursue their own interests under the guise of waging a struggle to normalize the situation in the NKAO and to support the people's right to self-determination, not to mention the nationalist claims these individuals have put forward, have brought trouble and unhappiness to hundreds of thousands of people. Instead of the pertinent organs' having taken measures against these individuals, the atmosphere that has been created has allowed these people to carry out their activities without fear of being penalized.

The country's leaders have failed to end the disputes, which were provoked by the separatists from the very start. Using the excuse that they do not wish to interfere in the affairs of the republics, an excuse which seems agreeable only from the outside, the country's leaders are trying to (?disclaim responsibility) for settling the disputes. In other words, the problem should be resolved by the two republics.

It is common knowledge that a national army has been established in Armenia. Various units of this army are active in the NKAO. In view of this, the president's decree on the disarming and disbanding of the armed bands must be fulfilled.

Obviously, no dialogue can be held with the Armenian deputies on the NKAO problem. NKAO is within the Azerbaijan SSR's territory. The dispute is being skillfully aggravated. We are convinced that the [words indistinct] can use this as an excuse for a military intervention. We take this opportunity to point out that Azerbaijan is completely opposed to the debate of [words indistinct] and note the following: The country's leaders have failed to take realistic steps to normalize the situation in the NKAO. The [words indistinct] in connection with the realization of the appeals and calls made by the central authorities and the [words indistinct] have not produced results. Regardless of the state of emergency situation and the (?presence) of the internal units in the NKAO, the terrorists have been destroying roads, bridges, and buildings; killing peaceful citizens and military servicemen; and firing on the vehicle transportation units every day. A group of extremist Armenians, who keep the ordinary Armenian people who want to establish peace with their Azerbaijani counterparts in fear of the possibility of renewed disturbances, are spearheading these activities. Irrespective of this state of affairs, the extremist Armenians have not been punished.

We have appealed to the central organs several times requesting that the disruptive forces be exposed and that the armed bands be disarmed. As of today, however, our appeals have remained unanswered. [Words indistinct], legislations are not satisfactory, the question of recalling the deputies, who are engaged in disruptive activities aimed at provoking interethnic disputes, has not been resolved, etcetera. Obviously, unless resolute measures are put into effect, no result will be achieved through any kind of debate, and the existing situation will worsen.

Azerbaijan must resolve the NKAO problem in accordance with the Constitution and existing laws and other [word indistinct]. Yes, that is what it has to do. Azerbaijan will achieve this without any interference from the outside. This is the requirement of Azerbaijan's state structure and Constitution and is the sovereign right of the Azerbaijani people. We shall regard any other decision as a move which disregards the rights of Azerbaijan, which is a sovereign republic.

The appeal has been distributed at the Fourth Congress of the USSR People's Deputies.

Armenian Deputy Discusses Congress Participation

NC2412135690 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 21 Dec 90

[Text] Yerevan, 20 Dec (ARMENPRES)—A few days ago AVANGARD correspondent Shushanik Gazaryan met in Moscow with Mikhail Surkov, USSR people's deputy from Armenia and former commander of Yerevan city garrison, who is participating in the congress of the USSR people's deputies. The Armenian deputies group had earlier told Gorbachev, president of the USSR, and Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, that participation was impossible as long as basic human rights are not ensured in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO], the state of emergency is not lifted in the oblast, and the constitutional power is not restored. Mikhail Surkov, along with other 58 deputies, signed that appeal.

Surkov explained his contradictory action: "I am in full agreement with the appeal, except for the last point concerning the non-participation in the congress. I think that non-participation in the congress is not the best method. When we signed the appeal I called on Lukyanov, and twice on Nishanov and Yazov, to bring about some slight movement on NKAO problem. I do not think this work is over. It should be carried forward and for that very reason it is impossible not to participate in the congress. I am not belittling the Armenian deputies, but find that all the opportunities provided by the congress must be used to point out Armenia's problems.

"Second, my strong constituency of thousands from Kumayri [former Leninakan] has appealed to me, stating that not to take part in the congress when Kumayri finds itself under extraordinary conditions would mean to disregard the rights of the people in the disaster zone. While deeply respectful of the Armenian people, I am convinced that their demands and problems must be raised at this Congress as well. This my method of struggle to achieve the content of the appeal."

Greek Paper Interviews Lukyanov on Congress

NC2912205790 Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 29 Dec 90 p 10

["Full text" of interview with Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov by RIZOSPASTIS correspondents Yiannis Litsos and Manolis Tsourounakis in Moscow on 27 December]

[Text] Anatoliy Lukyanov, USSR Supreme Soviet chairman, appears to be optimistic about how the fourth USSR People's Deputies Congress resolutions will ease the country's situation. We met him the day before yesterday immediately after the end of the congress, and he gladly agreed to talk to RIZOSPASTIS.

He told us: "I believe that based on the policy for the reconstruction, not dissolution of the USSR, our work these days has laid the basis from which we will be able to lead the country out of the crisis."

Following is the full text of Lukyanov's interview with RIZOSPASTIS:

[RIZOSPASTIS] In your opinion, what were the most significant results of the fourth Congress of People's Deputies, and what is your general appraisal of the changes it will bring about in the USSR's sociopolitical life?

[Lukyanov] Briefly, I would describe it as a congress of responsibility. The decisions made about the new Union treaty, the situation in the country, and amendments to the Constitution are by nature very serious, and I believe they are going to be catalysts in the further development of our sociopolitical life. I believe that based on the policy for the reconstruction, not dissolution of the USSR, our work these days has laid the basis from which we will be able to lead the country out of the crisis. For this reason, the fourth congress is for me not only a congress of responsibility but also of the hope that we will proceed toward the goals we have set.

[RIZOSPASTIS] Do you expect serious disagreement from certain republics on promoting in practice the decisions of the congress?

[Lukyanov] Naturally, there will be disagreements and different approaches on many issues, but we should learn to settle these differences politically, as we actually did at the congress.

The most dramatic point in this case is that there are significant diferences among the leaderships of the republics. In my opinion, the people themselves do not resort to the blind and unyielding confrontation to which their leaders are led many times. So, the confrontations we had in the congress were primarily those between the republics' leaders.

One of the most positive points during the fourth congress was also the fact that the majority of deputies exercise their duties responsibly. If we compare the current congress with the first three, we will see that although there are more and different legislative groups, today the confrontation and dialogue from the congress platform was conducted at a higher level than before. The deputies realize their role and responsibility toward their voters and the country's fate in general.

[RIZOSPASTIS] What do you have to say about Eduard Shevardnadze's resignation?

[Lukyanov] This action by the foreign minister was somehow his answer to the really tough criticism of him. Of course, if we compare that criticism with that of the president or the prime minister, we can say that it was much milder.

[RIZOSPASTIS] In your opinion, do not the latest amendments to the Constitution concerning presidential powers include the danger of moving the country's political system toward uncontrolled and unlimited presidential power?

[Lukyanov] If you carefully study the amendments that were made you will see that the powers of the president and those of the legislature are completely balanced. As the president's authority was upgraded, so was the corresponding power of the legislature to control. What is being said about dictatorial trends by the president is, I would say at the least, a figment of certain peoples' imagination.

[RIZOSPASTIS] What would you like to wish our newspaper's readers and the Greek people for the new year?

[Lukyanov] I would like to tell you that we are following the work and experience of the Greek legislature as well as the activity of the Greek political forces with particular attention. I believe that we have a lot to learn from the rich experience of your country's political and legislative activity. I would like to wish your newspaper's readers and all the working people of Greece success and every happiness in their social and personal life.

Turkmenia's Niyazov on Union Treaty, Referendums

PM2612161790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Dec 90 Second Edition p 3

["Lightning Interview" with S. Niyazov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, president of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic, and first secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee, by S. Oganyan—place and date not given: "Saparmurad Niyazov: 'We Cannot See Ourselves Outside the Union'"]

[Text] That was an extraordinary day at the Congress of People's Deputies. E. Shevardnadze's resignation speech forced deputies to postpone the discussion of one of the main questions on the agenda—on the Union treaty. That was the atmosphere of our brief interview with Saparmurad Niyazov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, president of the Turkmen SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], and first secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee.

[Oganyan] I think you will agree that the events unfolding at the congress are directly or indirectly associated with the Union's destiny. Attention today is focused on the concept of the Union treaty. What is your view of the debate on this question?

[Niyazov] I agree that, whatever we might be discussing today, we are ultimately talking about the destiny of our multinational state. But here is an interesting observation: I study the deputies' speeches and I catch myself thinking that many of them have been perhaps either incapable or unable to perceive the essence of the Union treaty. Numerous explanations can be offered. It must be explained that people reflecting different interests have assembled in the hall. Many of them feel the pressure of the burden of responsibility to their republics and peoples. Declarations on independence have sharply changed the situation in the country. Some perceive them as the beginning of a split and urge the earliest possible signing of the treaty, thus voicing no confidence in the processes now under way in the republics. There is also an element of no confidence between the center and the republics which, I think, does not promote any constructive discussion.

[Oganyan] What could you say about Turkmenia's position on the Union treaty?

[Niyazov] I have already made a statement on this issue. We are in favor of complete confidence between all partners under the treaty, of a review of economic relations now prevailing within the union with some republics doomed to eke an existence as raw materials appendages with all the ensuing consequences. If there is concern for people, there will be also confidence in the center. We realize that all the talk about economic autonomy will be absolute nonsense without the union. Our republic is in favor of concluding the Union treaty, we cannot see ourselves outside the Union. But the republics must have broad autonomy in order to freely deal with their assets. We believe that not a single republic will be able to exist outside the Union. There is much that holds us together.

[Oganyan] The congress will have to discuss the question about a referendum on private ownership. What is your attitude toward this? And toward referendums in general?

[Niyazov] I think that referendums must be held with great caution. They will not always present an objective picture. The nation may be in a certain mood at certain stages, and this mood may sharply change later. A referendum must not be held to suit a mood. It is necessary to work painstakingly, to create conditions for the adoption of various decisions, to accurately monitor the people's mood; not to whip up hysteria in order to pass a suitable decision. As for our own republic, private ownership of land is impossible.

[Oganyan] You are the first president in our country to have been elected not by parliament but by the people. How does your potential differ from the potential of other presidents who have been elected by parliaments?

[Niyazov] I do not know about the potential, but life has become more complex. I consider that everything which causes dissatisfaction among people is due to my own shortcomings at work. The people voted for me when I stood for election to the top office in the republic.... The responsibility is incredibly great. Today I cannot hide behind anyone else's back—everything comes back to me and everything begins with me. The political situation, food supplies, the establishment of democracy, cultural problems—all these are part of the presidential functions, of my functions. This is a package of highly complex problems, and it is not easy for the president to cope with them by himself. This is why a lot depends on the presidential team.

Finally, I would like to say that today, when the back of one [system of] power has been broken, it is very important to establish new structures so as to avoid anarchy. Absence of power is dangerous, and this is why so much attention must be given to the establishment of the new organs of power.

Abalkin Cited on Economic Problems

PM2012140390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 Dec 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by S. Karkhanin "Political Observers' Notes": "The Country Awaits Tough Decisions"]

[Excerpts] Waiting lines, economic sabotage, shortages in regional budgets—these were the signs of precongress days so well known to everyone. The country waited for the president's address with alarm and hope. It became clear in the first few hours of the congress' work that it would not be possible to find an easy way out of the crisis, as they do not exist. One of the reasons is the fact that forces in whose interests it is to destabilize the situation and kindle social tension are on the rampage. [passage omitted]

The food problem remains a burning one, as before. As V.I. Chernoivanov, first deputy chairman of the State Commission for Food and Purchases, reported, an inspection of all food supplies in the country has already been carried out, and a so-called balance of provisions for next year has been made. It became clear that things will scarcely get better if discipline is not established in deliveries between regions and in all-Union stocks. Using the credits that the Soviet Union has received, purchases of provisions have been made abroad and these have also been included in the overall balance. In a word, there is food in the country, but it just needs to be sensibly handled.

How can this be done if internal economic ties are breaking down as a result of blows from separatists? The referendum on questions of the Union mentioned in the president's address should make it clear once and for all what kind of a state people want to live in. [passage omitted]

Without stabilizing the ruble it will be difficult to advance toward a way out of the crisis. The idea of a reform of the monetary system has been repeatedly put forward by eminent economists, while the arguments of its opponents are less known. Now is the time to hear them. [passage omitted]

L.I. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, also expressed his position:

"The popularity of the idea of monetary reform is due, in my opinion, to the fact that it meets people's instinctive desire to believe in miracles and to change things at a stroke without changing the organization of manufacturing or ownership relations. But miracles do not happen. In the past 100 years there have been three monetary reforms in our country. But each of these was preceded by the elimination of the budget deficit, and stocks of commodities and currency reserves were built up beforehand. None of these preconditions are present today."

It is difficult to disagree with the academician. I must add that we will scarcely manage to create the aforementioned preconditions when the ugly offspring of the monopoly on production—industrial racketeering—is rampant in the country's economic life. In Tver Gorispolkom [City Soviet Executive Committee] people say: The Rybinskiy asphalt paving plant has put up its prices on its machines by almost ten times, and the plant that manufactures trolleybuses in Engels gave Tver an ultimatum: Either buy our trolleybuses at higher prices than before, and add on 700,000 rubles for the development of our manufacturing as well, or go on foot....

L.I. Abalkin continued to comment on the president's address, expounding the government's position:

"The problems of our economy are connected with contradictory laws, the violation of other people's powers when legislative acts are adopted that infringe the sovereign rights of enterprises. Talk that the plan and budget might allegedly be postponed led to 1 January being nearly upon us. If the budget is not ratified, hospitals will not be able to pay their bills for food for the patients and for washing linen, and it is not clear how wages for teachers or servicemen will be worked out. After all, budget financing ends with the fiscal year. Now there is no budget anywhere—from Union right down to rural soviet. In accordance with the president's instructions, the government assumed responsibility 15 December and ratified budget targets for the first quarter of next year without ratification in the Supreme Soviet. We cannot wait. We have adopted a resolution initiating budget financing in all structures—schools, hospitals, children's institutions, and we have initiated financing of programs connected with the Aral sea and Chernobyl, Leonid Ivanovich noted. [passage omitted]

Agricultural Experts Discuss Food Problems

LD2412214190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 24 Dec 90

[Excerpt] [Announcer] News conferences are being held, in line with tradition, during breaks in the work of the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies. Our correspondent Igor Zorin tells us about today's:

[Zorin] Well-known specialists of our country's agroprom [agro-industrial complex] took part in the news conference—Veprev from Siberia; Kukhar, chairman of the Union Council of Collective Farms; Dmitriy Starodubtsev from Yaroslavl; Klepikov from the Kuban; and Klishchuk from the virgin lands.

[Begin recording] [Zorin] All-Union radio, the Mayak radio station. Esteemed leaders of the Soviet collective and state farm movement, will you confirm or deny rumors that you can hear in every Moscow line that collective and state farms are holding back this year's produce and as a result of that there is semi-starvation [polugolod] in Moscow, and calamity in general? Who can answer?

[Starodubtsev] Can I? Insofar as the information I have goes—and I have absolutely accurate information—at present, more than 4,000 tonnes of meat are sold in Moscow every day. To take the situation of two to three years ago, when all the neighboring oblasts traveled to Moscow, 3,900 tonnes of meat were sold at that time; that is, less than is sold today.

[Zorin] Dmitiry Aleksandrovich, will you answer my question?

[Starodubtsev] I will answer you. Collective and state farms are producing output. They are not appropriating it. They are selling all of it to the state.

[Unidentified speaker] I have to say that there is output today at the collective and state farms. I have talked in public about this; I said that the Ukraine and Russia and Kazakhstan and other republics can yield additional produce, but one question, comrades: In connection with this sovereignty which has been declared in every oblast, collective farms cannot transport this produce beyond the confines of their own oblasts, and they are forced to keep this produce for the time being at the collective farms. I know of collective farms that have 100 tonnes of sunflower oil. All the barrels are crammed full, crammed full of this splendid fresh harvest, but the farm chairman cannot transport it out and sell it because it is impossible, the barriers, as they say, everything is not allowed out. Now, for example, in connection with the adoption of the law, the presidential decree, I think that this will be sorted out. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Further on Dzasokhov's 22 Dec News Conference

PM2612141790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Dec 90 Second Edition p 3

[Ye. Ivanov report: "A.S. Dzasokhov Press Conference"]

[Text] A. Dzasokhov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Commitee and chairman of the legislative Committee on International Affairs, held a news conference at the Congress Press Center during a recess yesterday. Opening it, he noted that the fourth congress is indeed examining the most important and fundamental questions concerning the life of the state and the people. It is appropriate therefore, against the background of this significant situation, to measure our position as a state in the international community. I would like to stress that I—as leader of the Committee on International Affairs—am completely satisfied with the high level of agreement that has emerged during the work of the congress regarding the fact that, in the Union that is undergoing renewal and in the draft Union treaty, the republics are voluntarily delegating to the center their powers in foreign policy. That is precisely the kind of experience that states with a federative system have built up in world practice.

Moreover, such delegation of powers to the center acts as a stabilizer, if you wish, a barrier to those structures which would attempt to take actions detrimental to the stability of our state.

A. Dzasokhov noted that without the ending of the cold war, today we would not be examining at the congress such a diversity of problems connected with our complex, but at the same time constructive, problems.

I therefore pay tribute to our foreign policy, which is embodied in the fact that we enjoy favorable international conditions for the implementation of our domestic plans. The congress is planning, in his words, a great amount of urgent work for the legislature. For example, how to increase Union republics' interest in the "techniques" involved in shaping state foreign policy. As far as political aspects are concerned, they, in Dzasokhov's opinion, could be examined in the Council of the Federation. But questions of economics, cultural exchanges, and so forth should be mainly referred to the jurisdiction of the republics themselves.

Answering numerous questions concerning E. Shevardnadze's resignation statement, A. Dzasokhov noted that the foreign minister is continuing to carry out his activities and that the further development of this question should clearly be decided in contact with the president in accordance with the Constitution. On behalf of the Committee on International Affairs, he expressed regret at the statement made by E. Shevardnadze.

Both Soviet and foreign journalists wanted to know whether the foreign minister's statement will influence on the whole the Soviet Union's international policy. A. Dzasokhov noted that the country's foreign policy course, which has received worldwide recognition, will remain as before, regardless of whether E. Shevardnadze remains in his post or is replaced by someone else. He noted that our diplomatic corps has top-class professionals working in it.

A. Dzasokhov also answered other questions put by Soviet and foreign correspondents.

The press conference was conducted by A. Maslennikov, leader of the USSR Supreme Soviet Press Center.

'Conservatives' Said To Triumph at Congress

LD2912081590 Moscow TASS in English 0802 GMT 29 Dec 90

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Surzhanskiy]

[Text] Moscow December 29 TASS—The Soviet Congress of People's Deputies began the task of pulling the country out of crisis, leading Soviet lawyer Academician Vladimir Kudryavtsev told TASS.

Debates focused on two main issues—ways to stabilise the Soviet economy and relations between republics—and reflected the situation in the country, he said.

In spite of the rapid development of events during the congress, when interests of various groups clashed and sometimes emotions burst out, the congress resolved major issues. "The adoption of the Law on Amendments to the Soviet Constitution considerably changes our managing system," Kudryavtsev said.

"We are approaching a presidential republic. The cabinet is subordinated to the Soviet president, and the application of all his decrees will be extended to executive bodies and aimed to more efficient execution of laws. For the first time, the congress elected the country's vice president, who will undoubtedly help the president in his work," he said.

The congress has worked out a basis for signing an economic agreement between republics soon. The agreement, in its turn, should be a basis for switching to the main political agreement—a union treaty, Kudryavtsev said. He said he believed an economic agreement would be signed at the beginning of January.

The congress was marked by the fact that during debates, deputies were divided not into Right and Left, as had been noticeable at previous congresses. The division was between those who supported strengthening discipline and order and those who favoured anarchy, the academician said.

"I would say that conservative positions triumphed, conservative in the right sense of the word. This is not a return to Stalinism or an administrative system, but the strengthening of today's positions," Kudryavtsev said.

Empty Seats on Congress Presidium Deplored

PM2412103490 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Dec 90 Union Edition p 1

[Report by A. Stepovoy: "Why There Are No Armenian Deputies at the Congress"]

[Text] Changes have affected many aspects of life in the country's supreme organ of power, including its presidium. According to the standing orders approved at the three previous congresses, there were 16 seats on the presidium: the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet plus his 15 deputies—the chairmen of the Union republic Supreme Soviets. This time, at the opening of the Fourth Congress, there were precisely 20 of them.

A. Lukyanov explained this to the Congress. The Union republics may now be represented on the presidium not only by Supreme Soviet chairmen. The congress has also agreed, for the first time, to seats on the presidium being occupied by representatives from autonomous republics, oblasts, and okrugs. The USSR president, elected at the Third Congress, is also on the presidium of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. In all—20 seats.

...But there were empty seats on the presidium on the first, the second, and the third day of the work of the deputies' forum. Light was soon shed on two of the vacancies. The Lithuanian and Estonian groups of USSR people's deputies, which are not present in full, considered it incorrect to nominate their representatives on the presidium. Just one riddle remained: Whose place was not occupied?

On checking with the list of names, I saw that S. Ambartsumyan, USSR people's deputy from Armenia, was not on the congress presidium. No official explanation for this was given at the congress. The only course was to seek the solution independently.

A report received at the editorial office from Sergey Bablumyan, IZVESTIYA's correspondent in Yerevan, helped to a certain extent. He reported that the participation of three deputies from Armenia in the work of the Fourth Congress had elicited an extremely negative response from voters. The thing is that on the eve of the opening of the congress the USSR people's deputies from Armenia and the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] had sent an appeal to the congress, the country's president, and the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in which they set forth the reasons why they could not participate in the forum's work. The appeal stated, in particular: "We and our voters were pinning great hopes on the Congresses of USSR People's Deputies and the country's legislature. Unfortunately, however, each new decision of the Congress or a USSR Supreme Soviet session has invariably exacerbated the situation in the NKAO and resulted in today's dire situation."

The deputies from Armenia and the NKAO declared that they have repeatedly informed the country's leadership and legislature of the fact that, in violation of the USSR Constitution and contrary to the resolutions adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, the soviet of people's deputies has not been restored in the NKAO. "Under these conditions," the appeal states, "we deem it impossible to participate in the work of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies until elementary human rights have been observed in the NKAO, the state of emergency has been lifted, and constitutional power has been restored in the oblast."

IZVESTIYA's own correspondent reported in addition that the appeal was signed by all the USSR people's deputies from Armenia and the NKAO, including V. Badamyants, V. Markaryants, and M. Surkov, who nevertheless took their seats in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. Speaking on republican television, USSR People's Deputy G. Khandzhyan said, in particular: USSR people's deputies who have broken their word do not have the moral right to represent Armenia at the congress.

I have found out that, although the Armenian deputation is not in the hall of the congress, it is in Moscow. What is more, A. Lukyanov has met with its representatives. But nothing was reported on the results.

A further quest led me to the Moskva Hotel. I talked with Deputy S. Ambartsumyan. I asked him to explain the situation which has come about.

"Why did I not take my seat on the presidium, although my name was read out at the congress? The lists were drawn up in advance, when we were still hoping that there would be some response," Sergey Aleksandrovich said. "Yes, three representatives of our deputation did meet with A. Lukyanov in the Kremlin, but he confined himself just to hearing them out."

In the evening of 18 December M. Gorbachev telephoned S. Ambartsumyan at the hotel and invited him to have a talk with him. In the afternoon of 19 December the USSR president had a meeting in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses with the group of deputies from Armenia. The conditions for the Armenian deputation's participation at the congress were discussed.

"A great deal," Deputy S. Ambartsumyan said, "will now depend on the president's 19 December speech at the congress. But not only this. Our letter was written 2 December, and four days later the republic legislature made a statement supporting us. So our final decision will depend on M. Gorbachev's speech and the attitude of our parliament toward that."

Is there still a hope that the Armenian deputation will participate in the work of the Fourth Congress?

"We all want to participate in the congress, but not to the detriment of our prestige and sense of national pride"—this was the reply formulated by Deputy S. Ambartsumyan, whose seat on the presidium of the Fourth Congress is still empty.

...One more seat on the presidium found itself under threat following the ostentatious walkout from the congress of a considerable part of the Moldovan deputation. Four vacancies out of 20... Dangerously yawning empty spaces.

Will the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies really go down in history as the congress of our anxiety? There is still hope. As is known, this is the last thing to die....

Information Center Serves People's Deputies

PM2112154190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Dec 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by A. Chereshnev: "Do You Need Information?"]

[Text] Everybody feels the need for clear, impartial information. It is of particular importance to legislators—the people who shoulder the burden of responsibility for the fate of our country....

To provide the participants in the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies with informative material within the framework of an information service, a special information center has been set up. Here legislators will be able to obtain information on the state of affairs in any corner of our country, summaries of the procedure followed by foreign states when holding a national vote (referendum), information on the problems of a federation and confederation, as well as information on the powers of the president and vice president. A bibliographical list of material, a thematic dossier, copies of scientific articles and essays on relevant issues—in short, information on literally every question concerning the congress—is at the service of the body of deputies.

The center's chief, O. Volkova, said: "Our information units provide access to the data bases of "INFO-TASS", "TELE-TASS", and IVS "SOYUZ". We have at our disposal up-to-date information on legislative acts adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the congresses and information on the people's deputies, committees, and commissions. There is informative data on all decrees adopted by the President, and a lot of material on the Union treaty. Information on law and order in society and on the structure and dynamics of crime in the country as a whole and in the republics is stored separately."

A group of specialist consultants is attached to the information center, which is located in the foyer of the fourth floor of the Palace of Congresses, to assist the people's deputies on legal, social, domestic and foreign policy questions.

Political & Social

Gorbachev New Year Address to Soviet People

LD3112152990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1418 GMT 31 Dec 90

["New Year Address of the USSR President to the Soviet People"]

[Text] Moscow 31 Dec (TASS)—Mikhail Gorbachev, president of the USSR, delivered his traditional address to the Soviet people on central television today. He said:

"Dear comrades, dear fellow countrymen! The hands of the clock are approaching the point which separates not just one day from another, but the old year from the new. In these moments we review the events of the past year, and think with hope about what awaits us and our dear ones, and our great country in the forthcoming year of 1991.

The past year was one of the most difficult in our history. The crisis phenomena in the economy, the decrease in people's personal safety, the weakening of order and discipline have had their effect on the way in which we live. Yes, we are seeing off an exceptionally difficult year for all of us. Of course, difficulties are unavoidable in a transition period, especially when such a huge country as ours is turning toward something new. Added to this the miscalculations and errors of the recent past too. The errors of the country's leadership, the shortcomings of all of us.

But the country has lived, struggled, and worked. In bidding farewell to 1990, I want to address good words and gratitude to rural toilers, who gathered a record harvest. To power workers, who are providing the country with light and heat in difficult conditions. To all those who worked well and honestly, overcoming difficulties great and small, and doing their duty conscientiously.

It was a year of difficult and important decisions—on property, on power, on land. The Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies which finished a few days ago discussed the situation in the country and determined a program of practical actions. The congress introduced changes into the USSR Constitution aimed at strengthening executive power.

Stabilization of the economic and political situation is vitally necessary if we are confidently to continue our advance along the path of democratic reforms, to strengthen order, legality, and discipline, and to protect human rights. We shall not retreat from this course.

Next year is a special one—the resolution of the issue of the fate of our multiethnic state falls to it. For all of us, Soviet people, there is no cause more sacred than the preservation and the renewal of the Union, a Union in which all the people would lead a free and good life. The country's peoples have lived together for centuries. They are also united by the values built up during the Soviet years and bound together by the memory of the victory achieved in the most destructive war. We now, perhaps as never before, acutely feel that we cannot live fencing ourselves off from each other. Moreover, we can only emerge from the crisis, rise to our feet, and firmly proceed along the path of renewal if we do so together. The key to the resolution of the huge, crucial tasks facing us in 1991 is precisely in the Union, in its preservation and renewal.

In thinking of the future, we do not separate our destiny from the destiny of other countries and peoples. The world has high regard for our contribution to the improvement of international relations and sincerely wishes perestroyka success. We regard this as solidarity with our great cause, and send all the peoples sincere wishes for prosperity and happiness.

Dear comrades! No matter how deep the crisis being experienced by the country, we can and must achieve a breakthrough to better things next year. But this will require civil and interethnic accord, responsibility and discipline, conscientious labor, and humanity toward each other. During these last moments of the outgoing year, I address a New Year greeting to all who have gathered with their families and friends. In 1991 may there be peace, harmony, and prosperity in every home! May our homeland recover and enter upon a new life!

I wish you a happy New Year, dear fellow citizens!"

No Deterioration in Ryzhkov's Condition

LD0201103691 Moscow TASS in English 1026 GMT 2 Jan 90

[By TASS World Service correspondent Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow January 2 TASS—Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov's condition has not worsened, eight days after his heart attack, Dmitriy Shcherbatkin, a senior official of the USSR Health Ministry, told TASS.

"Everything is proceeding normally, he added, specifying that his information on Ryzhkov's condition was current at 11:55, Moscow time.

Shcherbatkin recalled that the first seven to eight days after a heart attack are considered the most volatile time. The general condition can change several times a day. Doctors are doing everything possible to prevent possible complications.

Ryzhkov had a heart attack on the night of December 25. In a subsequent talk with TASS, his wife described it as "a heart attack of medium grade".

Rumors 'Completely Groundless'

AU0201120291 Paris AFP in English 1138 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, Jan 2 (AFP)—Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, who had a heart attack at Christmas, is now in a "satisfactory condition" and in "quite good spirits", INTERFAX news agency reported on Wednesday.

Quoting sources close to the government, the agency said rumours circulating in the past few hours in Moscow that Mr. Ryzhkov's health had taken a turn for the worse were "completely groundless".

Mr. Ryzhkov has been in hospital since his heart attack on the night of December 25.

Gorbachev Issues Decree on Sales Tax

LD2912185190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 29 Dec 90

[Decree issued by USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev; date not given; from the "Vremya" newscast—read by announcer]

[Text] To provide financial backup to the socioeconomic programs adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Supreme Soviets of the republics, supporting the less well-off sections of the population, and stabilizing the circulation of money on the basis of the decisions of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies, I resolve:

1. Introducing as of 1 January 1991 a 5-percent sales tax on the sale of production and technical output, consumer goods, completed jobs, and paid services.

2. Establishing that 70 percent of the sales tax is paid into the budgets of the republics and 30 percent into the union budget; the procedure for distributing the sales tax between republican and local budgets is determined by republican legislation.

3. The USSR Government will confirm provisions for the procedure of calculating and paying the sales tax before 15 January 1991.

Finance Minister on New Tax

AU3012182390 Paris AFP in English 1808 GMT 30 Dec 90

[Text] Moscow, Dec 30 (AFP) — Proceeds of a five per cent value added tax to go into effect on January 1 will be used particularly to finance programs for helping the most disadvantaged citizens, Soviet Finance Minister Valentin Pavlov said.

Receipts from the tax would also be used to increase teachers' salaries, he said in an interview published on Sunday [30 December] by union daily newspaper TRUD.

The minister said that "the reality of the market economy has already taken hold" in daily life. "More than 60 per cent of prices are no longer controlled by the state, and they are rising everywhere".

Mr. Pavlov acknowledged that the law on financial "compensation" to be paid to the poorest citizens has not been adopted, but said the value added tax would make it possible "to collect the funds needed for carrying out those programs".

The tax is to affect consumer goods and services, but food is excluded. It was announced by President Mikhail Gorbachev on Saturday.

January 1 will also see a series of price increases aimed at bringing prices into line with the real value of goods, after 70 years of government subsidies.

Analyst on Decrees To Minimize Transition Cost

LD0201102191 Moscow TASS in English 1005 GMT 2 Jan 90

[By TASS analyst Boris Grishchenko]

[Text] Moscow January 2 TASS—Two presidential decrees, published on New Year's Eve, are intended to minimise the cost which society will have to pay for the country's transition to a market economy. One of the decrees introduces the tax on sales this year and and the second establishes extra-budget funds for stabilising the economy. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of these decrees on the threshold of the radical reforms that will be carried out shortly.

No society has ever rejoiced about new taxes. Five per cent will now have to be paid from all financial deals. But it is clear to everybody that support must be given to those who are unable to counter the growing cost of living by boosting prices for the services they render to society. They include teachers, doctors, servicemen and cultural workers, who are among the most vulnerable social groups on the threshold of a market economy.

One can hardly rely in this situation on our very strained budget. This is why the tax was needed. The received money will be used to raise salaries to teachers and then to other employees. This is envisaged in the decree. some of the money will also be used to pay compensations to poor families.

Whole republics and regions are now unsure of their future. They believe, and not without reasons, that transition to a market economy has placed people in unequal starting positions. The way out of this impasse was suggested by the idea to set up in 1991 an all-Union extra-budget fund for economic stabilisation. The correpsonding presidential decree recommends them to be set up in all the republics.

The money for this purpose is expected to come from the difference between the present contributions to the social insurance fund, envisaged by the current pensions law, and the size of contributions fixed for the next year. The fund will also be replenished partially from depreciation payments and also with money received from privatisation. It is also planned to partialy use superprofits and the economic stimulation funds' leftovers after the results of the year are summed up.

The received money will be distributed between the all-Union and republican funds on the basis of a special agreement. The money will be accumulated on a single account until it is signed.

The country's transition to a new economic system, which some market advocates imagine as a headlong dive into a whirlpool, will become just and humane due to subvention practices. The interests of republics, regions and localities will be fully taken into account. This means that we now have a sufficiently solid economic foundation for concluding a new federal treaty and for normal work this year. And this is exactly what millions of people want. They are sick and tired of worries and uncertainties.

Afanasyev: Gorbachev on Verge of Dictatorship

TA3012073590 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0600 GMT 30 Dec 90

[Text] Yuriy Afanasyev, one of the leaders of the reformist bloc in the Soviet parliament, asserted that there is a renewed intention to demand that emigrants, including those immigrating to Israel, reimburse the state for the cost of their studies. He claimed that the reason for this was the regime's inability to stem in any other way the emigration fever that has seized the hungry younger generation.

In an interview with the Voice of Israel, Afanasyev said that the censoring of Moscow's television broadcasts was another sign that Mikhail Gorbachev is on the verge of becoming a dictator [rodan]. He accused Gorbachev of forging the election results of his candidate for the vice-presidency and of harboring the intention of employing the military and the KGB in order to impose a dictatorship.

Shatalin: Gorbachev Will Never Backtrack

PM3112163490 Paris LE FIGARO in French 29-30 Dec 90 p 6

[Interview with Presidential Council member Stanislav Shatalin by Franz-Olivier Giesbert; place and date not given: "Shatalin, author of '500 Days Program,' Tells LE FIGARO: 'Gorbachev Will Never Backtrack'"]

[Text] [Giesbert] Does what is happening now in Moscow—with the stiffening of the regime—not pose a challenge to your entire policy of economic reform?

[Shatalin] I do not believe that there is any stiffening of the regime. Apparently several analysts, both in the West and in the USSR, see the situation that way. However, this is a simplistic view, in black and white terms, although it seems accurate. What is actually happening is a quest for a strong, or strict (which does not mean cruel), administration capable of strengthening executive authority, creating favorable conditions for establishing a single market throughout the Soviet Union.

At the same time, I would be misunderstood as a scientist if I were to say that the envisaged structure is free of discrepancies. In fact it is a matter of sharing responsibilities between the center and the republics, As for the discrepancies, I must point out the role of the Federation Council, that of the Cabinet of Ministers, the vice president's role... The presidential system is absolutely essentials—a strong presidential authority based on the law. It must be admitted that there is no other way. I am absolutely sure of it. Furthermore, I do not believe at all that Gorbachev is authoritarian. I know the man very well.

[Giesbert] Is the process of reforms that has been begun irreversible?

[Shatalin] The situation in our country is difficult, but it has already reached the so-called "point of no return."

[Giesbert] Is it not very optimistic to intend to shift the Soviet Union from socialism to a market economy in 500 days, as you do?

[Shatalin] The most important thing is the symbolic aspect. Our country is accustomed to very long-term plans, through the year 2001 or 2015. They are all equally anonymous. Their authors and their various stages are unknown. We decided to ensure that society can monitor our reform program. I would add that I always liked to be cornered. Then you are forced to act quickly that you can ultimately do the most difficult things. Hence this deadline—entirely symbolic, I admit—of 500 days.

[Giesbert] Do you believe that there is nothing about socialism that is is worth keeping?

[Shatalin] My view of socialism embraces private ownership, free enterprise, and a market economy. That is dead and blocking the way and must be eliminated.

[Giesbert] Do you believe that there is anything in Marx, Engels, and Lenin that is worth keeping?

[Shatalin] I have always tried to "de-ideologize" economic discussions.

[Giesbert] So should the Marxist authors be thrown away?

[Shatalin] I believe that it is important to have a knowledge of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. As with Proudhon, Fourier, Fichte, and Berdyayev, who were milestones in European thinking.

[Giesbert] Why do you not talk in terms of a socialist market economy?

[Shatalin] I have never done so. It is a formula that has been attributed to me, but that I have never used.

[Giesbert] Are you a socialist?

[Shatalin] Yes, but I do not believe that the Soviet Union was a socialist system before. Similarly, I cannot understand the objective of human and democratic socialism formulated at the 28th CPSU Congress A form of socialism that is neither one thing nor the other is not socialism.

[Giesbert] Which country now seems to you to provide a model of social organization?

[Shatalin] That is difficult to answer: Austria and Switzerland. France, too.

[Giesbert] What do you think of the idea of the mixed economy current in France, intended to reconcile a powerful private sector with a strong public sector?

[Shatalin] Both are needed. This is the road that we will take. For the present we can see no other historical perspective.

[Giesbert] How is it possible to be—as you are—an advocate of the establishment of some form of capitalism in the Soviet Union and at the same time a member of the Communist Party?

[Shatalin] I am, I repeat, a socialist, an advocate of my own form of socialism. If you are a doctor who has to carry out an emergency operation you do not concern yourself with whether the scalpel is capitalist or socialist.

[Giesbert] The impression is that you are loath to show your colors clearly. Are party conservatives not right to accuse you of trying to introduce capitalism to the Soviet Union?

[Shatalin] These are ideological criticisms, so they do not affect me. There are some who claim to speak on the people's behalf, but they almost always act against their interest. My aim is to ensure that the Soviet people are well fed and well clothed and prosperous. If I do not contribute to this end, I deserve not criticisms but hanging.

[Giesbert] Others criticize your prudence. Why are you so slow to allow commercial concerns to become established and prosper?

[Shatalin] We must try to speed up the process. But we must not forget to take account of the social environment in which the reforms are taking place. It is never a good thing to move too far ahead of society's "progress."

[Giesbert] What is now the main obstacle to your reform plan? Is it not the passive resistance embodied in what Aleksandr Zinovyev called "homo Sovieticus?"

[Shatalin] That is a factor, sure. But there are also in the Soviet Union many people ready to tackle competition—even among the Communist Party apparatchiks. The CPSU has not been monolithic for a long time.

[Giesbert] To carry out reforms there must be a strong central authority. Is there still a central authority in the Soviet Union?

[Shatalin] The most serious issue at the moment is the sharing of responsibilities between the union and the republics. But when we start to proceed to privatizations everything will change radically. The factories that are released from state ownership will revert not to their republics but to private individuals.

[Giesbert] Does your main problem not stem from the fact that Gorbachev began political reform before starting economic reform?

[Shatalin] We had no choice. We started reforming whatever we could. Some people had to be beaten on the head to make them realize that in fact nothing could be done without private ownership.

[Giesbert] Did you realize this long ago?

[Shatalin] Yes, 25 years ago.

[Giesbert] Are you sure of not having made any mistakes?

[Shatalin] If there is one mistake that I willingly admit to, it is that we failed to accelerate agrarian reform. In fact it should all have started with that. Because the structures are simple. We wasted time in many fields, but there I believe that we could have been much less cautious.

[Giesbert] Do you trust Gorbachev? Are you sure that he will not be tempted to backtrack?

[Shatalin] Yes, he is an intelligent man who is neither dogmatic, nor orthodox, nor fanatical. He is always open to new ideas. He will never backtrack.

[Giesbert] Do you not fear a return of authoritarianism?

[Shatalin] I unreservedly support the establishment of a firm presidential system, which clearly has nothing to do with a return of the dictatorship. It is necessary to ensure legality in the country. Otherwise we will continue with this absurd situation of the legislative war, whereby the Union's laws conflict with those of the republics, undermined by those of the cities, which are destroyed by the neighborhoods. And so on.

[Giesbert] What did you think of Eduard Shevardnadze's thunderbolt?

[Shatalin] I have a great deal of respect for that man. He issued a severe warning—and not just to the conservatives. Society at large is now in danger.

[Giesbert] Tatyana Koryagana, a deputy of the Russian Republic, said recently in our columns that you wanted to change the Soviet economy even though there no longer is an economy and that you would suddenly destabilize everything. What do you think?

[Shatalin] She is one of my students. (laughs) Her jest is no lie. But it is precisely because the economy is disintegrating that we must try to put it back together again. It is time she set to work, too.

Shevardnadze Role in Foreign Policy Assessed

LD3112172690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 31 Dec 90

[From the "International Panorama" program; presented by Stanislav Kondrashov]

[Text] Approximately 30 nations are taking part alongside the United States in military preparations against Iraq. The Soviet support is only political, as well as participation in the economic sanctions. The Soviet Union, together with the United States, voted for the 10 or so resolutions of the Security Council. The last of these permitted the use of military measures, granting Saddam Husayn a deadline for withdrawing troops from Kuwait by 15 January.

The threat of a new war in the New Year. Our support is only political, but none other than USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze has fallen victim to this new conflict. Colonel-deputies plagued Shevardnadze with accusations that he agreed to send Soviet troops to the Persian Gulf zone to pull the chestnuts out of the fire there with and for the United States. It is said that the minister was deeply upset by these accusations but they continued in spite of his denials.

How suddenly moods changed, including those of the military. How long ago was it that Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov was hissed off the stage at the Congress of People's Deputies for his protest against the Afghan war, as people tried to justify the war? Today, public opinion is firmly against our, even symbolic, participation in a Middle East war. This is a resolute farewell to imperial psychology—no more expeditions abroad—though, in this case, action against the aggressor seems an irreproachably moral cause.

Summing up the results of the year, I would like to look more broadly at Shevardnadze's gamble. This is a drama of our entire foreign policy, our new foreign policy. I would call it a drama in three acts. The first act is cheerful: the Soviet Union opened up to the world and people throughout the West welcomed us, renewed and ready for dialogue and compromise; the treaty on medium-range weapons; the unilateral reduction of Soviet Armed Forces by half a million men; the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The first act gave the diplomacy of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze the reputation of successful state activity, especially against the background of accumulated internal problems.

But then, a year ago, the second act in the drama opened. Events moved out of Moscow's control: the peaceful revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe; the collapse of the empire. Our allies of yesterday now look only to the West for credits and models for organizing society. In the second act, the most important issue was not the direction of changes—this was correct and historically inevitable—but of their speed, sensible and advantageous for us, without which changes become dangerously uncontrollable.

Thus, this sensible speed has not been achieved. In the eyes not only of a number of military deputies, but also in the public consciousness, our forced departure from Eastern Europe—love cannot be forced—has turned into an disorderly, almost humiliating, retreat, when there has not even been time to prepare housing for the withdrawing troops back at home. Shevardnadze has now had to take the rap for this, although the time limits for the withdrawal were, of course, agreed with the Ministry of Defense and approved by the top leadership.

Let me cite yet another recent episode from the second act that, in my view, is highly symptomatic. On 22 December, two days after Shevardnadze's announcement of his resignation, Lech Walesa, the new president of Poland, took up his post. In his speech, he spoke about the development of relations with the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania. He mentioned Russia, but he seemed to forget the Soviet Union: that Soviet Union that still includes the Ukraine, Belorussia, and, for the time being, even Lithuania.

Poland is our largest immediate neighbor to the West. What does the forgetfulness of the new Polish president signify? Even given all his anti-Sovietism, could he allow himself such a unforgiveable, strategic forgetfulness? Or is it Walesa's view that there is no longer any need to take account of the Soviet Union, or to treat it considerately even at formal ceremonies? In my view, it is worth pondering this question.

What will the third act be like in the drama of foreign policy during the era of perestroyka? It is hard to judge, and to be honest, frightening. The centrifugal forces appearing in Eastern Europe accelerated the action of centrifugal forces in the union and autonomous republics. Will the Soviet Union be preserved as a state formation with a unified foreign policy giving us the status of a great power, or will the unplanned result of the new political thinking be the emergence of numerous new states that, in orphan-like loneliness, almost by touch, will have to seek their own paths of foreign policy in a tough world that knows how to guard what is to its advantage? These are, perhaps, the main issues of the third act, truly issues of life and death.

Volovets on Shevardnadze Resignation

PM0201112891 Paris PARIS MATCH in French 3 Jan 91 p49

[Article by MOSCOW NEWS Assistant Chief Editor Sergey Volovets: "Shevardnadze Does Not Fear a Military Dictatorship But...Gorbachev's Excessive Power!"]

[Text] Who will follow Eduard Shevardnadze?

Like Aleksandr Yakovlev, the ideologue of perestroyka's first stage, he has constantly been the target of persistent attacks by the most reactionary group in the Supreme Soviet and, in general, by extreme right-wing circles in the USSR. Nonetheless, it seems that his resounding successes in foreign policy made the Soviet foreign minister's position secure. Just recently, Aleksandr Yakovlev, elected to the Academy of Sciences, has virtually abandoned active politics. And that is not all! We recently learned of the firing of Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin, an independent-minded person who annoyed right-wingers because he was in no hurry to send in the paramilitary forces and the militia to back the communist opposition against the Baltic Republics' democratically elected governments.

Consequently, Shevardnadze's resignation is a normal link in the chain of events bringing about personnel changes in Gorbachev's entourage. Without going into details, we can say that these changes highlight this fact: The center of gravity of the political leadership in the USSR has moved toward the right to such an extent that a large number of Gorbachev's comrades in the early days of perestroyka are no longer at his side.

What has happened between Shevardnadze and Gorbachev in recent days? Could it be that U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's worries about the appearance of authoritarian traits in Soviet politics served as a pretext? Could it be that Shevardnadze, who also warned Gorbachev, shared those worries? We will not find the answer very quickly.

Shevardnadze is a cold and calculating politician, and it was not parliamentary excentricities forcing him to resign. What shook Gorbachev and parliament most was the minister's assertion that, in substance, he did not want to belong to the government of a country sliding toward dictatorship.

"What dictatorship?" the president later asked parliament. It is precisely these deputies who have invested the president with all kinds of imaginable and unimaginable powers who are now feeling some guilt complex. Like everybody, they see that the strengthening of presidential powers is being used not to achieve the goals of perestroyka, not to achieve a very rapid transition toward a market economy worthy of the name, but to achieve what is increasingly frequently called stabilization.

Politically speaking, it is primarily an attempt to secure the signing of a new Union treaty, the draft of which gives Moscow central government the chance of issuing orders to the Republics. A large number of them have already said that they are sovereign and some that they have no intention of signing that kind of Union treaty.

Let us not forget that Shevardnadze is a Georgian. Now, Georgia has taken the path of national independence and does not intend to sign the treaty. In making his decision, was the minister afraid that if he remained in government, he would see the paratroopers invading the streets of Tbilisi again?

For Gorbachev, the blow was particularly bitter because Shevardnadze, in his statement, explicitly rejected the post of vice president the president intended to offer him. This means that Shevardnadze, a skilled man and a past master in political intrigue, is leaving because he thinks it would be dangerous for his future and clearly morally unacceptable to continue to form part of the government.

We can certainly say that Shevardnadze's departure will not bring any perceptible change, or more precisely any change at all in Soviet foreign policy, as the West so fears. At all events, there will be no change in the short term. Foreign ministers have always influenced the presentation of the USSR's policy rather than its formulation. Second, the internal situation in the USSR is such that the reduction in military spending and cooperation with the West remain unavoidable necessities. In such a situation, even the most extreme among the generals who disapprove of the Soviet army's withdrawal from Eastern Europe—if he felt like staging a coup—would find it impossible to increase the armed forces' budget. Finally, Yevgeniy Primakov, whom popular rumor has already placed in the ministerial chair, or anybody else who is given the post, will have to limit himself, as people constantly say, to "implementing the president's instructions."

In the present situation, it is a good thing. It is also a good thing that Shevardnadze's resignation (like the departure of Aleksandr Yakovlev, Stanislav Shatalin, and Vadim Bakatin) should clarify the current political scene in the USSR for the Soviets and for the West. The presence in the president's entourage of prominent people labeled "left-wingers" or "centrists" merely masks the regression of perestroyka and a timid although perceptible restoration of the traits of a totalitarian regime. A PARIS MATCH reader would just have to watch Soviet television to fully understand what I mean.

For a year we have seen surprising examples of cohabitation in Gorbachev's entourage. For instance, in the presidential council Venyamin Yarin, a fanatical advocate of the "socialist choice," sat side by side with Santislav Shatalin, advocate of the free market, Aleksandr Yakovlev, expert on world affairs and internationalist, and Valentin Rasputin, a nationalist patriot. The polarization of the political forces has now reached the highest echelons of power. There is nothing tragic about that. The new presidential entourage will simply show its political course more clearly.

Just recently it was still unthinkable for a Soviet politician to resign. Any man holding a position of any importance was "placed" there by the party or the people or both. Rejecting their will virtually amounted to high treason.

The fact that the most important leaders are beginning to see themselves as men, able or unable to implement a specific policy and to take responsibility for it, shows that, despite all the shortcomings, a great amount has been achieved during these five years of perestroyka. That is why we can end this sad story on an optimistic note.

In the USSR it is becoming more important to defend one's honor than to obey orders.

Group Appeals for Aid to Russian Culture

91UN0569A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 51, 22 Dec 90 p 1

[Appeal signed by the participants in the All-Russian Theater Conference in in Sverdlovsk-Belgorod in December 1990: "Protect Russian Culture—Appeal to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and Local Soviets of People's Deputies"]

[Text] **Esteemed people's deputies!**

The theater has always had a great influence on the minds and hearts of people in Russia. We are a country with a great tradition in the theater. Today this tradition is in danger.

Perestroyka has offered the artist creative freedom but has placed him under the threat of a new bondage: The miserly, still "residual" financing of culture, social vulnerability, and unsettled day-to-day existence are leading many theaters to destruction.

We participants in the all-Russian theater conference "The City and the Theater—Face to Face" are appealing to you, the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputies, to do everything possible and impossible to save Russian culture. To do this it is necessary:

to accelerate the adoption of the Law on Culture by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet;

to switch immediately from the residual principle for financing culture to financing by branch norms, taking inflation into account;

to release institutions of culture and art that are financed from the budget from any taxation of their incomes;

to increase the tax-free profit of enterprises, organizations, and cooperatives used for the development of culture and art to five percent and establish tax benefits for the private incomes of citizens making donations to culture.

Many issues regarding the support of institutions of culture and art can be resolved successfully in the local areas.

Local soviets of people's deputies!

Create funds for the development of the culture and art of your regions from the funds of local budgets, enterprises, organizations, cooperatives, social associations, and voluntary contributions of citizens;

take responsibility for expenses for maintaining, equipping, and repairing the buildings of theaters and other cultural institutions;

provide acceptable conditions for the life and work of theater workers.

Esteemed people's deputies!

Today we have a chance either to save and preserve the culture of Russia or to cast it onto the market and sell it out.

We are expecting immediate and wise decisions from you.

[Signed] The participants in the All-Russian Theater Conference, Sverdlovsk-Belgorod, December 1990

General Lizichev Reviews 'Complicated' 1990

LD3012160190 Moscow World Service in Russian 1030 GMT 30 Dec 90

[Interview with Army General Aleksey Lizichev, a USSR people's deputy, by correspondent Mikhail Buzukashvili; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Lizichev] I consider 1990 to have been a very complicated year economically, socially, politically, and spiritually in the life of society, and as a military man I would like to say that it was also not a simple one for servicemen.

I think that there is no need to explain why. Everybody sees that. And Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev also spoke in detail on this in his report on the situation in the country and on the ways out of the crisis. I share the opinions that were expressed, the evaluations that were made. I would like to say that, in my personal opinion, 1990 has also been characterized by the rise in the intolerance and relative aggressiveness of people. This also can be explained. This can be explained, first and foremost, by the state of our economy that, naturally, has its effect on everything. That is why I believe the issue that should be at the center of attention for next year is, in the first place, the issue of the economic development of the country.

[Buzukashvili] Was there anything in 1990 that has inspired in you any hope and optimism for the future?

[Lizichev] Unfortunately, there is nothing positive that I can say. I have thoroughly analyzed all the events that have taken place during this year and I can't say that there has been any big success anywhere. If there was a process of the strengthening of the positions of peace in international politics then the many questions of deciding in this matter were not so easy for us, the servicemen. The withdrawal of troops—not a simple issue—from Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. [sentence as heard] All these are issues that with the hasty decision making, the hasty withdrawal of these troops, have their influence not only on a human being, but also on the families, on a huge, I would say, contingent of people who have their own worries, their own lives. And these problems are very, very difficult to resolve.

They only add additional difficulties to all the problems that have to be resolved today.

[Buzkashvili] How do you see, in your opinion, 1991?

[Lizichev] If 1991 sees the signing of the Union treaty, if 1991 sees a distinct sharing of the functions between the republics and Union and the year of the assertion and the strengthening of both—I mean the republics and the center—then there will be progress in the matter. If there is a parade of sovereignties, if there is a war of laws, there will be little hope that all this will end.

[Buzukashvili] The beginning of 1991 may see a very dificult situation in the Persian Gulf. What is your personal opinion as a military man?

[Lizichev] Well, I think that the events in the Persian Gulf are really not very simple and that the more it goes on, the more the tension increases. It goes without saying that our country, in all circumstances, being a member of the United Nations, has expressed its attitude. It has condemned the act of aggression of Iraq against Kuwait and we have taken upon ourselves some definite obligations and we are carrying them out. But, I consider that we actually will not take part in the conflict. I do not think that we should do so.

Academics Interviewed on 1990 Reforms

LD2912034190 Moscow World Service in English 2300 GMT 28 Dec 90

["Top Priority" program presented by Irina Tkachenko, with Sergey Plekhanov and Andrey Kortunov of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States of America and Canada Institute]

[Excerpts] [Tkachenko] Welcome to Top Priority, the last edition of this program in 1990, and I'm glad to welcome Mr. Sergey Plekhanov and Mr. Andrey Kortunov, from the Institute for U.S. and Canada Studies based in Moscow, summing up some of the results of 1990. [passage omitted]

How do you comment on the view held widely by Western observers—and indeed promoted inside the country by some commentators and political analysts here—that it is either the economic reform or the Union that can be saved, salvaged, and that Mr. Gorbachev is now facing a dilemma: either hold the Union together and say goodbye to economic reform, or press ahead with the most radical and fundamental economic change, but let the republics have their own way. How valid or accurate do you think this assessment is?

[Plekhanov] I think it's the wrong view. You should take the Shatalin program. It was predicated on the idea that the Union stays together. In fact, every economist recognizes that you cannot move forward with economic reform without a united economic space...

[Tkachenko, interrupting] But the Shatalin program is dead.

[Plekhanov] No, but you mentioned the dilemma. The dilemma is not there. I don't think that there is such a dilemma. It is an artificial counterposition of the two tasks which are closely integrated.

[Kortunov] And I would say even more. If there is a binding force that will keep the Union together, this force is just the market economy, because the market is really the major driving force of integration.

[Tkachenko] How can the market reform be effective at the same pace in the Baltic republics and in Uzbekistan? Certainly it can't be controlled from the center with the same legislation for all the republics, which is supposed to be the solution for keeping the Union together.

[Kortunov] Well, of course it cannot be the same for all the republics, and I think that the republics will enter the market at different speeds. And it's only natural that they should compete with each other for investments, for business opportunities, for labor, and I think that finally it should promote all the republics to take bold and more active steps in the direction of the market.

But I think what the center can do and what the center should do is to present a kind of economic framework for their independence. For example, it is impossible to have independent financial policies in each of the republics, because even if Russia, let us say, takes a very rigid financial policy, the emission [as heard] in other republics can just devaluate all the efforts that are being taken in Moscow.

[Tkachenko] In this respect, the procedure to work out this comprehensive economic basis and the legislation to which all republics would subscribe seems to be heading towards the rocks—because, as Mr. Gorbachev has hinted quite explicitly the other day at the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union, some of the republics, and he named the Russian Federation as one of the most salient examples, are indeed obstructing the way towards this common, united effort to prevent the country from collapsing into total chaos. How do you think the relationship between the Russian leadership and the Soviet national authority is going to develop in the near future, given the certain slide back into the lack of cooperation? Certainly some cooperation was fostered when Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Yeltsin pledged to proceed together along the road to market reform. They are now drifting apart. Do you think it's a danger?

[Plekhanov] I think they've drifted apart and then come closer together several times over the past year, and I'm not hysterical about what's happened. You have to keep in mind that when the leaders of the republics and Gorbachev sat at the table and discussed and negotiated a one-year agreement—agreement for 1991—on stabilization of the economic situation in the Soviet Union, they were able to agree on every point but one. There is one point of contention, and that has to do with the way the budget authority is distributed between the center and the Russian Republic.

[Tkachenko] It's a crucial point, I would have thought.

[Plekhanov] It is a crucial point, but I mean if you've had a negotiation in which there's just one last point on the agenda, around which there is so much hullaballoo, the odds are that after the smoke clears out and the dust settles down they will be able to reach an agreement. I see it as a process of tough bargaining with a lot of dramatic gestures and a lot of ruffles and flourishes. We are talking about the painful process of wielding [as heard] power away from the center, and the center is giving way. We have seen a transformation of the approach of the central government to the way the Soviet Union will be held together. Besides, the most important thing is that the economy—in its sorry state now, in its crisis state with the prospect of millions of people losing their jobs because agreements have not been reached, with the power stations stopping working and further disruption of the consumer market and so on—the economy is the most powerful force which will compel Yeltsin and Gorbachev to work out an agreement which both can live with.

[Tkachenko] Andrey, do you foresee this turnabout in the economic development of this country, let's say within the next few months, and will the growing distribution crisis, the food shortages, make the powers that be aware of the need to cooperate rather than press ahead in their different directions?

[Kortunov] Well, you know, theoretically it can work both ways; it can lead to mutual accusations and to the desire of [the] Russian Federation just to escape responsibility for what's happening in the country, and I think that it can lead to some statements on the part of the central government that the republics are undermining all the efforts to stabilize the situation. So I can foresee, you know, additional fuel for conflict here. But on the other hand I think, taking into account that the horizontal ties between the republics are developing pretty fast at certain points, I think that the position of the center will not matter that much because the republics can create their own, you know, coordinating committee, which would be pretty independent and which will replace the old central government if the old central government is not active enough, is not flexible enough, to respond to the new challenge on the part of the republics. I think that can be a very feasible option.

[Plekhanov] Right, but the real power now as far as control over the economy, control over the law enforcement apparatus and so on, the real power is in the hands of the central government. So the dilemma that the republics face is that no matter how they may wish to be independent of the center, they have to deal with the real cold facts, and they have to do with the legacy of the old centralized system.

[Tkachenko] Introducing law and order to guarantee this peaceful but progressive development of the country towards a market economy, and towards union among the republics, is viewed by some people as a danger of conservatism—and you, Sergey, mentioned a few minutes ago the danger of a reversal in the democratic trend that has taken root over the last few years—and one of the most convincing arguments here is the recent shakeup in the top administration of the country, with the replacement of the liberal minister of the interior, Mr. Bakatin, by a party apparatchik, Mr. Boris Pugo; the resignation of Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, Soviet foreign minister; the appointment—quite recent appointment—of a vice president, Mr. Yanayev, who is also much more known for his work inside the party apparatus than anything else; and finally the resignation of all, practically all, the authors of the 500-day reform plan. That is seen as a giving up of hope for a radical economic reform, at least in Russia. Do you see all this as a sign of danger, of the possible come back to the old autocratic traditions, or is it possibly just a move towards restoring some of the inevitable discipline and order that will be necessary to enact any reform and any legislation, Andrey?

[Kortunov] Well, my feeling is that some setback is practically inevitable, and the question is how far it can go. I think that some kind of new authoritarianism is coming back, and the big question is whether this new authoritarian regime will push the economic reform even further, or it will try to stop the current transformation to the market economy. I think that to take into account the inevitable immense social strains in the process of economic modernization you need some strong authority. You need some authoritarian instruments to control these strains not to create a chaos in the country, especially now when it turned out that many of our liberals, many of our democrats, are simply not ready to take their responsibility. They are very effective in their destructive functions. They can criticize bureaucracies, then can, you know, speak at the rallies, they can lead demonstrations, but when it comes down to usual business it turns out that they are not ready, that they have no people, they have no qualification, they have no experience. And from this point of view I think that some kind, some degree of authoritarianism is probably for the better of this country—but the question is whether the central power is able to limit this authoritarianism, whether it is able to stop it from going too far, to the old totalitarian models of the society.

[Tkachenko] Sergey, would you also leave the totalitarian danger in question?

[Plekhanov] I don't think it's likely that we're going to see a reaction, a going back to the old model, in 1991. I think what we have entered is a conservative phase in perestroyka, but conservative has to be used very precisely. When we're talking about conserving things we are talking about keeping the status quo which has been reached. There is only so much change that a society can take during a given period of time, and God knows we've seen so much change in the past six years and people are bewildered. People are bewildered. The country is in poor shape as far as daily life is concerned. The democrats—it is very characteristic that the democrats who've been swept into power on this wave of popular anger are now talking like law and order advocates. They are talking about eliminating some levels of government; they are talking about the need for discipline and strength. So that has become an overwhelming theme.

The question is whether those forces, the reactionary forces, which have always been against these fundamental changes, will be able to take advantage of this conservative phase in order to take the country back. In fact Gorbachev has addressed this problem openly, and he said unless we are able—we: he still counts himself in the democratic camp as the architect of perestroyka—unless we are able to keep the country together, unless we are able to stabilize the situation economically, politically, as far as law enforcement is concerned, people may come to the fore which [as heard] would like to take us all back. I think he has in mind, and the other reformers around him have in mind, far-reaching goals, continued progress toward a market economy, and a stable democracy. There is no doubt about that. The project is not complete yet, but the need for stabilization, for, if you will, enlightened conservative phase, is widely felt.

[Tkachenko] Well, and that's it. As our time has run out let me thank Sergey Plekhanov and Andrey Kortunov from the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies in Moscow, and let me wish you a very happy new year and also a happy new year to all our listeners, and a Merry Christmas, which is celebrated in Russia in a week's time, and best wishes for next year. We invite you to join us next week, same time. Goodbye.

Yanayev Receives Credentials of New Ambassadors

LD2912112690 Moscow TASS in English 1055 GMT 29 Dec 90

[Text] Moscow December 29 TASS—Soviet Vice-President Gennadiy Yanayev today received ambassadors of the Republic of Korea—Kong No-myong, Rwanda—Anastase Ntezilyayo and Equatorial Guinea—Policarpo Monsuy Mba who presented their credentials.

Trade Union Council Meets Discusses Property

Official on Shifting Trade Ties

LD2912231590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1640 GMT 29 Dec 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Yegorov]

[Text] Moscow, 29 Dec (TASS)—"The All-Union Conference of Trade Unions (ACTU) of the USSR intends to shift the emphasis of its international activity from mainly political and ideological to socio-economic issues. That will require a considerable ideological shift in the external ties of Soviet trade unions, and an independent, 'syndicalist' view of the key problems of today," Igor Yurgens, chief of the international department of the ACTU, said today. He presented to the leading body—the ACTU Council Presidium—the concept of the activity of the country's new trade union center on the world arena.

The former nationwide trade union center—the AUCCTU, which was abolished two months ago—attached too much attention to resistance to political blocs, and in no way furthered the improvement of the international situation, Yurgens noted. "The trade union movement is not an arena of ideological confrontation but a field of constructive cooperation in the social sphere of organizations of various orientation."

"We will need to carry out a detailed study of the experience of the world labor and trade union movement in the sphere of the new problems the Soviet trade union center will come up against in the transition to the market,": the ACTU trade union representative noted. He reported that at the proposal of the trade union centers of the FRG, Norway, Denmark, France, Finland, and other countries trade union groups will be sent to Western Europe and also to North America to become acquainted with practical work to protect the interests of working people in the conditions of market relations and when various forms of ownership are present. Particular attention will be paid to foreign experience in concluding collective agreements and social insurance.

It is intended to expand the practice, that has vindicated itself, of the thrust towards expert analysis in the ILO and the international trade union center of the rights of draft legislative acts in the protection of the socio-economic interests of working people, which the ACTU will present to the USSR Supreme Soviet, Igor Yurgens reported.

Property Deemed 'Indivisible'

LD2812153690 Moscow TASS in English 1451 GMT 28 Dec 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Egorov]

[Text]Moscow December 28 TASS—Soviet trade union property, created through several generations of work, should be common and indivisible, said participants in today's meeting of the Council Presidium of the Soviet General Trade Union Confederation.

Debates focused on the problem of property. Now that new laws on property, lease and self-government have gone into effect, demands are growing by state and local authorities and public organisations to transfer or divide the property of Soviet trade unions.

The 19th Soviet Trade Union Congress in October, attended by representatives of all republics and regions of the country, rejected any encroachments upon trade union property. The Congress proclaimed that all resorts, tourist, cultural, sports and educational institutions and publishing houses, owned by trade unions in the country, and their money are the property of all Soviet trade unions.

Later, some organisations, including the Georgian Confederation of Independent Trade Unions declared their exclusive rights to republican resorts.

Having denounced such attempts to divide trade union property according to ethnic, regional and other principles, the Council Presidium passed a resolution, reading that only unity and indivisibility of trade union property can ensure its effective and rational use in the interest of all working people.

A trade union property fund is being created to manage the property collectively. The fund will include members of all confederation organisations and other trade union associations that are not confederation members.

Participants favoured organising joint-stock companies on the basis of trade union enterprises and institutions. Work collectives will be able to become co-owners.

More Pay for Teachers Sought

LD2912230190 Moscow TASS in English 2154 GMT 29 Dec 90

[Text] Moscow December 30 TASS—The Presidium of the Council of the USSR General Confederation of Trade Unions has expressed solidarity with Soviet teachers. It unanimously adopted a resolution, supporting the demand of the Executive Committee of the Federation of Trade Unions of Public Education and Scientific Workers on increasing wages of teachers.

It was pointed out at the session of the presidium that a critical situation had formed in the public education system: teachers' wages reached the lowest level in the whole of the Soviet period. They amount now to only two thirds of the average wages of specialists working in industry. In othe words, at the time when the country is approaching a market-based system well-respected public education workers found themselves close to a poverty line. The Soviet parliament, which discussed the 1991 budget several days ago, disregarded the needs of teachers working at secondary and vocational schools, as well as specialised secondary educational establishments.

In these conditions the elected body of the General Confederation of Trade Unions regarded it as its duty to send an appeal to the Soviet parliament, urging deputies to raise wages of teachers to a level compatible with human dignity. Otherwise collective actions of public education workers, including warning strikes, will be inevitable.

Deputy Speaks on People's Desire for Order

91UN0580A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 25 Dec 90 Second Edition p 1

[Statement by USSR People's Deputy N.P. Kustarev, blacksmith at the Gorkiy Motor Vehicle Works Production Association, recorded by S. Karkhanin: "For a Dictatorship of Order"]

[Text]**N.P. Kustarev, a blacksmith at the Gorkiy Motor Vehicle Works Production Association, participated in a meeting between the USSR president and worker-deputies. His short speech which lasted two and a half minutes at a recent meeting of the congress has generated numerous voter responses. At the request of a SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA political commentator, Nikolay Petrovich shared with the readers of our newspaper his reflections on the issues now being debated in the Kremlin:**

I took the floor when they started talking about the supposedly forthcoming dictatorship. They have tried to intimidate us with it before. Therefore, I asked: Whose dictatorship exactly is meant? There is no answer... It appears to me that some deputies who rode a wave of rallies to their seats are filling by means of these unsubstantiated threats a social order by political forces interested in economic and political chaos.

At present, the shadow economy possesses hundreds of billions of rubles, and all of us feel the pressure they put on our life and existence. They burn the pockets of their owners and badly need to be laundered. This is why my co-workers and fellow citizens are very concerned, and they demand resolute measures.

Here at the congress, they continuously provoke and offend us, those who seek to ensure order in the country, and prompt us to engage in an opposition with a view to later accusing us of "a reactionary attitude." To be sure, I agree with Deputy V.I. Alksnis: We are "hawkish" when they wrong the elderly and the children somewhere and trample on civil rights and social justice.

Yesterday a group of outraged women stopped us at the entrance to our hotel. They sought an investigation of the circumstances of the deaths of soldiers in peacetime. I sympathize with their pain: One son of mine has already served in the army, and the other will begin his service soon. However, I also understand something else: The mothers of soldiers are being deliberately incited to engage in ill-considered actions; they are attempting to set the mothers of soldiers against the Armed Forces. To be sure, we cannot clear of blame our law enforcement organs either; they are too passive.

Listen to what they talk about in the streetcars, in the shops, in the lines—the people demand order. In turn, order is inconceivable in the absence of responsibility under the law. What about delivery contracts? There are many outrages in this sphere!

This is what we talked about during our meeting with the president.

We should steer the draft law on the militia and the KGB and a legal document on production discipline through the Supreme Soviet more vigorously. Strange things sometimes happen. Somebody drinks in a neighboring shop, not his own, and it is quite possible for him to avoid being disciplined if he has smart defenders. The Code of Labor Laws does not specify precisely what a work station is. I believe that a law is necessary which would regulate our mutual relations with management in order to reinforce order in production facilities. To my mind, these rules should be the same in all republics.

At present, a dictatorship of anarchy reigns supreme in our country, and all appeals for order immediately run into desperate cries: "Help! A dictatorship is coming!" I and the like-minded worker-deputies are convinced: We need a dictatorship of the interests of the people. The latter will not be successfully defended given the chaos which benefits irresponsible politicos and underground millionaires.

We have been talking about a reform of executive power at the congress. However, we still do not know what powers the vice president and the prime minister are going to be entrusted with. We should discuss this in our group of communist deputies created in the USSR Supreme Soviet; however, so far its activities have not been very conspicuous. The Interregional Group, social democrats, immediately gather and work out changes in their tactic after every important event which happens at the congress. For some reason, we do not gather, although we should. Concerning a statement by E.A. Shevardnadze, it was worthwhile to find out how the communists view it and what the reasons are for his request to resign. Perhaps, it made sense to discuss who we were going to recommend for individual positions in the leadership of the country. I discussed that at the CPSU Central Committee plenum. At present, there are 98 deputies elected from the CPSU, this is a mobile and very strong group. However, I think that its potential has not been fully utilized.

Why? So far, there has been no real leader.

We represent here the interests of the people who work at their work stations and live in electoral districts. Voters called me and sent telegrams to me after my speech at the congress. Their common opinion was: We will not get off the ground until we put things in order. If we have order there will be normal work and, therefore, goods in the stores. Foreign handouts will not help us, all the more so because I have already told M.S. Gorbachev at the session: We, the workers, are not sure that these packages will reach common buyers. It has indeed been the case.

After all, why are the cars not being unloaded at the stations? Shadow economy operators are getting rich, and the social situation is being destabilized. The main point is that our political system is being discredited. To my mind, the parties guilty of economic sabotage should be sought among those to whom these objectives are advantageous.

The soviets are frequently powerless because they are headed by scientists who do not have managerial experience.

At the congress, the discussion of the Union Treaty has been particularly stormy. Voices are heard to the effect that Russia needs exclusive rights and privileges. I disagree! The equality of republics is the main achievement of our union.

Finally, here I have happened to hear appeals to separate the positions of CPSU Central Committee general secretary and USSR president. I say as a communist: We entrusted the leader of our party with the office of head of state, and this is quite legitimate.

U.S. Funding for Soviet Groups Detailed

91UF0277A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Dec 90 First Edition p 5

[Letter and report to Yu. Blokhin and G. Komarov, USSR people's deputies, by D. Yazov published without headline]

[Text] *To Comrades Yu.V. Blokhin and G.A. Komarov, USSR people's deputies.*

Dear Yuriy Vitayevich and Georgiy Alekseyevich!

In regard to your appeal on 19 November 1990, I consider it necessary to report that the USSR Ministry of Defense does not undertake investigations of subversive activities against the Soviet Union. These questions are within the jurisdiction of other organs.

Specific information at the disposal of the USSR Ministry of Defense concerning attempts by Western organizations to influence political processes in the Soviet Union is set forth in the attached document.

[Signed] D. Yazov.

On Attempts by Western Organizations To Influence Political Processes in the Soviet Union

The "National Fund for the Support of Democracy" was created in the United States in 1983 by order of President R. Reagan. It received the status of a nongovernmental organization, but it was financed from the U.S. federal budget (about $20 million per year). During discussion in the U.S. Congress about creating this fund it was directly indicated that the fund would openly carry out several tasks which the CIA had previously carried out in secret. W. Casey, director of the CIA at that time, declared that his agency would not administer its employees in the "'National Fund for the Support of Democracy' except in instances which will be specially coordinated with the senators" (press service of THE NEW YORK TIMES, 20 May 1984).

From the moment of its creation, this fund has sent, through third organizations (the "Institute of Free Trade Unions," emigre organizations, and other funds), about $2 million annually to support the Polish "Solidarity" and a number of other opposition movements in the countries of Eastern Europe and other regions of the world. Beginning in 1986 the fund began to finance several groups and movements in the USSR. The fund's financial report indicates that more than $500,000 were allotted for this goal in 1989. Among the recipients of this money were designated, as indicated in the bulletin of the "National Fund for the Support of Democracy" (Autumn 1990), "democratic activists in various regions including Lithuania, Estonia, the Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Latvia, and the Crimean Tatars, to whom aid has been stipulated in a program of struggle for human rights and for activities directed at preserving the history and culture of these regions, as well as for a program to strengthen the democratic process everywhere in the Soviet Union."

The aforementioned bulletin also indicates that in 1990 several more recipients of foreign aid were added to those organizations and movements in the USSR that were receiving aid from the "National Fund for the Support of Democracy." It is reported that "the Initiatives Fund in Moscow belonging to the Interregional Group of Deputies received a subsidy for the creation of an information center and communications system promoting the dissemination of democratic ideas in the Soviet Union... The chief goal of this information center will be to give Soviet citizens precise information on the activities of the Interregional Group of Deputies and other democratic activists."

One more recipient of the fund's aid is, as the bulletin notes, "the Center for Applied Political Research, belonging to the weekly newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. The money allotted by the fund will be used to purchase equipment for that center to increase its ability to follow political processes and collect and analyze information." The fund also allotted money for the "Memorial" society "with the goal of supporting the

'Memorial' program directed at informing society about the situation in the oblast regarding human rights," says the bulletin.

The activities of the United States to influence political movements and organizations in the USSR also takes other forms. For example, in June 1990 the conference "Transition to Democracy in Modern Europe" took place in Warsaw. It was attended by representatives of various organizations from the United States and Western Europe as well as Lithuania, and the western regions of the Ukraine and Belorussia. The conference discussed questions of "the struggle against totalitarianism" and the role in this struggle of the population of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania who belong to the Roman Catholic Church. The question of increasing the influence of "democratic movements" on the mass media in the USSR was raised, and the problem of creating in Warsaw a "Center of the Struggle for Democracy in the USSR and Eastern Europe" was examined.

One way of influencing political officials in the USSR is to invite them to take second positions at research centers and universities. Thus, for example, V. Korotich, chief editor of the journal OGONEK, received the post of scientific associate at the Gannett Center at Columbia University in New York (NEW YORK TIMES, 16 October 1990).

Politburo's Dzasokhov Meets Newspaper Workers

LD2812225690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 28 Dec 90

[Report by correspondent I. Minayev; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Today a meeting between Aleksandr Sergeyevich Dzasokhov and workers of the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper took place at the CPSU Central Committee.

On 30 December, this year's last issue of KOMSOMOLKA [nickname for KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] will be published. It will also be the 20,000th issue of the newspaper. And one other event occurred in the passing year—KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA has been entered in the Guiness Book of World Records as the daily newspaper with the greatest readership. I will remind you that its print run is 17 million copies. However, the KOMSOMOLKA, like many other newspapers, risks terminating its existence as a daily newspaper. The decision to publish it five times a week instead of six is explained by the paper shortage. It is clear that the cutting of frequency significantly narrows the information potential of the newspaper. And this occurs in our extremely politicized era, when, on the contrary, it is time to make supplementary issues—as, let's say, during the years of revolution.

Today's conversation, a committed and amicable one, has once again confirmed that the times when a high-ranking Party leader communicated with journalists predominantly in the language of directives and critical analyses have sunk into oblivion. Under discussion were principles of cooperation; not mutual reproaches, but dialogue, an aspiration to find a common language.

Leningrad Reporter Nevzorov on Working Methods

AU0201125691 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 29 Dec 90 p 6

[Interview with Leningrad television reporter Aleksandr Nevzorov by Svetlana Vetkina and Tatiana Zhukova; in Leningrad, date not given: "Too Late To Be Afraid"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Excerpts] For the last 18 months, Aleksandr Nevzorov has been the most famous television reporter in the Soviet Union, even though his Leningrad television program "600 Seconds" is not even transmitted in half of Russia. Nevzorov has captivated his audience with his aggressiveness, his knowledge, and his completely unique style. The world first heard his name when he recently became the victim of a murder attempt. A bullet was fired at him from a short distance, it went through the soft part of his ribcage, but miraculously, it touched neither his lungs, nor his heart, nor any major artery. Nevzorov is also well-known for his unwillingness to change roles; he rarely agrees to being interviewed. Two Soviet journalists gave NEPSZABADSAG the tape recording of an interview with Nevzorov, which was then translated by our correspondent Laszlo Lengyel. We decided to publish those extracts from the interview that were particularly relevant after the attempt on Nevzorov's life.

[Vetkina/Zhukova] You cannot stand barriers. How did you become a bellicose and uncompromising journalist?

[Nevzorov] I do not think that I am bellicose or uncompromising. I just see myself as a professional. I never tried to enter this profession, and I still protest today if people try to analyze me in that way.

[Vetkina/Zhukova] You protest if people say that you are bellicose?

[Nevzorov] That is right. I am a reporter, and that is different. At least that is concrete and unambiguous. [passage omitted]

[Vetkina/Zhukova] There are so many telephones here, they are forever ringing, people are always telephoning you.

[Nevzorov] That merely represents a tenth of all the incoming information. We have an agent network in the city, the agents work for us and we pay them. It would be surplus information to tell you how much we pay them. Just like intelligence organizations, we have our own secrets, and we have a right to keep those secrets. [passage omitted]

[Vetkina/Zhukova] Are you not afraid?

[Nevzorov] It is too late for me to start being afraid. I have already done so much that if I started being afraid now, and "bettering myself," it would not help anyway. [passage omitted]

[Vetkina/Zhukova] You are implacable, you are always fighting. What goals do you fight for, who are your saints?

[Nevzorov] I do not like the people who run this country today. They are the representatives of an absolutely criminal power, of course. They govern and manage at a local level, and it is really only for the sake of very corrupted links that they cling to their positions. They call the one power that they have—and which we have become used to—an executive, decisionmaking power, or other terms along that line. They represent that power. That power should be smashed to bits, although it is difficult to aim directly at it. [passage omitted]

Conflicting Views on Dropped TV Feature

PM3012152190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Dec 90 Union Edition p 8

[Article by Vl. Arsenyev and S. Dvigantsev under the "TV and Us" rubric: "Three Views on VID"]

[Text] Last Friday, 28 December, the television company ViD [View, Vzglyad, and Others] did not show us the Vzglyad program. The program's moderator has reported that this was for political reasons. What actually did happen?

Petr Reshetov, first deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, considers that the decision not to show Vzglyad was taken by democratic means:

"The decision was a joint one. We—the television chiefs—were unable to relinquish our position. They—the authors of Vzglyad—likewise. The discussion was long, but eventually, at 2300 hours on 27 December, we decided not to broadcast the program. We decided, and I stress this, jointly. Although television in our country is state television, and we could simply have issued orders. I will say more: The Vzglyad program, its authors, and its presenters have greatly risen in my estimation as a result of the discussion. I was able to see for myself that these young, talented journalists are capable of taking considered decisions."

Aleksandr Lyubimov, leader of Vzglyad and an RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy, does not agree with Petr Reshetov:

"The conflict started at the stage when the broadcast was being prepared. On Monday, 24 December, we submitted our plan to the boss. Among the names of interlocutors in the studio were collaborators of USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze—Teymuraz Stepanov, a ministerial aide, and Sergey Tarasenko, chief of the evaluation and planning administration. Moreover, we planned to devote a series of features to the USSR Congress of USSR People's Deputies. The people are interested in the circumstances involving a series of resignations and changes in the country's leadership. We considered it our duty to comment on them. We were not allowed to. Vzglyad has been cut before by leaders of various ranks, who are able to do that. The present incident is the first where a whole topic rather than an individual feature has been banned."

Leonid Kravchenko, head of the country's radio and television, has his own viewpoint:

"There was nothing for me to take off the air," he said, "No actual broadcast existed in real life. There was discussion about it—that's the way it was. I talked with Lyubimov about the delicacy of the situation and the fact that Shevardnadze would scarcely come to the television studio himself. And I am surprised that this generally calm discussion, which was held in the presence of several television chiefs, is now being argued over so strangely. The names of Stepanov and Tarasenko whom, it turns out, they had intended to invite to the studio, were not mentioned during my meeting with Lyubimov on 27 December. And the allegation that it is now forbidden to use Shevardnazde's name on the air is completely groundless."

Official 'Persecution' of TV Shows Denied

91UN0568A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 22 Dec 90 Second Edition

[By S. Karkhanin: "Through the Fog Surrounding the Screen: Notes From the Meeting of the USSR Gosteleradio Collegium"

[Text] Serious passions are raging behind the blue screen and the anchormen of such popular programs as ATV [Authors' Television] and ViD [View (Vzglyad) and Others] reach tens of millions of TV viewers. Several editors and directors have threatened a strike or a hunger strike. The conflict has already reached the dimensions of a scandal, but the press is still tirelessly fanning up the passions: "Action To Strangle New Publicistic Channel," "The Defeat of Those Who Wanted Independence, and With It the Freedom of Expression," "The Most Noteworthy and Truly New Program on Central Television Lately Has Been Rejected by Leadership."

The subject is the so-called Authors' Televisions that, according to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, KOMMERSANT, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, and NEDELYA, had been created by talented young people and now is being relentlessly repressed by the television leadership stuck in their prejudices. Now that part of the ATV rubrics have been moved from Channel No. 1 to Channel No. 2, the agitation has reached desperate pitch. Therefore the USSR Gosteleradio [State Commission on Radio and Television] Collegium correctly decided, that the situation requires a serious and comprehensive discussion.

This discussion took place at the collegium meeting, and it quickly became clear that the dramatic scheme of struggle between the creative youth and the leadership simply does not stand close scrutiny. When we look at the facts, the myth of "struggle for freedom" bursts as a soap bubble.

Here are the facts. Beginning in the new year a new, slightly different programming concept will come into effect. In accordance with this new concept, the all-Union television channel No. 1 will be devoted mostly—especially in the evening—to entertainment programming. People are tired of politics and, according to numerous letters, they no longer want to see "talking heads" everywhere as they flip from channel to channel. Therefore ATV with its extremely politicized programs, as well as other creative groups making programs of that type, will have to give up their space on Channel No. 1 in favor of films, concerts, and plays. At the same time, the best of ATV's work will have a chance of coming back to this channel.

It seems to be very clear: Nobody gets any privileges, there is an honest competition for space in the air waves. But this solution does not agree with ATV director A. Malkin or, even more important, those who use psychological pressure as a weapon against the Gosteleradio collegium.

This is a good time to remember the ruckus raised a year ago around a scheduled show of "Vzglyad" that had not been broadcast because of its poor quality. After all, do not creative young journalists fail once in a while?

Instead of looking for scapegoats, it would be useful to listen to the opinion of the television viewers who are less than happy with the program. Here is just one of letters; it was sent to Central Television by K. Daskalu from Dnepropetrovsk: "Since the time when many 'Vzglyad' anchors were elected deputies, the shows have became more hard-hitting. Everything is permeated by a good dose of anger. But anger begets anger. I think the television should contribute to equanimity between the people, to goodness. At least, this is the way it should be."

There are, however, people outside of Ostankino who want the television to feed only bitter medicines to the people, to whip up social tensions, cheap sensationalism, and political instability. A rebuke to these uninvited ATV defenders came from N. Statsenko, a representative of the Main Department of Youth Programming: "These publications harm both Authors' Television and the entire department that is responsible for it. Do not interfere in our work; we do not need all this agitation. ATV is perfectly capable of taking care of itself through the airwaves." She is supported by the chief editor A. Ponomarev: "The above mentioned publications reflect a point of view of only a small part of our collective; we do not feel that we are being 'clamped down.'"

Yes, the power of television is enormous. It can make or break a politician, or make a performer popular... So what right do the people without a keen sense of responsibility have to promote their own purely subjective positions through the conduit of state TV?

USSR Gosteleradio Chairman L. Kravchenko says:

"We feel that we cannot fill the airwaves with endless discussion that even in the parliament is not always conducted in a parliamentary manner. Quite often all they do is split our society. Political extremism should be removed; it is especially dangerous because of the television's enormous influence on the people. We should not be dragged into political arguments; our task is to help to bring about civic unity. We intend to sharply change the programming makeup in favor of entertainment programs. As to ATV, it is possible that we will put it on Channel No. 2 in a better time slot—Sunday evening. So who needs the strikes and hunger strikes? Why are we being drawn into the epicenter of this struggle? We intend to consistently implement this concept. Our personal emotions are nothing in comparison with the necessity of having modern state television that would meet the expectations of today's society."

So, the sensational ATV bubble, generously colored by printers' ink, turned out to be just that—a bubble. However, the question remains whether this was blown out of proportion by ignorance or for reasons of quite a different nature. It is known that if the picture on the screen suddenly seems to be covered with snow, it means that there is a powerful source of interference nearby. The publications concerning ATV have an excess of such snow. The discussion at the collegium had helped to melt most of it away. Hopefully, the TV viewers will appreciate it.

TRUD Reportedly on 'Verge of Bankruptcy'

LD2912174990 Moscow World Service in Russian 1030 GMT 29 Dec 90

[Text] The Soviet trade union newspaper TRUD which has an edition of over 18 million—which is very high—has found itself on the verge of bankruptcy. The editorial believes that the reason for this is the establishment of contract, that is to say, free, prices for paperprint. Moreover, printing services and delivery are getting more expensive. Today TRUD printed an address by 48 parliamentaries who point to the extremely grave economic situation of the press. Several publications have already been closed and jobless journalists have appeared. The deputies assume that the USSR Supreme Soviet should conduct hearings of the problem.

Officials Leave OGONEK Magazine

LD2912000590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2125 GMT 28 Dec 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Today we received a report concerning OGONEK magazine. Oleg Khlebnikov, (Vladimir Vigilyanskiy), (Dmitriy Biryukov), Levon Ayrapetyan, members of the editorial board, the chairman of the labor collective council, the chairman of the trade union committee, the commercial director, and all the members of the auditing commission, except Gushchin, first deputy of the editor in chief of OGONEK, have left the magazine. We hope that we will soon learn details of what happened.

Radio Station To Have TV Slot, Change Name

LD2912082690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 29 Dec 90

[Text] The Europe Plus Moscow [Evropa Plus Moskva] radio station has enjoyed great popularity in the Moscow region for over six months. On 3 January, this station will have a one-hour slot on the first television program, showing pop videos. Furthermore, starting in January, the station will be called Radio Europe Plus [Radio Evropa Plus] as it is opening a branch in Leningrad.

Leningrad State Ownership Fund Announced

LD2912185290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1600 GMT on 29 December carries a two-minute announcer-read report that "the USSR Council of Ministers has decided to turn the state enterprises of Leningrad and its oblast into joint-stock companies and enterprises of other forms of ownership. It has been decided to set up a Leningrad Territorial State Property Fund with the power to resolve privatization and management issues of Union, republican, and local state enterprise property situated in the city and oblast."

Moscow Radio correspondent Matvey Frolov says the fund will protect the rights of private owners, draw up a privatization program, assess the value of state property, and organize its sale. He then interviews an official who gives further details and expresses confidence in success.

Encyclopedia Britannica To Publish in USSR

91UN0574A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 51, 22 Dec 90 p 2

[Article by A. Alekseyev: "Contacts and Contracts—Russian Britannica"]

[Text] The document signed by the American publishing firm Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. and the Progress publishing house indicates that an international encyclopedia will appear in the Soviet Union for the first time since the October Revolution, Robert Gwinn, chairman of the editorial council and executive director of Britannica, explained briefly at a news conference about the history of his firm. It has been engaged for a long time in the publication and dissemination of reference and textbook literature, it published the first encyclopedia in 1768, and it is now active on all continents.

"As is known, the view of Soviet science on the history of the world and on social structures is unique, and it is unusual for foreigners. Just as the Western, non-Marxist, interpretation is for the Soviet people. How do you intend to resolve disputable questions in elucidating various historical events in the encyclopedia, Mr. Gwinn?" I asked the chairman.

"To avoid arbitrary changes and additions that contradict the Britannica's principles of objectivity, we are establishing a special editorial council jointly with Progress. The position of co-chairman on the Soviet side has been assigned to Academician Aleksandr Yakovlev. On the American side, the co-chairman of the editorial council will be Frank Gibney, vice chairman of the Britannica editorial council. So, these questions will have to be resolved by them and their colleagues," replied Robert Gwinn.

It should be added that this is one of the most prestigious publications in the world, and that it is one of the most expensive. The 12-volume Britannica costs $8,500 in America.[sentence as published] Judging by the fact that the approximate cost of one volume of the Russian Britannica is preliminarily estimated at 30 rubles, it should be assumed that the signed agreement expresses a generous gesture by the Americans, who in this way are presenting an invaluable fount of learning to the Soviet people. It is calculated that implementation of the project will take five years. **There were no instructions to [end bold]**

Press Law Shortcomings Analyzed

91UN0574B Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 51, 22 Dec 90 p 5

[Article by R. Sergeyev: "The Law Is... the Law?"]

[Text] **Several months have passed since the Law on the Press and Other Mass Media was implemented. The law for which we all waited for so many decades and whose speedy adoption was made an issue by both journalists and people's deputies. And although it has not been in force long, some conclusions can already be made about how it is functioning.**

The positive consequences of the adoption of the law are apparent: The doors are open wider for glasnost and the pluralism of opinions in the mass media.

But I would like to dwell on something else, on whether the Law on the Press is being entirely fulfilled and whether mechanisms have been thought out and introduced to ensure the vitality of the norms defined by the law?

Let us take the question of the registration of the mass media. The law (Article 8) and a decree of the USSR Government adopted for its development determine which medium is to be registered by which organ: Those intended for an all-Union audience are registered by the USSR Goskompechat [State Committee for the Press], and those for a republic or local audience—by the corresponding organs. It would seem to be simple. But we learn from the publications: MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, a city newspaper, is registered with the Union committee, but the all-Union LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, is registered in the republic committee. In some places dates are postponed without reason, or the registration of one or another medium is rejected, but in other places no decision has been made at all yet as to who will be involved in this matter—the local soviet or a Goskompechat organ, and so far registration has not been initiated. Does this mean that the norms of the law are not being fulfilled either by the mass media or by the organs of state administration?

Further, does anyone have an interest as to whether those hundreds of publications are registered which are disseminated not only in subway underground crossings, but even in the kiosks of the State Committee for the Press? Try to ask the distributors about this, and the softest answer will be a silent but suspicious glance.

It is necessary here also to talk about another rather widespread violation of the law. Article 18 establishes a compulsory minimum for the publisher's imprint for periodical publications (including the last name and initials of the editor, circulation, editorial address, publisher, and printing house). These data cannot be found in many of the new publications. Well, what is this? Once again "samizdat"? But, you see, the law prohibits the distribution of unregistered publications and publications without a publisher's imprint. But there is no legal norm for the procedure and mechanism to prevent or suppress violations of these requirements, and, therefore, there are no cases of bringing charges for such violations. And, in general, how are charges brought against such a publication in the event of its abuse of free speech (see Article 5)?

By the way, about Article 5. In prohibiting censorship of the mass media, in Article 5 the law points to the impermissibility of the abuse of free speech, mentioning information and materials that should not be disseminated through the mass media. Among that prohibited from publication is information that constitutes a state secret. Previously, questions concerning the protection of state secrets in the press were handled by Glavlit [Main Administration for Safeguarding State Secrets in the Press], which performed preliminary censorship, but what about now? Because editorial offices do not have experience with such work. Glavlit (now reorganized into GUOT [Main Administration for the Protection of Secrets]) worked up and presented to interested parties, first of all to editorial offices and publishing houses, versions of the mechanism for preventing publication of information that constitutes a state secret: Either editorial offices themselves engage in this, receiving the necessary documents and methodical assistance from GUOT, or GUOT by agreement consults on already prepared materials, but without the right of independently prohibiting publication.

However, even here there are unresolved questions. The USSR Supreme Soviet, with its decree on implementation of the Law on the Press, obliged the USSR Council of Ministers, over the course of this year, to submit a number of laws to parliament, including a law regulating questions concerning the protection of state and other secrets. The year is coming to an end, but, judging by press information, there is still no draft of such a law in the Supreme Soviet. There is still no clear legal definition of the concept of state secret. It is likely that it is for this reason that certain ministries and departments continue to hold as secret information that under reasonable examination can in no way be categorized as a state secret. But on the other hand, this situation makes it possible for individual authors to conclude that the source of information should be kept secret, but not the information itself, even if it is secret.

The same Article 5 of the law prohibits propaganda of national discrimination and intolerance. But it is no secret that material of this nature, to put it mildly, "slips through." However, I cannot recall cases of interference by law enforcement organs to protect these requirements of the law as well.

Many questions can be raised about the law. For example, are control copies sent to such national repositories of printed publications as the All-Union Book Chamber and the State Libraries imeni V.I. Lenin and imeni M.Ye. Saltykov-Shchedrin? Is anyone checking on the fulfillment of these norms? Material is frequently published in the press about the interference of one or another organ in the activity of the mass media, but there is no information as to whether such violations of the law are suppressed. I think the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Glasnost, Rights, and Appeals of Citizens must study how the Law on the Press is being observed and whether the decree of the Supreme Soviet of 12 June 1990 is being fulfilled.

Anarchy, in one of the definitions of the word, means spontaneity, disorganization, and disorder. It seems that such anarchy in the mass media, whose role in the formation of public opinion and social conscience is truly great, should not be allowed.

TV Chief on New Look for 1991 Broadcasting

LD0101132791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Dec 90 Union Edition p4

[Telephone interview with V. Bogdanov, head of the General Directorate of Central Television Programs, by own correspondent V. Belikov under the rubric "Details for IZVESTIYA"—date and place not specified: "Television Corporation Instead of Central Television"]

[Text] USSR Central Television is going to be turned into a state television corporation in the New Year.

IZVESTIYA has already carried a report on this. But, starting in the New Year, changes are also going to be made in principle to the programs and to the length and content of broadcasts. Our correspondent telephoned the General Directorate of Central Television Programs. This is what its head, V. Bogdanov, had to say:

"Our life is now full of political passions, social upheavals, and everyday disorder. Quite simply, people have had enough. We cannot ignore this when putting together the so-called 'network' of television broadcasts. We have drawn up a new concept of modern-day state television, that will be taken as a basis when deciding the schedule of programs to be shown on channels served by the Ostankino Television Center.

"Henceforth, Channel One, watched by virtually the entire population, will be the news and arts channel. We must provide these tens of millions of viewers with the most objective possible panorama of sociopolitical and other events taking place in the country and the rest of the world, and also give them the opportunity to watch good quality arts programs. By that I mean first showings and repeats of the best Soviet and foreign movies, music concerts, entertaining quiz programs and competitions, educational programs, and programs purely for amusement.

"The basic 'framework' of the broadcasting day on Channel One will be made up of information broadcasts, starting at 0630 hours with '120 Minutes,' and is going to be extended by 30 minutes. A foreign musical series consisting of 52 short cartoons has been selected to start the year off. This will be followed at 0900 hours by economic news for business people. The first 'TSN' program of the day will be shown at midday. Then, three hours later, 'News for People at Home': mothers looking after young children, housewives, pensioners, invalids, and the elderly.

"The evening news programs will begin at 1830 hours every day with the international news. 'Vremya' will keep its traditional slot in the 'network' but is going to be extended to 45 minutes, giving fuller reports on the day's events. Finally, 'TSN' will go on air for the last time at midnight.

"There is going to be a regular daily slot for a movie premiere before 'Vremya.' The 'Nikolay Vavilov' serial—about the eminent Soviet geneticist—will be shown in the New Year. This is going to be followed by 'Octopus-IV,' the 'Anthology of French Comedy' series, and the 'Family Cinema' series. At the same time, sensational football or hockey matches will sometimes be shown.

"Evening viewing time after 2200 hours will be given over to the television almanac 'Word,' 'Movie Panorama,' and the new series 'The Past,' dedicated to acquainting viewers with masterpieces of world cinema produced in the 100 years that this art form has existed. In addition to this, every evening viewers will be able to watch an entertainment program, many being the work of our young editorial staff: the amusing competition 'Love at First Sight,' the game of courage 'Matador,' 'Field of Miracles,' already a firm favorite, KVN-91, and others.

"At weekends we intend to regularly show 'Promenade Concert,' and also a program to discover young talent: 'Morning Star,' which will be 'launched' on air by Yu. Nikolayev, the popular host of the old program 'Morning Mail.'"

[Belikov] When will the final decisions be made on the new look for Channel One?

[Bogdanov] Central Television must decide in the first three months of the New Year which of the old programs and series it is going to keep and what new rubrics and serials have the right to exist if our television is to become more optimistic and upbeat.

[Belikov] What are we going to see on Channel Two and the other channels?

[Bogdanov] Russian television is going to begin broadcasting on Channel Two at the end of March 1991. It is not part of the state television corporation, incidentally. The adverts and music program '2x2' and Moscow television broadcasts will remain on Channel Three. The education program is going to be transformed into '21st Century,' retaining its original thrust but achieving a qualitatively higher level. This will be helped by broad contacts between members of the editorial staff and foreign colleagues, scientists, and television companies.

Railways Minister Evaluates Latest 5-Year Plan

LD2912182190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 29 Dec 90

[Summary] An all-Union telephone conference of railway officials was held today in Moscow. Railways Minister Konarev summed up last year's work and the 12th 5-year plan. In the last two years, rail transportation has declined in absolute terms, he said, but the railways overfulfilled their five-year plan for freight by 119 million tonnes. Above-plan profits of 700 million rubles were achieved, and since 1985, passengers have been travelling more often and further. Passenger turnover increased by 376 percent.

Some Republics Declare 7 January Holiday

LD0201144391 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Text] This year a number of nonworking festive days will be increased in many republics. For the first time in a long while at the church's request, the parliaments of Russia, the Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia has revived Christian holidays. Now 7 January, the day of the Orthodox Christmas, will be a holiday.

Comparison of USSR Presidential Decree

WA2812173990

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 1 December 1990 carries in its Second Edition on pages 1 and 4 the text of the USSR president's decree "On Intensifying Worker's Control for the Purposes of Imposing Order in the Storage, Transport, and Retailing of Foodstuffs and Consumer Goods" dated 30 November. Comparison of the PRAVDA item with the translation of the Moscow Television Russian version published in the 3 December Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 50, reveals the following variation:

second column, last paragraph, sentence one, PRAVDA reads: First: To institute, for the period of the stabilization of... (retranslating.)

Comparison of Kryuchkov TV Statement

WA2812181790

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 12 December 1990 carries in its Single Edition on page 5 an unattributed report under the heading "KGB Chairman's Television Speech" on the 11 December television statement by KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov. Comparison of the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA report with the translation of the Moscow Television version published in the 12 December Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 32, reveals the following variations:

Column two, first paragraph SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA version begins:[Text] On the path of advance toward the projected goals there have arisen "not simply difficulties but entirely real and serious dangers," believes USSR KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov. A keen struggle has developed in the country on two key salients: on the question of ownership and the question of power. There is a desire on the part of certain forces to resolve them at the expense of the working people's fundamental interests.

The KGB Chairman spoke on Central Television 11 December. He said that forces operating using... (supplying alternative opening passage, picking up fourth paragraph first sentence);

same column, fifth paragraph, first sentence reads: ...support from abroad. We are facing...(omitting first part of second sentence)

same column, last paragraph, first sentence reads: ...liquidate Soviet power. page 33, column one, second complete paragraph: [new graf] Speaking on the... (omitting rest of paragraph and first complete paragraph on page 33)

column one, second complete paragraph, first sentence reads: ...the USSR president, the KGB chairman stated:

The USSR State... (retranslating);

second paragraph first sentence reads: ...of social order, Soviet power of the people, and the state... (retranslating);

second complete paragraph, fourth sentence reads: ...and public facilities and staff and institutions of the KGB organs and troops and of stopping acts of violence, the personnel have been issued appropriate instructions. [new graph] Officials of the... (retranslating);

third paragraph, sole sentence, reads: ...have conducted a "secret war" against the Soviet ... (adding quotation marks);

fourth complete paragraph, last sentence reads ...in order decisively to stop crimes in... (adding "to");

final paragraph, first sentence reads: ...absent from society ... (omitting rest of paragraph).

Economic

KGB Finds Large Stocks of Medicines at Depot

PM0101161591 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 24 Dec 90

[Report by V. Bakarinov, A. Kostromin from the "Vremya" newcast]

[Text] [Announcer] For the umpteenth time, empty store shelves are the theme of our next reportage.

Our correspondent took part in a number of operations mounted by staffers of the Moscow City and Oblast KGB Administration in an effort to find the answer to some questions which worry us all.

[Bakarinov] We seem to have gotten used to of late to some worrying expressions which have become fashionable. "Economic sabotage," for instance. On the one hand it sounds convincing, of course, but, on the other hand, it is a complete abstraction. Let us find out what is at the root of it all.

From an encoded telegram of the Kolomna City Department of the the Moscow City and Oblast KGB Administration: The republic pharmaceuticals depot is located on the territory of Kolomenskiy Rayon, at Peski village. Large quantities of pharmaceuticals have accumulated here. Most of them are imported and are destined for various parts of Russia—50 tonnes for Voronezh, 40 tonnes for Vologda, 40 tonnes of Ivanovo, 40 tonnes for Kalinin, 60 tonnes for Kursk, 20 tonnes for Kostroma, 60 tonnes for Orel, and 60 tonnes for Tula. Are you listening, inhabitants of these cities? These are your medicines. Is no one ill any more, or are your pharmacies well-stocked with essential drugs?

I do not think it would be right to blame this situation on the faceless and elusive mafia. It would be better to remember the tried and tested formula about indifference and mismanagement. In this case it will be easier to find the culprits and call them to book.

What is the explanation for the fact that in connection with the early end of the navigation period—that is, as a result of objective circumstances—62 containers with tea from as far away as India have been marooned at the port of Yaroslavl since 18 November? The canal is icebound, and the goods are stuck. This is not likely to cause joy to the inhabitants of Sverdlovskiy, Volgogradskiy, and Pervomayskiy Rayons of the capital. But those who by dint of their office should have taken delivery of these goods which are in such short supply, did not even bother to reply to the urgent cable from Yaroslavl. I foresee that an accusing finger will, as is by now traditional, be pointed at transport workers. Especially since the Severnaya Railroad is unable to supply flat cars to move the containers. But why?

What KGB staffers discovered at the Yaroslavskiy freight station in Moscow is likely to raise eyebrows even among law enforcement organ staffers. Hundreds of kilograms of medicines, imported shoes, knitwear, hats, children's clothing, and many other goods which are not just in short supply but whose existence Muscovites have simply long since forgetten. Their main destinations are department stores, wholesale depots, and industrial enterprises. The addresses are specified. Much of what you see has been lying around here not just for weeks and months, but for years. Railroad workers whose voices have grown hoarse from protesting, exhorting and pleading are simply in despair. Meanwhile, road transport workers are paying them fines without batting an eye—15 kopeks per day per 100 kg of freight. That is R1 million, since the beginning of this year alone. I will not try and add it all up. There is no doctor around. Perhaps this is economic sabotage?

One of the experts let me into a secret. To keep all this in shop store-rooms and cellars is dangerous these times. The Department for the Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation and Workers Control are suddenly rearing their heads, and the KGB has joined forces with them. A depot is a depot. There are plenty of excuses. Shortage of transport facilities, engine fuel, loaders....

Generally speaking, our country lacks nothing. It is just not available to everyone, all the time, and where it is needed. So that, truly and honestly, it is not our fault. Let anyone try and prove that there is criminal intent.

Yes, it is a clever scheme. But there is a saying: You can only push your luck so far. But maybe one should not leave it until a sudden visit from KGB staffers?

Stalled Freight in Moscow Investigated

914D0092A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Dec 90 Union Edition p 6

[Article by A. Pokrovskiy: "Why Are Cars With Foodstuffs Idle"]

[Text] The Moscow City Executive Committee GUVD [Main Administration of Internal Affairs] inspected the unloading of cars with foodstuffs and consumer goods arriving at the stations of the Moscow Railway Junction.

At present (the situation as of 20 December will be discussed), the railroad is extremely tense: The "station-motor vehicle pool-addressee" link is frequently severed, which is clearly indicated by the empty store shelves.

To begin with, we will cite data from the administration of the Moscow Railroad. At present, "the balance" amounts to 8,667 cars not unloaded and 5,767 containers not shipped out. Let us note that in December of last year the picture was, alas, similar. Insane panic buying which sweeps pitiful crumbs off the store shelves is the only thing that was not in the picture then.

In the capital, terminal tracks are clogged with cars which have not been unloaded. The militia is, unfortunately, unable to establish the actual number of cars and containers with consumer goods in this chaos, however. Statistical reporting simply does not provide for placing these necessary data in a separate "rubric." Operations officers are convinced that a special investigation of this is required. For now, studies indicate that cars are unloaded and containers are shipped out "in the general order." Nobody takes priorities into account. The movement of the most significant freight is not monitored by the railroad.

A flaw such as the delayed outshipment of containers is built into the very operation plans of the motor vehicle pools. According to the plans of the railroad administration, daily accumulation on platforms should amount to 1,520 medium-tonnage and 637 large-tonnage containers, whereas their outshipment (according to the plans of a motor vehicle combine) amounts only to 1,205 and 505 pieces.... Actually, even fewer are being shipped out in December. The result of such operations is as follows: As of last Friday, 7,277 containers were stuck in Moscow and its vicinity.

Still, what is in the cars? In particular, there is meat—171 "meat" cars have not been unloaded. In this case as well, all "plans" and "average daily rates" are a sham. At the same time, only at the Biryulevo Meat Combine are the refrigeration chambers 119 percent full. At all other combines, this is a semi-vacant winter: The average load factor of the capital city Mosmyasoprom [Moscow Association of Meat-Packing Combines] is 58.7 percent of capacity.... Chiefs of the meat-packing combines promptly pay fines for the idle time of cars (up to 10 rubles per day) which are supposed to be unloaded (once again, in keeping with the norms) within three hours of their arrival. Refrigerated cars are being used as... warehouses on wheels. Meat is unloaded from them as needed and taken directly to the combine shops.

Now about the operation of the motor vehicle pools. Detectives maintain that the outshipment of freight from warehouses and container platforms is the weakest link in the entire chain of freight movement. More than 500 vehicles daily are idle due to a shortage of drivers, or one-half of the average daily number of all trucks assigned in December for these purposes. On the railroad cars are unloaded around the clock, whereas motor-vehicle pools send the largest number of vehicles for transportation in the morning. Work virtually comes to a standstill in the evening hours, to say nothing of nights and days off.... Besides, the unloading of the motor vehicles themselves is organized in such a manner that nobody finds five to six hours of idle time surprising, and nobody in the Mosavtotrans [Moscow Motor Vehicle Transport Association] does more than one haul per shift.

It has so happened recently that very many people in our country have engaged in what is not their business. It is not the fault but rather the misfortune of the militia that the issues of railway terminals and the caprices of motor-vehicle pools have now become its headache. What do professional crime fighters propose to do in order to combat this economic disorder?

First of all, they are convinced that the shortcomings in the operation of railway, motor-vehicle, and trade organizations combine to bring about the current chaos and foodstuffs panic. Therefore, the Moscow City Executive Committee Main Administration of Internal Affairs considers it necessary to urgently adopt normative acts on making the transportation of consumer goods, primarily foodstuffs and humanitarian-aid freight, a priority. Of course, this should envisage the priority provision of cars for loading them and the organization of their unloading and outshipment out of turn. Taking into account the emergency nature of the situation with supplies for the populace, stiffer fines and disciplinary sanctions should be introduced. A system of tracking and monitoring the movement of freight (including imported freight and that received free of charge) should be developed and implemented. This should be done from the very border. Finally, plans for the unloading of cars by the railroad and the outshipment of freight by motor vehicles should be reconciled. Special centers or dispatcher facilities should be set up in trade....

...While supporting the measures proposed by the militia unreservedly, I for one still started thinking about a simple fact which has very clearly come to the fore this year: The greater and richer the crop is the more enormous its losses are. Correspondingly, the shouts "help, we are starving!" get louder. The wider the stream of humanitarian aid becomes the greater is the number of people, in theory engaged in crime control, who are distracted to "follow" and "control" boxes with provisions. Meanwhile, old and apparently obsolete bureaucratic structures find work for themselves in this organizational bustle and display tireless vigor. This is to be understood: All headquarters and commission will always have something to do when there is something to monitor and distribute.

Newspaper's Position on Food Shortages Viewed

914D0091A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 21 Dec 90 p 1

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA chief editor A. Yurkov: "Have You Read in KOMSOMOLKA? 'Pigs in a Neighborly Sort of Way'"]

[Text] Which people's deputy, or even the USSR, can boast that he has provided meat, for a start, for the following: four kindergartens, six hospitals, seven enterprises?

Without having a single kilogram of reserves, an ounce of influence, or even a wooden board for barter.

Again the gauntlet has been thrown down by a powerful mafia to which all of Moscow is uncomplainingly paying tribute. Even the entire world in the person of its empowered diplomatic representatives quartered in white-stone residences, who like to eat from time to time. To do this they wander into the markets because it is better not to visit our stores. Unless one wants to whet one's appetite by walking.

There is no such deputy. There is no such minister. In any event, I have not heard of them, although perhaps they do exist, but remain silent out of modesty.

But there is a KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, which not only tirelessly attacks the government and the president, but just as untiringly looks around for something to eat. And finds it. Including you and me. And for the hospitals, for the kindergartens, for the enterprises. What it describes in its latest issues is, as always, done with talent and to point out a lesson. It is not simply a story about pigs and the mafia, it is a documentary repudiation of panic rumors that we are threatened with meat starvation. If something really does threaten us it is a chronic inability to deal in businesslike commerce. Even under threat of starvation. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's "meat exchange," now open on the pages of that newspaper, and not just there, is also an irrefutable condemnation of the Soviet official and his uselessness and his inability to allocate food reserves. It is he, the fledgling of the nest of stagnation, who has passed the initiative to the mafia on the meat front (and likewise the fruit, vegetable, industrial goods, and housing fronts...); it is he who is ready to barter our pride and the honor of the people for free canned goods from abroad, and to raise customs barriers against popular wisdom and initiative.

In recent times KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA has been increasingly berated in the corridors of power for its one-sided political predilections. But surely it must be shameful for those who berate it to place the newspaper on the same level as the mafia, on the same level as the thousands and thousands of owners of sows?! For KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA is not a branch of the food commission and it is not a backup man for the Ministry of Trade.

...And between ourselves, in a neighborly fashion, the boys from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA have played a dirty trick on us. A fine, beautiful pig on which we congratulate them at New Year.

Regional Food Supply Variations Noted

914D0085A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 15 Dec 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "A. Yukish: We Are Not in Danger of Famine"]

[Text] According to L. Nikitina, deputy chief of the USSR State Statistical Administration administration for statistics, trade and services, the inventories of goods stored at warehouses and storage facilities, as well as at industrial enterprises, have diminished considerably in comparison with last year. The entire all-Union stock of inventories—both food and non-food—is 72 billion rubles [R]worth. Last year at the same time it was 82 billion worth. By the way, according to some estimates, the inventories of goods bought and hoarded by consumers is valued at approximately R120-130 billion.

Retail trade inventories have diminished from R62 billion last year to R54 billion this year. There are three times less butter, eggs, and dairy products, and one and a half times less meat.

By the way, the inventories of goods differ considerably depending on the region. The Ukraine, for instance, has the most sugar—26 kilos per capita—while Uzbekistan only has one kilo. The situation with meat is the best in Belorussia and in the Baltics: the resources here are over two kilos per capita.

These are worrisome figures. A. Yukish, deputy chief of the Chief Administration for State Food Resources of the USSR Council of Ministers, is more optimistic, however:

"We are not in danger of famine if we work well. Labor is our happiness and the guarantee of good life. If we work well we will have plenty of food. As to those who do not want to work, they should be forced to."

Moscow Meat Price Ceilings Challenged

914D0093A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Dec 90 Union Edition p 6

[Article by A. Protsenko: "A Bazaar at the Market"]

[Text] Moscow—Meat should have cost half as much at the capital's markets starting 21 December: By a decision of the Moscow Gorispolkom [City Soviet Executive Committee] a price ceiling was introduced here—15 rubles [R] per kilogram. The famous Riga Market has already refused to implement this ruling.

When workers of the capital's BKhSS [Combating Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation] service arrived there in large numbers to monitor implementation of the ruling by the city authorities, they saw a statement posted by B. Mailov, director of the Riga Market, concerning the introduction of price ceilings on meat with the postscript, "This ruling is in violation of Article 40 of the Fundamental Civil Legislation of the USSR." Correspondents from IZVESTIYA also visited the Riga Market that day and saw for themselves that prices for meat were the same as before—R30 per kilogram.

"Your Popov cannot order us about," said a mustached vendor proudly.

Now, apparently, Boris Vasilyevich Gorbatov, acting chairman of Moscow's Dzerzhinskiy Rayon Soviet, must enter the struggle; the rayon service to combat embezzlement of socialist property and speculation has complained to him about B. Mailov.

"Our workers have inspected seven other markets in the capital, including the Central, Butyrskiy, and Danilovskiy Markets," reported Yu. Kolesnichenko, deputy department head of the city service to combat embezzlement of socialist property and speculation. "For the most part the ruling of the Moscow Gorispolkom is being carried out. But at the Leningrad Market the management avoided inspection by stating that there is no punishment stipulated for violators. It is silly: For nonfulfillment of the ruling of the city authorities the administration can simply eject violators from the market. Is there any more terrible punishment for vendors?"

The next morning, a Saturday, I began with a visit to the Preobrazhenskiy Market—a modest and quite unknown market. Here they were complying with the authorities: Pork at R15 and veal, too. What about mutton?

"This little piece is R15, and the rump is R20..." began the vendor; but then suspecting me of being an inspector, he quickly "corrected" himself: "For the entire piece!"

In general, should we be thanking the Moscow Gorispolkom for a correct decision and for demonstrating concern for Muscovites and guests of the capital? I would not be in such a hurry....

Of course, it is necessary to fight the market mafia, and there are different means of doing this. But dictating prices alone will hardly succeed in correcting the situation. Our experience in this matter is rich: Dozens of times the authorities have tried to influence prices at the markets with administrative levers in the most varied cities of the Union, including Moscow, and each time they have suffered defeat. Do they really hope to be victorious this time? I doubt it very much. My doubts were multiplied after today's visit to still one more of the capital's main markets—the Central Market.

No, they are complying with the city authorities here as well: The price tags in the meat isles warmed the heart: "Meat with fat up to R15 for one kg." But after five minutes it became clear that these resourceful fellows had already found a completely legal way to circumvent the ruling of the Moscow Gorispolkom. Previously for R30-35 you could get "clean" meat here—without bones, fat, horns, and hooves; now for R15 they put a heavy piece of "filler" on the scales with the piece of meat you have chosen and say, as they do in the store, "If you do not want it, do not take it!" Or, of course, pay the extra.

This is on the second day of the ruling of the city authorities.

Incidentally, our colleagues from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA tried quite recently to demonstrate graphically how to manage such "pricing": First and foremost it is necessary to increase the number of stalls in the meat isles and the number of the isles themselves and to make sure that the peasants driving meat into the city are not directed straight to the market threshold and robbed at the very gates. There is enough meat in the Moscow region and in the other oblasts, and there are enough people willing to drive it to the capital and sell it for R10-15. But, according to the testimony of Yu. Kolesnichenko, even after announcements in the newspaper and on Moscow television, even after discussion of these problems in most varied offices, not one meat isle and not one stall in these isles has been added at a single market.

True, as a result of this "pricing" ruling of the Moscow Gorispolkom the capital's markets have again been taken out of the hands of the Central Council of Consumer Societies and transferred to the jurisdiction of the rayon authorities, which can now show some useful initiative....

Crime in Cooperative Sector Increases

PM0201151791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Jan 91 Second Edition p 4

[A. Chereshnev report: "Time To Come Down to Earth..."]

[Text] If you take, as they say, a bird's-eye view of the cooperative movement, you get a bright and pleasant picture. Judge for yourself. During 1990 alone 209,600 cooperatives started operating. The sector employs 5.2 million people. Income from the sale of cooperative produce amounted to some 27.2 billion rubles [R]...

But if you come down to this sinful earth and take a closer look...

During 1990 the number of crimes for gain in the economic sector rose in comparison to last year by almost 77 percent, from 5,770 to 10,235 cases. Material losses increased from R11.2 to R54.8 million. The number of persons committing crimes in the cooperative sector rose from 5,622 to 9,792, that is by 72.7 percent, and of those incurring administrative penalties from 6,111 to 9,814.

As the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs informed us, one of the main reasons for this is that the financial and economic activities of many trade, purchasing, and intermediary cooperatives is in the highest degree unregulated and in effect unmonitored.

As far as joint enterprises are concerned, they have their own specific problems. For example, many foreign firms which have cofounded joint enterprises are refusing to bring civil actions against "errant" Soviet colleagues, in the belief that this will damage their firm's reputation.

All this insistently suggests that the normative basis is lagging well behind the processes taking place in economic life and that the existing legislation needs rapid and fundamental amendments.

Petrakov on Currency Reform, 'Hard' Ruble

91UF0282A Moscow TRUD in Russian 27 Dec 90 p 3

[Interview with academician Nikolay Petrakov, by TRUD political commentator V. Golovachev; place and date not given: "I Am for Hard Ruble"]

[Text] [Golovachev] Nikolay Yakovlevich, before we discuss the report produced by the IMF experts, will you please tell us why, in your opinion, our economy continues to rapidly disintegrate? For almost a year we have been discussing various programs; we have even adopted some of them, but things just keep getting worse....

[Petrakov] The economy continues to disintegrate precisely because we do not go beyond discussions. Even those measures that have been adopted either are not being implemented, or it is done extremely slowly. Add to that political passions that tear apart unified economic space, and the sovereignties parade.... Plus there are errors in economic matters that we continue to make. Finally, there is no unity among the people. The people are tired, they have lost faith, their patience is at the limit, there is neither enthusiasm nor energy, only bitterness and animosity.

I think we have finally approached the stage where it is clear to everybody: Discussions are fine, but what we need are emergency economic measures. We need, in the nearest future, to reach an economic agreement between the republics. The Union treaty may still require lengthy discussions. In the economic sphere the situation is much more clear: We need to reach an agreement on common market (economic space) and human rights (first of all related to social protection—minimum pensions, wages, cost of living adjustments as prices go up). We will also have to agree, of course, on interrepublic ecological programs, energy, and transportation systems; all of these are specific, well defined things, on which we can reach agreement quickly.

Next, we need a well-functioning mechanism of implementation of agreed-upon decisions, including the antimonopoly law.

Most important, we have to start—not in words, but in reality—bringing the economy back to health, first of all getting in order the money supply, the finances.

Recommendations by the IMF experts contain the same ideas. By the way, many points made in the IMF report are the same as in the well known 500 days program, therefore it was easy for me to read this research by foreign specialists. This extensive report has not been borne of abstract contemplations, but is a result of careful study of the situation in our country.

Generally speaking, the international community has accumulated considerable experience in restoring destroyed economies. After the war many countries (Japan, Italy, Germany) found themselves in a situation similar to ours. The international community came to their rescue (as it later did with Latin American countries). Competent recommendations made it possible for these countries to achieve new levels of development. Our situation, of course, is different. First, what had plunged us into the economic abyss was not a war, but an inefficient economic system. Second, the economies of the countries I just mentioned had been based on market relations; we need to create them from scratch. The international experts have taken that into account, however.

[Golovachev] Both the 500 days program and the program later presented by the USSR president—and adopted for action—contained an important step in bringing the economy back to health, namely, the siphoning off of the excess money in circulation by selling off apartments and a variety of unfinished and "frozen" construction projects. It is clear now that these measures are not working as it was envisioned, however, and that the goals are not being achieved. The question of currency reform has reemerged. It has been supported by such different people as KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov, Moscow City Soviet Chairman G.Kh. Popov, and All-Union Confederation of Trade Unions Chairman V.P. Shcherbakov. What is your opinion on this issue?

[Petrakov] Yes, it is true that the hopes of tying up the "hot money" on a large scale so far have not materialized. Therefore, many see a solution in a currency reform. I am not sure that this will be effective. I think that a better solution would be a "soft" version of the currency reform—the introduction of a parallel "hard" ruble. With all the shortcomings of this solution (and there are quite a few of them), the hard ruble will produce an incentive for quick improvement in the economy, and for its progress. I proposed this idea during the first years of perestroyka (for instance, in NOVYY MIR magazine, No 8, 1987), and I think that it is still a viable idea.

The substance of this idea is as follows. Parallel to existing money, we introduce a hard ruble, for which one will be able to buy a variety of goods—guaranteed—and which could be exchanged in the bank for dollars or any other currency. The rate of the new ruble is fixed. The issue of new money is strictly limited by the volume of existing goods and currency reserves. Gradually, as the volume of goods increases, the share of hard rubles in the salaries and pensions will be increased proportionally.

[Golovachev] Then the speculation with new rubles will start....

[Petrakov] Why speculation? The rate of the new ruble towards the old one will establish itself naturally. The new money will be in short supply. Then, for example, an old lady will decide whether she wants to sell her hard ruble for seven or 10 new ones, or she prefers to save the new ones for a major purchase. Naturally, the distribution of basic necessities will need to be controlled by the state; their prices should remain, in old money, on such levels that people could afford to purchase things included in the "consumer basket." But a car, for instance, may cost 6,000 new rubles or 30,000-40,000 old ones (as it costs now on the "black market"). That is, many goods will have two prices, and there is nothing terrible about it.

[Golovachev] We already have hard currency stores where one can buy scarce goods for dollars or marks (although the lines there are growing longer, too). What then is the difference between introducing this hard ruble and simply using foreign currency?

[Petrakov] The difference is that today you cannot exchange ordinary rubles for dollars in the bank (the "black market" does not count). The hard ruble will be exchanged without limitations.

In general, I think that selling things for foreign currency inside the country is only making the ruble even weaker, and is undermining the national economy. This is not a thought-through decision. Normal countries use their own currency in domestic circulation, but any bank would exchange that currency for a foreign one, and vice versa.

[Golovachev] You said yourself that in order to introduce the hard ruble we would need a substantial reserve of hard currency. Right now all we have are debts....

[Petrakov] We have to understand clearly that it will be extraordinarily difficult for us to climb out of this economic catastrophe without the help of the international community. The introduction of a hard ruble will give the economy a powerful push. There will an incentive to develop production, to earn money, because this money will buy things. Coupled with other measures, including some of those proposed in the foreign experts report, we could quickly move forward. This would become a good foundation for starting negotiations with the same IMF. I think that after studying our proposals the IMF would make the necessary currency reserves available to us in order to support the hard ruble. We could pay back these debts by developing exports.

The hard ruble would help to get the economy that had been aground moving again, to start balancing the money and goods supply, to softly and gradually accomplish the monetary reform. To tie up "hot" money, we could pay interest on funds kept in savings institutions in new rubles. Or to guarantee that if the money is left on deposit for a certain period of time—three or five years—part of it will be converted to new money. After a longer period the entire deposit will be converted.... In short, the mechanism will start to work.

At the same time, we will need to improve the pay system (people should be paid for producing concrete results, and without limitations; today the volume of production shrinks while the salaries go up), to develop shareholding economic forms, small businesses, etc.

If we want to follow a normal development course, we need to integrate ourselves into the system of international division of labor, to become an organic part of the world market, to work in close cooperation with international economic organizations. That is why we study the IMF report with such interest. We are open to wide international cooperation.

[Golovachev] Now a few questions not related directly to economy. The press writes a lot today that the official course of our country is gradually shifting to the right. Have you noticed it?

[Petrakov] Yes, there are such tendencies, in my opinion. How solid they are is another question....

[Golovachev] In his resignation statement, E.A. Shevardnadze was talking about a serious threat to democratic transformations. I have heard before that a temporary retreat is inevitable, but it would not last long, and in a year perestroyka will resume its course....

[Petrakov] This is a naive delusion. If the opponents of reform come to power, it will be not a temporary retreat, but a crushing defeat. Looking at historical analogies, one can say with certainty that if the "retreat" starts, it will last not one and not even five years....

Besides, those who demand a "break" in the course of the reform in order to "bring back elementary order," basically ignore a self-evident fact that the reforms themselves had been necessitated by the total failure of the "feudal-serfdom" methods of maintaining the order.

[Golovachev] How do you see the future—optimistically or pessimistically?

[Petrakov] Optimistically. We have almost reached the limit. The realization of this fact should unite the country. We have a substantial scientific and technological potential (look, for instance, at the military-industrial complex that has many state-of-the-art technologies), we have enormous natural resources, good conditions for agriculture... Finally, the international climate is right. If we move toward consensus instead of a confrontation and a civil war, if we use effective economic models and international experience in overcoming economic crises, we will succeed.

Aid to USSR Called Investment in Future

91UF0270A Moscow TRUD in Russian 19 Dec 90 p 3

[Article by TASS political observer A. Antsiferov: "To Achieve a Better Future"]

[Text] The Soviet Union is far from the only country which is receiving aid from the world community. The USSR is undoubtedly the first and, for the time being, only great power which has found itself in peacetime in a situation which does not permit it to ignore even such minor aid as shipments of goods from abroad, however, even though everyone understands that they will not resolve any problems.

On the other hand, the scale of solidarity is such that it cannot be considered trifling: The "rivulets" of packages containing food and medical supplies converge to form a solid river. According to preliminary estimates, at the present time various foreign institutions, charity funds, public organizations, firms, and private individuals have already contributed an amount exceeding $160 million in food and humanitarian aid for the Soviet people.

When accepting aid it is not proper to ask what motives are guiding those who are presently demonstrating both generosity and simple human kindness. Nonetheless, such a question cannot be passed over if only because the aid is coming from those same countries which only yesterday considered themselves our "potential enemies."

The aid being rendered us today demonstrates for all practical purposes that millions of people in the West do not consider us enemies any longer. It hardly needs saying that, in much the same manner, few Soviet people will henceforth fear the "aggressive intentions" of those who sent the packages. Perhaps such a statement of the situation is worth more than a whole crowd of official declarations.

These days our country, in the eyes of the world, is finally losing the appearance or, as it is fashionable to say today, the image of a state accustomed to instilling fear in everyone. We can finally be seen as we are: With all our past and present mistakes, but also as people—without any unnecessary self-disparagement—resolved on a great experiment of the social perestroyka of society. As it turns out, everyone in the world has an interest in seeing this experiment completed satisfactorily.

Moreover, this process, in the opinion of the leading politicians of the West, should lead not to the degradation of a great power, not to its transformation into a third-class country, but to its stabilization and prosperity. Because only as a great power can our country be a worthy partner, assume its responsibilities, and make its contribution to the resolution of the problems facing humanity, whether they concern disarmament, the ecology, or world economic integration. There is good reason for foreign political circles to view the aid being give us not as an act of charity and not even simply as a gesture of good will, but as an investment in a joint future.

I am prepared to understand the feelings of those of my countrymen who consider this aid demeaning and who are even ashamed of it. I cannot share their point of view, however. Can charity, solidarity, and belief in us, our forces, our will, and our ability to achieve a better future really demean anyone? Is it really possible to be ashamed that we were not abandoned as hopeless and that plans and hopes are bound up with us?

And cannot these hopes be justified?

Kucherenko Discusses Union Budget

LD2812233190 Moscow Central Television Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 28 Dec 90

[Interview with Viktor Grigoryevich Kucherenko, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission for Planning, Budget and Finance, by correspondent L. Khatayevich on 28 December; place not given; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Khateyevich] Viktor Grigoryevich, we are going talk about probably the most acute issue today; I am talking about the business connected with the Union's budget and the situation which has arisen with the adoption of the budget by the Russian legislature. In this regard, I want to quote something. Handing in his resignation, Russian Finance Minister Federov said: I can in no way agree with the superficial approach in the mutual relations between the Russian and Soviet budgets, with the exaggeration of shortages. What does this superficial approach consist of, if it actually exists?

[Kucherenko] Legislatures—both Union and republican—after their election, took the direction of increasing expenditure on social needs. But, of course—and you know that the Union legislature adopted almost 47 billion more in expenditure in 1991 for social needs—for the whole five-year period, only 16 billion was planned. The Russian legislature is also making decisions in this direction, and I cannot say that these decisions are somehow superficial or unfounded. Russia, in the first place, and the other republics, of course, need increased expenditure on social needs. But, in all these issues, there is a need for balanced, established rules of the game in all the country's economy.

[Khatayevich] There is a proverb: Cut your suit according to the cloth.

[Kucherenko] That is absolutely correct. The whole country must cut its suit according to the cloth. But, the most important thing is not to try to solve your questions at the expense of others. This is fraught with major consequences. The Russian legislature and Russia have now acted; they have increased their expenditure on social and other aims by not financing the Union budget's expenditures, and moreover by not financing the subsidies which are given to other raw-material-producing republics. Now there is the situation when Russia says: No, this is all our money, and we will not give it to them, we will not send it for others' needs—and needs really do exist, and they exist in every republic—we will sent it for our own needs. Of course, this will cause extraordinary consequences in the country. They will consist of a very simple variant. In Uzbekistan, there is cotton; in Kazakhstan, they have rare ferrous metals; they will simply raise the present prices to have normal profitability in these enterprises so their labor collectives can somehow exist comfortably. Prices will jump immediately, and Russia will not have this money, and it will pay the price for this.

These rules are already envisaged in the transfer to market relations here. All this is levelled out as regards the pace and development and introduction of market relations and those circumstances which have been developed in the basic guidelines. The market itself will regulate and allocate all this income—the national income which the country gets—between producers. Now, it has come about that the national income has gone into one pair of hands, and it has been decided to allocate this national income independently. Now, such a decision breaks the whole system and structure which has been formed, aimed at the transfer to the market.

[Khateyevich] Tell me, are there any republics that have already acted when drawing up their budget, or are intending to act, like Russia?

[Kucherenko] No, practically all the republics have determined themselves. Well, maybe it is not yet completely regulated with the baltic republics. For example, the Ukraine has drawn up its budget; everything is as normal. They have taken subsidies of seven billion for the coal industry. We will subsidize from our budget; let us have a turnover tax and keep seven billion for ourselves. Fine, keep seven billion and send seven billion; it ends up balanced.

[Khatayevich] During the polemics, we heard yesterday Nazarbayev say the following: Forgive—I stress, forgive—the Russian legislature. In the first quarter of next year, leave—so to speak—all contributions to the Union budget at the level which they were.

[Kucherenko] I remember Nazarbayev's statement. I only want to say that it is impossible for the first quarter. It is not such a simple question, quarterly; it must be decided for the year.

[Khatayevich] What position is your planning and budget commission forming today on this question?

[Kucherenko] They must agree. If there is no agreement, then the laws of the USSR must operate in the country.

Agricultural

Stroyev Interviewed on Agrarian Policy

914B0052A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 20 Dec 90 First Edition pp 1-2

[Unattributed interview with Ye.S. Stroyev, CPSU Politburo member, CPSU Central Committee secretary; place and date not given: "The Situation Requires Active and Specific Actions by Communists"]

[Text] [SELSKAYA ZHIZN] Yegor Semenovich, we would like to start our interview with a question that concerns our entire society today. We are talking about the food situation in the country, and how to overcome the difficulties that have emerged in this sphere. Obviously, the editorial staff is aware of the fact that the CPSU Central Committee, as well as the entire party, no longer takes the managerial function upon itself. Our mail supports the conclusion that the people believe in the Communist Party's substantial ability to exert decisive influence not only on the political atmosphere of society, however, but on the resolution of socioeconomic problems. People want to know what the CPSU Central Committee is doing, and is going to undertake, in the sphere of agrarian policy.

[Stroyev] I want to say first of all that the Central Committee accepts, with full responsibility, the hopes the people attach to our party's activities in resolving the food problem, and to the practical implementation of the measures contained in the president's program presented to the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Just recently, at a meeting of the Central Committee Commission on Agrarian Policy, we discussed at length how to mobilize efforts and resources to improve the food situation in the country, to ensure that the development of the agro-industrial complex gets the priority during the transition to market relations. The work ahead of us will be intensive. Especially considering that the political and social-economic situation in which we have to operate has become, to be honest, extremely acute.

The problem of supplying food—especially meat and dairy products—to large cities and industrial centers has become much more complicated practically everywhere. The growth in agricultural production has slowed down, and the social conditions of the peasant's lives are not improving in some places. The discipline of fulfilling state orders and making contractual deliveries has plunged. All these processes require from us a deep analysis of the situation and a determination of effective measures, of bold and non-standard approaches to the problem.

Yes, it is true that the Communist Party has abandoned the command methods of managing the economy, substituting soviet and economic organs for the party. But does this mean that the communists will now, so to say, leave the battlefield? Not at all! It is very alarming that many party committees have found themselves not ready for the new situation, have started to lose the initiative in implementing the agrarian policy, and some "most ardent" ones have even decided to disband their agricultural departments. Such an approach has never ensured success. We are the party that has the majority in elected all-Union power organs, in most republics, krays and oblasts; therefore we should shed this veil of shyness in taking this position of non-interference and passivity and, on the contrary, become activist in implementing our agrarian policy through communists.

It has been noted that many party organizations recently have been widely discussing global problems while shoving the problems related to ensuring the daily needs of the people to the back burner. This is a dangerous tendency which may lead to separation from reality. In many places an old ill of acting only on the commands and directives of the center still prevails, and in some others the current situation is simply being observed with skepticism. The lack of desire, or ability, of the party committee to search for new approaches has nothing to do with the prescribed demand for power of the party masses which is one of the founding statements of the 28th CPSU Congress.

The situation is completely different in places where the party committees and the primary party organizations have not slackened, but, on the contrary, have increased their organizational and ideological activities; where the party goes to people in full knowledge of their needs, moods, and concerns; where they do not shun heated discussions, and where they convincingly defend the socialist ideal. We can name a whole number of rayons and entire oblasts—for instance, Belgorod, Rostov, Penza, Orel, Cherkassy, Chernigov, Brest, and Vitebsk Oblasts, as well as some oblasts in Kazakhstan—where even under these conditions a noticeable improvement in the agrarian sphere has been achieved.

In these oblasts communists work closely with the agrarian movement, with the trade unions and youth organizations; they help the soviets of people's deputies and economic organs in solving social-economic problems. I should note that each of these regions has its own outstanding program of action and its loyal and competent cadres; the people's faith in the possibility of finding a way out of the crisis is on the rise there—and this is the main precondition for success in any undertaking.

Of course, it is not easy now to work in a party committee of any party organization. The party continues to be attacked both from the "right" and the "left"; attempts are still being made to isolate party organizations from the workers' collectives, to discredit, and sometimes plainly to defame, any actions by the communists. There is an ongoing open political struggle. The winners will be those who attract the people to their side by realistic and bold programs; who convince the people of the viability of these programs, and prove it to them. Now, more than ever, is the time for an open position not only by the party, but by each communist separately, a time for consolidation and unity in action.

I would like to specifically emphasize that under the new conditions of all-out democratization of political and economic life the party organizations should find new methods, should utilize the rights given them by the party rules; they should not remove themselves from solving vital practical problems but, on the contrary, should get actively involved in them.

The specificity of new conditions also lies in the fact that the apparat's diktat is being completely removed, and emphasis is being made on the activation of elective organs. It is precisely the party committee members whose responsibility it is to get things organized, to oversee them, and to take responsibility for them. In this regard the role of permanent commissions, created by party committees at all levels, from the Central Committee to the party raykoms [rayon committees] to deal with various activities, grows tremendously.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] Can you tell us, since we are on this topic, how the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Agrarian Policy, which you head, plans to organize its work so it will be well-directed and will bring results?

[Stroyev] First of all I want to emphasize that the commission's work should be firmly guided by the 28th CPSU Congress' decisions and its resolution "On the Situation of the Peasants and the Implementation of the CPSU's Agrarian Policy," and the resolution of the October (1990) CPSU Central Committee Plenum on the situation in the country and the CPSU's tasks in relation to transition of the economy to market relations.

We hope that through the work of our commission and corresponding local commissions we will involve the widest possible party activ, scientists, specialists, administrators, and communist people's deputies in the search for solutions to the agrarian problem, and the study and consideration of all questions on the basis of a deep analysis of the situation and the scientific forecast of perspectives.

The main directions and tasks of the commission's work, I think, are reflected in its statute, as well as in its working plan for 1990-1991.

How do we implement them in practice? We intend to create, within the framework of the commission, temporary task forces which will study the problems and prepare them for consideration by the commission, and to present them, when necessary, to the CPSU Central Committee, and, as a legislative initiative, to the USSR Supreme Soviet. We are already forming the first groups of that kind. It is understandable that it will not be easy for them to realize their intentions; after all, they are acting, so to say, on a volunteer basis. We should remember that, in accordance with the decision of the Central Committee plenum, however, the working organ of the commission is CPSU Central Committee Department on Agrarian Policy, which provides the organizational and technical means for its functioning.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] But can one, Yegor Semenovich, count on the commission to be able to influence the current state of affairs in today's realities?

[Stroyev] Your doubts are understandable. Still, we think—and it is borne out by the realities of our life—that, despite the emergence of a multitude of parties and other social-political organizations and movements, there is not a more authoritative and organized force than the CPSU in the country and in many concrete regions, and that this is the force that can unite society and resurrect among the people the faith in the correctness of the chosen course towards the fundamental restructuring of all aspects of our life.

We need a breakthrough, and we need it very much. It seems that in the course of endless discussions, in the atmosphere of confusion and of continuously hyped up social tension, people stopped noticing each other; they also seem to have completely forgotten about earthly matters. Then they act surprised: What ever happened to the goods, why are the food counters empty? They act surprised, but then they again run to the rallies hoping for a miracle: Maybe some savior will appear who will relieve them of the anxieties, poverty, and strife. But the savior is not coming. We can only save ourselves, with a sensible attitude toward ourselves and toward our business.

Back to the work of the commission. I would like to say that the main, or key, point in its activities, which should receive the most attention, is the implementation of the CPSU's social policy toward the peasantry. Our entire society is facing the task of not only implementing social transformations in the countryside, but of bringing about a fundamental economic and moral rebirth of the countryside. We need to search for new approaches and motivations for work. It is important to involve all the intellectual potential of our party, the workers' class, and the intelligentsia in solving the problem of overcoming the social impoverishment of the countryside. Without understanding and without completely exposing the true reasons for the impoverishment of the rural areas we cannot seriously consider, and count on, a fast solution to the food problem. It is exactly the fact that we put the social problems of the rural areas at the forefront that gives us, the commission, reason to believe that our program of action will have full support among the peasantry, and that will become the basis for its implementation.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] What specific means of influencing the situation, of implementing the social transformation of the rural areas do you have in mind?

[Stroyev] The methods, means, and forms of action may be different, but they all have the same purpose—to resurrect society's respect for the peasants' labor and for the peasant himself; then his life will start changing for the better.

There is already some experience in the social transformation of the rural areas, of bringing back to life the nearly empty villages and entire rayons in some oblasts. We need to use this experience. The party committee's commissions on agrarian policy could play an important role in this. They would act not only by studying and propagating this experience. They need to exercise their right to invite to the commission for an informational briefing of communist officials of the state and economic organs; they should assist local soviets in working out concrete programs of social transformation of the rural areas, in mobilizing the means and resources for its implementation. After all, Lipetsk Oblast has found the resources to create a good basis for the construction industry, thereby substantially accelerating the solution of the social problems of the rural areas.

We plan, over the next year, to study in detail the process of implementing social programs in rural areas in a number of regions in the country, and to conduct a number of seminar-type conferences on this topic, with the participation of party committee secretaries. We intend, together with the agro-industrial and planning organs, to prepare and to present on the behalf of the CPSU a program of social transformation of the rural areas as a legislative initiative for the USSR Supreme Soviet.

We should also look most attentively at measures for the social protection of the peasantry under the conditions of market relations.

The plan for the commission's work pays special attention to working out concrete proposals on how to improve the pricing policy and how to ensure the equivalent correlation of prices between the agricultural products and industrial goods sold in the rural areas, that is, to maintain parity in the economic relationship between the cities and the rural areas. We intend, of course, to take all of this under control. There are also other aspects of social protection of the peasantry that require constant attention and development. Among them are the leveling of social security income, decent pay for work done, and improving retail, medical, and other services.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] You probably mean that the implementation of these plans of the Central Committee's commission should actively involve communists in localities, in the primary organizations; otherwise the whole idea may get stalled, as has happened many times before. But they—the "primaries"—will have to operate in an unusual environment—under the conditions of the transition to market relations. In your view, Yegor Semenovich, what are the most important points that communists in rural areas should keep in mind?

[Stroyev] I agree that the primary party organizations in rural areas—as well as working collectives on the whole—will have a difficult period of adjustment to market relations in all spheres of the agro-industrial complex. The foundation for this is the fastest possible introduction of the land reform, the rebirth of the peasant as the master of the land and of the results of his labor, and the development of a multisectoral economy. I would like to remind you that the main directions for the transition to a multisectoral economy and a variety of economic forms in agriculture have been defined by the March (1989) Central Committee Plenum. The extensively detailed foundation for them was laid out in the resolution of the 28th CPSU Congress, "On the Situation of the Peasantry and the Implementation of the CPSU's Agrarian Policy."

These issues have caused heated debates, as they did in 1917, at the congresses and sessions of the people's deputies in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], the Ukraine, Belorussia, Uzbekistan, and other republics. This is not surprising, since they touch on the most painful, vitally important problems.

One may say with all certainty that the necessity of transition to a multisectoral economy in agriculture is no longer denied by anybody. Everybody agrees on this direction in the agrarian reform—the radicals, the conservatives, and the centrists. Their approach to its implementation differs considerably, however. Some demand immediate liquidation of the kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms], and the distribution of land into private hands, believing that only individual farmers can feed the country. Others persist in insisting on only collective forms of production.

Our party as a whole, and primarily the rural communists, should have its own position on this issue. The general principle is the variety and equality of different forms of ownership, which will make it possible to use each of them in those areas where its potential will be utilized best. That is, we are talking about a mixed economy.

As to the land, we put special emphasis on the development of lifetime leases with inheritance rights, that will create wide opportunities for economic initiative and at the same time preclude abuse and land speculation.

Based on a sober assessment of the real situation, one may predict, that the modern production environment, historical traditions, and the social environment will create conditions for the prevalence of collective forms of ownership—shareholding, cooperative, and collective. No matter how much we talk about their lack of a future, we should honestly admit that so far the potential of our agricultural enterprises—the kolkhozes and sovkhozes—has not been able to reveal itself and show its full capacity. They will be able to show themselves when they get real independence, and all the attendant rights to organize production and dispose of it. Rural party organizations should understand that a necessary condition for this process is the overcoming of the peasants' alienation from the means of production. Therefore, we should ensure the change in the substance of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, their transformation from being administrative-economic structures into unions (associations) of primary cooperatives, and their transition to a shareholding-based ownership of common property, as was done in Chartayev's famous kolkhoz in Dagestan. Agro-conglomerations and agro-firms have not lost their importance, either.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] But communists are often accused of not wanting the rebirth of peasant farms, and of standing in the way of this process. Is that true?

[Stroyev] I categorically disagree with this, although in some localities these mistakes have indeed taken place. Our commission believes, in the spirit of the party resolutions, that peasant and family farms have considerable prospects. We have about 30,000 of them now. This constitutes approximately one half percent of the total number of families engaged in kolkhoz and sovkhoz production. As you see, it is still very little. Sociological research data show that about 20 percent of the peasants want to own land and to farm it individually. As you can see, this is not much, either, and will not bring about the destruction of the kolkhoz-sovkhoz system. To satisfy the wishes of these peasants, we should start now the large scale process of creating peasant and family farms. We should be careful, however, not to rush this process along without taking material resources into account. This will require a substantial volume of capital investment and resources, as well as various machinery that is not yet produced in sufficient quantities in our country. Therefore we support the idea that for now the peasant and family farms develop under the umbrella of public entities that will actively assist them and provide the necessary services.

I would also like to emphasize that individual plots adjacent to houses also have considerable potential. Right now they contribute about one quarter of all agricultural production. The experience of Uzbekistan and some other republics where they have increased the size of these plots, however, shows that this is a way to sharply increase the production of a variety of food products without substantial capital investment. Besides, this is a direct way of bringing the peasants into the market relations, and of gradually transforming such plots into independent farms.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] One again, Yegor Semenovich, a question that is causing quite a few accusations to be hurled at the Communist Party—the question of land. Some say that the party committees create obstacles to the allocation of land for peasant-farmers....

[Stroyev] The question of land is not as easy as it may seem. Almost all land already has an owner. Where will we find space for the farmers? We are convinced that the faster land reform is implemented, the more large scale and effective will be the de-state-ization of property—as applied to kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other enterprises and organizations in the agro-industrial complex—and the development of a multisectoral economy. This is the basis of the formation of market relations in the agrarian sphere.

Our commission, working closely with the corresponding commissions of party committees on all levels, is tasked with mobilizing the efforts of all communists who are in charge of agro-industrial organs and scientific institutes, of the Peasants' Union and the kolkhoz soviets, to carry out USSR and republic legislation on land. It is important, for instance, to inventory all lands—no matter to whom they currently belong—and to determine the effectiveness of their utilization. To allocate land to individual farmers, a supply of available lands should be created under the local soviets so that these lands could be allocated to all citizens who want to start individual or family farms, or cooperatives.

At the same time, we believe it expedient to help the creation of leaseholds in every possible way, the organization within the framework of kolkhozes and sovkhozes of primary cooperatives and their associations that will lease land on a long-term basis, will lease farms and other units, and will conduct their business in an efficient and effective manner.

We should also, in the nearest future, meet the wishes of those citizens who want to acquire garden and dacha plots.

The party committee commissions on agrarian policy are supposed to thoroughly study the experience of the development of various economic forms in various regions of the country, to identify the factors that are braking this development, to determine the steps necessary for the fastest implementation of everything that is useful in this sphere, and, through communists, to insist on their implementation by the state and economic organs in order to create the best environment for the working collectives and individual workers.

Among other issues that our commission will have to undertake is assistance to state, planning, and agro-industrial organs in the development and implementation of special purpose programs for the development of individual branches of agro-industrial production. By that we mean a more comprehensive approach to our "Grain" program, first of all in the material and technical supply of grain production. Additional work is also needed for the "Meat" program, that will take into account already existing means for the accelerated increase of production of this valuable food category. The development of the meat production branch of animal husbandry in the oblasts, krays, and republics that receive subsidies now, will require a special approach.

I want to again bring to the communists' attention the fact the food situation is now the most painful issue in our society. Acting on the basis of coordinated actions by all Union republics and the center as outlined in the president's program, we need to pull out of the food crisis and to stabilize the supply of basic food products for the population. The volume of production and monthly deliveries of food (including imports) to the distribution network for December-March have been determined; also outlined were measures in the areas of incentives and responsibility for observing contractual discipline in deliveries, in creating a modern basis for the processing of agricultural production, strengthening the material and technical base of the agro-industrial complex, and implementing achievements of the scientific and technical progress in the sphere of agriculture.

All of this can become a reality only if the people in each link make an effort to accomplish their tasks. Here I would like to again appeal to rural communists and their primary party organizations. Their immediate task is to not allow a decrease in livestock levels during the winter. The situation on the farms is difficult. There is less animal feed than last year, and its quality is worse. The number of livestock has diminished. Only a high level of organization of production can forestall a drastic reduction in productivity. The party committees should make sure that thy meet with farm workers more often to strive to resolve the emerging problems in a timely manner, especially in the area of feed production, and to activate an all-encompassing system of measures aimed at moral and material incentives for production leaders. I cannot agree with those who say that socialist competition has outlived itself. This is wrong. An individual has a natural desire to earn respect from his comrades in labor, to distinguish himself by good deeds. So why should we discard such an important incentive?

The issues of the political underpinnings of agrarian reform and the transition of the agro-industrial complex to market relations should be at the center of organizational work of the party committees and their commissions on agrarian policy.

Under conditions of the transition to the market the issue that comes to the forefront is that of the necessity to perfect the system of management and of the material and technical supply of the agro-industrial complex, the creation of a wide network of modern agro-service, and the fine-tuning of the credit and finance system. In our enormous country the market will start working first and foremost in the agrarian sphere that is most receptive to market relations. We are convinced that market relations will open greater possibilities for the producers of goods, will increase their incentives to increase production and to achieve high end results.

The effectiveness of the market will depend on the activist actions of all our republics, and the further development of their economic links. These principles of inter-relations are a part of the Union treaty.

Early December Weather, Crop Conditions Eyed

914B0053A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 14 Dec 90 Second Edition p 1

[Article by N. Mikheyev, agricultural meteorologist: "The Weather and Crops"]

[Text] Unusually warm weather is taking place over the European territory of the country. The average air temperature for the second 10-day period of December to the east of the Tallinn-Bryansk-Lugansk line exceeded the annual average by three to six degrees. Only in Moldova, the southwest half of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania was the air temperature close to the usual. Thawing has set in everywhere.

At the beginning of the month the winter grain crops grew in the southern Ukraine and in the North Caucasus. Their supply of moisture was adequate for the most part. The winter wheat bushed out generally to two-2.5 shoots per plant; crops that were sown early bushed out to more than three shoots. Subsequently temperatures dropped over the majority of the territory here, and growth of the winter grain crops slowed to 10-15 days behind the annual average.

In the majority of the regions of the USSR's European territory, winter grain crops were under a cover of snow whose thickness was less than 10 cm for the most part. Northeast of the Petrozavodsk-Vologda-Kostroma-Ufa-Sverdlovsk line the thickness of the snow cover was from 15 to 35 cm. The low for the soil temperature at the depth where the tillering node of the winter grain crops is bedded stayed between minus one to minus five degrees almost everywhere. The winter crops had satisfactory conditions for wintering. In a number of regions of Kirov and Perm Oblasts nutrients for respiration were applied intensively to the winter grain crops.

Warm weather also predominated in the republics of the Transcaucasus region and Central Asia. During the first days of the month the winter crops grew. Subsequently temperatures dropped over the majority of the territory, and a thin covering of snow formed on the fields in individual regions.

In Western Siberia temperatures dropped quickly after some warmth, and precipitation occurred in the majority of the regions. The winter grain crops were in a state of winter dormancy under a cover of snow, whose thickness was generally 10-15 cm. The low for the soil temperature at the depth where the tillering node of the winter grain crops is bedded stayed between minus 10 and minus 15 degrees. Wintering was proceeding favorably. The temperature at the tillering node depth was dangerous for young plants only in individual rayons of Kemerovo Oblast because of an uneven snow cover.

Yaroslav Farms Show Ongoing Reform Problems

PM0201112991 Moscow Central Television Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 28 Dec 90

[Report by writer A. Artsibashev on the state of the Russian countryside from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Artsibashev] Russian peasants have never been so abused as at present. They have been called parasites, lazy, and incapable. They have been accused of having stopped working and thinking altogether, of holding city dwellers to ransom, of creating food shortages, of driving prices at markets to astronomical heights. They have been all but stoned.

So what is happening in the countryside at present?

The Russian countryside is at a crossroads for the umpteenth time. Which road will it choose? Kolkhozes and sovkhozes [collective and state farms] are incapable of feeding people. Individual farmers cannot manage it yet. There are not enough of them, and the few that there are have not yet found their feet. Many wise peasant traditions have been lost. Yet our grandfathers built them up bit by bit, to help future generations to avoid mistakes. They wanted to see the country strong and rich. That was their dream. They could not have known that millions of hectares of the land for which many generations of Russian people gave their lives would be left untended, and those that had been sown would not be harvested in the fall. It is difficult to picture this, but, alas, it is the reality.

The wintering of livestock is fraught with difficulties in Yaroslavl Oblast this year. On many farms one-third of the grain was left in the fields, and not enough feeds have been laid in. Cows and calves are on meager rations. What question can there be of weight gain and increased milk yields in these circumstances? Yet the groundwork for the next agricultural year is being laid now. Will we be begging for outside help again? [Video shows Artsibashev interviewing milkmaids]

Are the milk yields high?

[Milkmaid] High? No, not particularly. We are operating at a loss. We need encouragement.

[Artsibashev] What is morale like? Is it bad?

[Milkmaid] There is no other work. We have nowhere to go. There is only the livestock unit. What can we do? We do what we are told to do.

[Artsibashev] There is no respite from all kinds of innovations in the countryside. Strange as it may seem, however, no one is satisfied. The kolkhoz members complain of a lack of attention, and individual farmers are unhappy.

At Rostov Velikiy I got talking to Aleksandra Dmitriyevna Beybulatova, a former milkmaid on the Lazartsevskiy sovkhoz. She had come to the rayon soviet executive committee with a petition. Despite her 30 head of cattle and 120 sheep she has been unable to secure the allocation of a plot of land. But, after all, the Land Law has been passed. Why is it not operating? All the people on the sovkhoz have been supplied with stoves for the winter. Only the Beybulatov family has been excluded. Their children try to keep warm by the gas cooker and nobody cares. Is this a way to get even with them?

[Beybulatova] We have been called scoundrels and thieves. We have been told: You have nothing to do, so you engage in pranks. You do not want to work in the sovkhoz—that is why you are doing this.

But what do I get if I work in the sovkhoz? A hundred rubles. For working day and night as a milkmaid. I have worked in the sovkhoz as a milkmaid for 14 years.

The Russian peasantry took centuries to grow up. It will take ages yet to be reborn.

At Konditovo village I had the pleasure of meeting the Rybakon family. Father, mother, son, daughters, and grandchildren are all working together. The farm is big. There are cows, and calves, and poultry, and bees. They have delivered 80 tonnes of milk to the sovkhoz. They have sold all kind of produce on the market. They have even acquired their own cart and are selling fresh produce at the workers' settlement. Who stands to lose from this?

Are there many people who envy you?

[Rybakon mother] Naturally, there are many people who envy us. But all they have to do is to get down to work themselves, to do as we do.

[Rybakon son] The problem is that we have no backing. People would get down to work if they had some assistance in financial matters, if someone helped them to find their feet. As it is, they watch me as I struggle on. They are afraid, they are simply afraid.

[Artsibashev] They have no faith in the future?

[Rybakon son] That is it. Lack of faith, a terrible lack of faith.

[Artsibashev] The Russian peasant has been exploited for a long time, for a long time he has remained silent. The time has come to pay for the senseless exploitation. The peasant today is no longer willing to pull the heavy cart single-handed, to live and work in the old way. The time has come to grasp this, and to help farmers to find their feet.

Military

Navy Reports Budget Constraints

PM0101113591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Dec 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents Captain Second Rank M. Lukanin and Captain Third Rank Yu. Gladkevich under the rubric "The Fleet Today and Tomorrow": "Escorted by Problems"]

[Excerpts] After covering thousands of miles from the Black Sea to the Pacific, the guided missile cruiser Chervona Ukraina, built by Black Sea shipbuilders, has made fast in a Kamchatka berth, at its permanent base.

The commissioning of a new ship is undoubtedly an exceptional event. But—and this can be seen particularly clearly today—each such event is painful rather than pleasant for the fleet.... [passage omitted]

Here we probably touch on the sorest point. The program for building the Navy provides for a balanced fleet to be built. But, alas, in the course of its realization, the situation, as a rule, obliges us to give preference to some areas of building to the detriment of others. Today, while possessing a considerable number of quite modern warships, we most frequently have a fleet infrastructure not in keeping with their requirements. [passage omitted]

Now, to all appearances, the situation will be still further complicated. The costs of conversion are to blame for this, particularly this one: Until the present time the local military ship-repair plant, in terms of its potential, has barely met the needs of the ships stationed here. With the arrival of the Chervona Ukraina and other new ships the need for new repair capacities and conditions for a new standard of repair arises. But the plant's potential has diminished, and significantly so: A plan worth several million rubles for the repair of fishing boats has been "passed down" to the plant. So the orders of naval sailors are being dislodged from the production plans, and the fleet has been forced to fix up its ships in the docks of a civilian shipyard and even... in the ship-repair shops of fishery collective farms.

The Navy Main Staff is today experiencing considerable concern at the prospects for military ship repairs. For spending on the fleet's needs is falling. The fleet is faced with a choice: either to build new ships to replace ones which have served their time—and then ship repairs will be put on starvation rations. Or to allocate funds for strengthening the ship-repair base—and then it will be necessary to delay the building of new ships.

The fleet has been forced to cut to a minimum the time allocated to combat training, if only to "extend" the service life of warships for as long as possible. Here losses in enhancing the professionalism of naval sailors are inevitable, for there will be fewer rather than more simulators which could compensate at least to some degree for the loss of training-ground time.

Nevertheless, everything possible is being done in the Navy to qualitatively strengthen units and combined units. To this end three fleets have been joined by cruisers of the Chervona Ukraina type. These ships strengthen the fleets' potential for defending bases and naval stations and for protecting lines of communication and the coast. In the course of such use some complaints about the level of technical equipment of cruisers and about the combined units' potential for reinforcing their efforts with other ships are removed. Take the question of ensuring a full formation for the Chervona Ukraina. In resolving defensive tasks, the cruiser is able, in cooperation with onshore units and aircraft, to efficiently detect the enemy at the utmost range, to use weapons against him, and to ensure its own survivability and ability to stand up in combat, the ability of the base to stand up in combat, and the deployment of the fleet's strike forces in this region.

This is not the first year that naval sailors, while perfectly satisfied with the quality and potential of their weapons, have complained about a certain weakness of shipboard electronic facilities. But the Chervona Ukraina is not allocated the role of a maritime "lone wolf": The cruiser is a constituent part of a system where there are onshore means of detecting and tracking the enemy and issuing target designations, other ships, and also air and space facilities.

It seems to us that Captain First Rank G. Shinkevich expressed a thought which is not devoid of reason: It is a good thing that ships of this design are distributed among various fleets, for a single fleet—the Pacific Fleet, for example—is not capable of maintaining several cruisers of the Chervona Ukraina type at once. In general, the weakness of fleet support structures is manifested particularly clearly in those bases and naval stations where several large modern ships are concentrated. Take, for example, the combined unit which includes the Novorossiysk, the Minsk, and the Frunze. These giants, figuratively speaking, devour almost all the "oxygen" destined to be breathed by all the ships stationed there.

The reality is such that the fleet is obliged to "cut its coat according to its cloth": Having abandoned indefinitely its hopes of a comprehensive approach to the development of all its constituent parts and estimating its scant budget one way or another, it has to choose on what to spend its money first. This was the case with the Chervona Ukraina: Either to put all funds and resources into constructing the berth and the onshore base and leave the ship's officers and warrant officers without housing or to spare a little to create everyday "berths" for sailors' families. Here they took the second path: Apartments have already been allocated to 70 percent of the cruiser's officers and warrant officers with families.

We could go on enumerating the difficulties accompanying the new ship's commissioning into the fleet. But it is already clear that they arise out of the poverty in whose vise-like grip our country is squeezed.

Today everyone is convinced that the Army and Navy must be brought into line with the requirement for reasonable defense sufficiency. This is being done. In the opinion of many cadre servicemen (and this was heard at the USSR president's meeting with servicemen deputies), however, the present approach to supporting the Armed Forces and to forming the military budget sometimes creates the impression that there are people even in the Union legislature who are ready to put the Army and Navy on starvation rations.

After the preliminary hearings on the military budget for 1991 in the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions L. Sharin, the committee's acting chairman, declared in an interview with our correspondent that the Ministry of Defense must henceforth thoroughly prove the need to adopt each type of military expenditure. A correct thesis. But it is also true that our legislators in turn must form this budget with knowledge of the matter and not forget that the Army and Navy mean not just combat readiness but everything that ensures it. The principle "if we are to cut, let us cut" is not always applicable here.

As a result of the reform every remaining component of the Armed Forces must get everything it needs, not what falls to its lot.

...But what of the Chervona Ukraina? For the time being the new cruiser, like many before it, is fated to live under conditions when this principle operates: "The minimum expenditure—the greatest possible effect." How soon the time will come when this principle is replaced by another one more in line with our times: "The optimum expenditure—the maximum effect" depends on us all—on legislators, cadre naval sailors, the entire people—on our common sense, our ability to adopt verified decisions, and our ability to work.

Decision on Officers Carrying Guns Explained

PM3112165990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Dec 90 Union Edition p 4

[Report by V. Litovkin: "Why Officers Need to Carry Arms"]

[Text] The USSR Defense Ministry Press Center has distributed a communique via TASS, saying that the USSR defense minister has authorized officers, warrant officers, ensigns, and personnel doing extended military service to carry hand arms in some regions of the country.

Which regions are these? They are a secret to no one today: They are regions of interethnic conflict, those cities and republics where military guards, storage bases, officers, and warrant officers are attacked and the lives of their families placed in real danger.

Here are just a few of the figures from the USSR Defense Ministry's extensive report. As many as 89 military servicemen were murdered by civilians in 1990: 30 officers, 14 warrant officers, and 45 soldiers and sergeants in compulsory military service. A total of 61 attacks were carried out on military installations with the object of seizing weapons and ammunition. Attacks on servicemen and insults to their honor and dignity by extremists and criminal elements are showing no sign of abating.

This cannot go on. The USSR defense minister's address on Central Television, given on instructions from the USSR president, contained a strong warning, and this has now been embodied in the above order.

When will weapons be used? Only when there is real danger to the lives of military servicemen and their friends and relatives or when their honor and dignity are in need of protection. They will be used as stipulated in documents regulating military service.

I do not think honest people have any reason to fear members of the military carrying arms. They are only for their protection.

Kazakh Official Quashes Nuclear Test Rumors

PM2812161790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Dec 90 Union Edition p 5

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent Oleg Stefashin under the rubric: "Direct Line": "Test Range Remains Silent"]

[Text] Karaganda—M. Nurtazin, chairman of the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural Resources, has denied the report circulated by certain news media that nuclear weapons tests are to be resumed at the Semipalatinsk test range.

As is well known, the republic legislature has expressed its attitude to this problem with utter clarity, banning the carrying out of nuclear explosions and the testing of other kinds of weapons both on the test range itself and throughout the rest of the territory of Kazakhstan. Soon after the issuing of this resolution, however, reports appeared in a number of central publications that the USSR Defense Council does not intend to take into account the expression of the sovereign republic's will and intends to carry out a total of 18 more underground explosions in the Semipalatinsk area in the next two years. This has, incidentally, also been stated in the press by E. Gukasov, deputy chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers, citing documents in his possession.

It is only natural that the republic should have been swept by a wave of protest, which has assumed serious proportions. The situation in many regions has become severely charged. This forced members of legislature to approach the USSR Defense Council for clarification.

"The answer received by us," M. Nurtazin stated, "indicates unambiguously that neither the Defense Council nor the president himself has taken any decisions to continue tests at the Semipalatinsk nuclear test range. The rumors circulated have proven to be false."

Asked who benefited from trying to mislead people, M. Nurtazin stated that he personally suspects populists, who have sought to acquire political capital by destabilizing the situation in the republic.

New Kiev Military District Commander Interviewed

PM2812145990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Dec 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Lieutenant General Viktor Stepanovich Chechevatov, commander of Kiev Military District, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents Colonel A. Polyakov and Major S. Anisko under the new rubric, "First Interview in New Post"; place and date not given: "'I Favor an Army of Professionals'"]

[Text] Readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA often ask the editors to talk about newly appointed high-ranking military chiefs.

With today's article we open a new rubric in which we introduce the new commander of Kiev Military District, Lieutenant General Viktor Stepanovich Chechevatov.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Comrade Lieutenant General, you have become district commander at the age of 45. Does this mean that, in climbing the service ladder, you have skipped some of the rungs?

[Chechevatov] Not at all. I have been through all the command posts. Incidentally, I began my service in the Ukraine in the post of tank platoon commander in 1966. I commanded a tank regiment, a division, and an army.... I was chief of staff of the former Central Asian Military District and first deputy commander of the Carpathian Military District. I graduated from the Armored Troops Academy and the Armed Forces General Staff Academy.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] You are taking over the district from Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov, a man whom the whole country knows. What are your feelings in connection with this?

[Chechevatov] I approach my appointment with a great sense of responsibility. What can I say? All that is left for me to do is to work so as to earn my own prestige.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Incidentally, how do you evaluate the appointment of B.V. Gromov to the post of first deputy minister of internal affairs?

[Chechevatov] Very well. The decree was signed by the president of the country. That means that Boris Vsevolodovich's knowledge and experience are now required in that place.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] We have already heard from officers of a Kiev Military District staff directorate that you are an exacting person, some even said, too exacting....

[Chechevatov] It is difficult for me to assess myself objectively, but I can say that I like order in everything; I keep a strict watch over myself, and I make demands of others.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Viktor Stepanovich, would you like to tell us about your family?

[Chechevatov] My wife, Lidiya Andreyevna has been with me all her life through all the garrisons. My son Andrey is a senior lieutenant, he serves in Kamchatka. He is following in my footsteps—he is a tank crewman. That makes me happy.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Some people claim that your wife is either a relative of the present prime minister of the country, or the daughter of a prominent military chief, and therefore, they say, you are quickly being promoted up the service ladder. What do you have to say about this?

[Chechevatov] These idle fabrications have been dogging me, and, apparently, not just me, for many years. We were both, my wife and I, born in the heartland of Ulyanov Oblast. My parents are ordinary agricultural workers. My wife's father was a soldier at the front. He died in 1949. Her mother died in 1953. My future wife and I studied at boarding school, where I met her. We have no influential relatives. All this is the fabrication of people who are themselves accustomed to be promoted in the service by dishonorable means.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What will you do first in your new capacity, Viktor Stepanovich?

[Chechevatov] I have already started. I spent two days at the second stage of the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress attentively studying the political situation in the republic. I will maintain and reinforce everything good that was done in the district before me.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] One last question. As a professional soldier, are you in favor of a professional army?

[Chechevatov] Yes, I am for a professional army. At the present time, this is unfortunately impossible for a number of reasons. But I am sure that we will have an army of professionals.

Baltic Republics

Troops in Baltics Condemn Anti-Army 'Campaign'

PM3112150790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Dec 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS correspondent dispatch under "Direct Line" rubric: "Extraordinary Congress"]

[Text] Riga—The first extraordinary congress of representatives of the army community of the Baltic region has opened here in the district's Officers Club. About 500 delegates from the various units and subunits of Baltic Military District, the Baltic Fleet, the Air Defense Forces, the USSR KGB Border Troops, and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops are attending. A resolution has been adopted.

The congress delegates are insisting that the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian Supreme Soviets suspend operation of all the anti-Army legislative acts that they have adopted, conscientiously fulfill all the decisions that were previously adopted conjointly with the organs of the Army community, and halt the campaign that is being conducted in the mass media aimed at denigrating and defaming the Army and Navy, the Internal and Border Troops, and veterans of the Great Patriotic War and USSR Armed Forces.

In addition, a demand was made that acts and decisions directly or indirectly affecting the fate of servicemen, the members of their families, employees of the Soviet Army, or veterans should not be adopted without the participation of the authorized representatives of the coordinating center of the Baltic region's army community.

The resolution stresses that any attempt to influence in any way whatsoever the combat training activity of military units or the life and daily round of military garrisons and living quarters will be immediately curtailed by placing under armed protection all energy, water, and heat supply facilities, utilities networks, and other vital facilities.

Appeals to the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies, USSR servicemen, and inhabitants of the Baltic region, were adopted.

Baltic Statement on USSR Talks, Army Tension

LD3112143490 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1800 GMT 29 Dec 90

[Text] Feeling a concern over the deadlock which has arisen in the talks between the Baltic states and the USSR, as well as over the tensions which are mounting between the Soviet Armed Forces stationed in the Baltic states and the local civilian population, Baltic Foreign Ministers Lennart Meri, Janis Kurkans, and Algirdas Saudargas have issued a statement.

It says that recently threats from representatives of the Soviet Army stationed in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania addressed to the democratically elected legislatures of the three Baltic states and their governments have become more frequent. On 26 December Vitaliy Ivanov, commander of the Baltic Fleet, made a speech at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. He made a libelous accusation against the Baltic peoples, of violence against the Soviet Army. The foreign ministers' statement says that the stay of Soviet troops on the territory of the Baltic states is a political and legal issue, all aspects of which must be resolved with interstate talks between the USSR and the Baltic states. Despite repeated appeals from the Baltic states and many other countries to open talks, the Soviet side has displayed no readiness to start talks with the three Baltic states.

The foreign ministers invite the USSR to declare that in the future it will not use military force against the Baltic states.

Yeltsin Cited on Estonia-Russia Relations

LD3112130390 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1800 GMT 29 Dec 90

[Text] Today's SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA had an interview with Boris Yeltsin, president of Russia. He was asked about the present state of the economic treaty between Estonia and Russia. Boris Yeltsin answered as follows:

The process of concluding treaties took its beginning from the Baltic republics, but up until now this has not been taken to its conclusion with signatures. I hope that difficulties will be soon overcome.

The first difference of opinion is the issue of borders. We are on the position that it is necessary to fix the borders which are in existence at present. The second issue is protective measures for the Russian-speaking population. Finally, there is the issue of citizenship. There has to be an option of one's free will: If a person living in Estonia wishes to remain a citizen of Russia, selfsame rights must be ensured for him—according to international law—as for a citizen of Estonia on the territory of Russia.

In the near future we intend to open a representation of ours in Tallinn, like in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Talks are already in progress in this respect.

Soviet Troops Occupy Party Presses in Riga

AU0201115791 Paris AFP in English 1131 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, Jan 2 (AFP)—Soviet Interior Ministry troops on Wednesday moved into the printshop of the Latvian Communist Party in Riga, capital of the Baltic republic, and surrounded the building, an employee there said.

"Armoured vehicles have been posted at each corner of the building and three armed soldiers are checking the identities of everybody coming in," the worker told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE by telephone.

Troops have hoisted the Soviet flag on the roof of the building and were preventing those inside from leaving. "Another big military vehicle has just arrived outside," the young woman added.

Informed sources said the independence-minded Latvian authorities had made a strong protest over the move.

Latvian Deputy Prime Minister Dainis Evans on Wednesday called on all his compatriots to down tools and demonstrate during the afternoon in central Riga. Mr. Evans said the government would pay the strikers' wages, local journalist Alexis Grigoriev said.

Asked how many troops were in the printshop, the employee said there were "a great many". "They're in every corner, round all the presses," she said, adding that "the troops are threatening canteen workers with their automatic weapons to get free food."

Deputy Premier Evans, who has been refused permission to enter the building, said the government had twice telephoned Soviet Interior Minister Boris Pugo about the operation. The first time, Mr. Pugo said he knew nothing about it, and on the second occasion, he said he had not given Interior Ministry troops any special orders, according to Mr. Grigoriev, who is close to the nationalists.

Print workers have stated that they will not work for the local communist party, which remains loyal to Moscow and apparently ordered the military action, Mr. Grigoriev said. The workers were meeting to work out their attitude, he added.

The Communist Party holds a monopoly on publishing in the Soviet Union, but the Baltic authorities took charge of the presses several months ago.

Similar military intervention occurred in the Lithuanian capital Vilnius last April. After large demonstrations, the troops left the printshop without incident.

'Black Beret' Troops Involved

LD0201123791 Stockholm Domestic Service in Swedish 1130 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Text] [Announcer] In the Latvian capital, Riga, troops loyal to Moscow cordoned off the building in which the editorial offices of the most important newspapers are situated. The troops, called the Black Berets, choose who can enter the building, says (Janis Osovs), acting head of Latvian radio:

[Begin (Osovs) recording] At about 0900, when people tried to get in to their jobs in the press building, it proved that only some of them were permitted to enter. The press building was surrounded, so to speak, and it was forbidden to come by car into the vicinity of the press building and so on. A little later we received information that the director of the press building, (Dumdus), had been arrested somehow and is sitting in his office watched by Black Beret men. A little later certain government leaders and the vice president of the Latvian Parliament also came to the press building, but they were not given permission to enter either. The situation shows that the Black Berets are now directed by the Latvian Communist Party. [end recording]

[Announcer] During the morning there was some trouble when journalists were turned away by the armed Black Berets, but no one has been seriously injured. All work has now stopped in the press building in Riga, a building which contains the editorial offices of all Latvian daily papers and the most important periodicals. The journalists have held a protest meeting during the morning and will also meet in the afternoon to discuss the developments. The building also contains Riga's biggest newspaper print works. There the printers are now striking, which has resulted in the fact that even the Latvian editions of Moscow papers, such as PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA, cannot be published. The Latvian Popular Front has called for a demonstration in the afternoon.

What does (Janis Osovs) think is the reason for the Black Berets taking action today?

[Begin (Osovs) recording] I think that they have perhaps received a signal from Moscow that it is high time to intervene in the development of events, as I have received information that Moscow has prepared an action to impose presidential rule in Latvia in the near future. I know that the Latvian president and the premier will go to Moscow tomorrow. They are to meet Gorbachev and Defense Minister Yazov. [end recording]

[Announcer] That was said by (Janis Osovs) of the Latvian Radio. And by the way, this is the first time that Gorbachev himself will receive representatives of the Latvian Government.

Three More Explosions Reported in Riga

LD3112135990 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1200 GMT 31 Dec 90

[Excerpt] The Ministry of Internal Affairs has said that the series of big explosions in the territory of Latvia has been added to with the events of last night. There have been three bangs in Riga—in Marupes Street, by the Latvija hotel, and by the Teika Cinema. Remains of a Bickford fuse cord and a piece of cardboard, of the kind normally used in the Army's pyrotechnical equipment, were found at one of these places.

The person on duty at the Riga Internal Affairs Administration said that tonight, quite probably, many would try to prove themselves with similar armaments; because the experience of previous years shows, especially in Riga, that people still keep many signal flares and army ammunition of other kinds. [passage omitted]

Rights of War Veterans Threatened in Latvia

91UN0581A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 25 Dec 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by V. Sopelnyak: "We Have Been and Will Be in the Front Ranks"]

[Text] Riga—Imagine this picture: Standing in line for milk, leaning on a crutch that has seen better days, is an elderly man. He stands there patiently and even though he has the right to go to the front of the line, he does not try to. All of a sudden three kids run up to him and, heaping curses on him, rip the medals from his jacket.

Any unprejudiced person would say that such a thing is possible only in a country where trampling on human rights has become the norm, where blackmail and threats are legitimate means of achieving unseemly political goals. Alas, this sort of thing happens almost every day in the Latvian Republic as it flaunts its democratic achievements. With tears in their eyes, people known throughout the republic, former partisans and fighters at the front, told a TASS correspondent about this. Among them was an honored citizen of Riga, a holder of three Orders of Glory, Ya.Ya. Roze, and also I.I. Kadakovskiy, P.A. Timerman, A.F. Svarinskiy, and L.V. Birkava.

"There are more than 50,000 war veterans in Latvia, including 8,000 disabled persons, and 630,000 veterans of labor," says Ya.Ya. Roze, official secretary of the Riga section of war veterans. "Activists of the republic Council of Veterans of War and Labor, workers of social security organs, and other representatives of society have done everything possible to help these people. And suddenly a campaign has broken out to impugn the honor and dignity and at the same time the rights mainly of participants in the Great Patriotic War.

"Regardless of where I have worked since then or to whom I have been speaking, I have always remembered and I still do remember and remind other people that 156,000 Soviet troops died in the liberation of Latvia. I simply cannot understand how anyone can forget that! How can they desecrate the graves of those to whom they owe not only their freedom but also their lives.

"I was recently invited to speak to some young people. I put on my medal and went. I entered the hall and I could not believe my eyes: Sitting at the table on the stage was a person wearing a swastika. If only you could have heard the ecstasy with which he discussed the punitive actions against the partisans and how he tortured women and threw children into the fire. I could not restrain myself and I interrupted this bastard. I am an intelligence worker and a sniper, I said. And I have 116 fascists to my credit. If you do not take that swastika off and get out of here, I will add you to my list or die trying. He got scared and left..."

As you can see, the discussion was not a happy one. But in conclusion the veterans said in unison: If the Union treaty was not signed by the authorities in Latvia, healthy forces would be found who would sign it for them. And the veterans have been and will be in the front ranks!

New Latvian Journal To 'Seek Compromise'

91P50063A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 24 Nov 90 p 1

[Unattributed report under rubric "SM Courier": "Latvia: Chronicle"]

[Text] On 23 November DIENA, newspaper of the Latvian Republic, started on its way to the readers. As V. Daugmalis, editor in chief of the newspaper, notes in the editorial column: "DIENA, in the name of a free and demoractic republic, will seek compromise between the divergent layers of the Latvian public."

Latvian Party Newspaper Editors Named

91P50063B Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 28 Nov 90 p 1

[Unattributed report under the rubric "SM Courier": Latvia: Chronicle"]

[Text] At the last plenum of the Latvian CP Central Committee certain organizational changes were implemented. I. Skuin was freed from his duties as secretary of the Central Committee (at his own request). K.-G. Gerkis was elected secretary. V. Stefanovich was confirmed as editor of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA and M. Kvite as editor of CINA.

The plenum freed K. Dundurs from his obligations as director of the Latvian Publishing House of the CPSU Central Committee (in connection with his transfer to other work) and confirmed A. Vrublevskiy, worker of the Latvian CP Central Committee apparatus, in this post.

Landsbergis Views Possible Military Resistance

AU3112214390 Vienna PROFIL in German 31 Dec 90 pp 36-37

[Interview with Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis by Werner Kraeutler and Alexander Tscheparuchin in Vilnius; date not given: "Spontaneous Military Resistance"]

[Text] [PROFIL] Mr. Landsbergis, what do you say about Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's warning against a dictatorship in the USSR?

[Landsbergis] This must be taken very seriously. Those forces that are striving for dictatorship hate the Baltic states and our policy of independence. On the other hand, his resignation is a warning to all the world. If the Soviet Union returns to the dictatorship of the military-industrial complex, permeated with Stalinist dogmas and other attributes of red fascism, such as anti-Semitism and hatred of nationalities, it will be dangerous. I can imagine the Soviet Union, armed with nuclear weapons, being on the brink of a famine. It would be able to blackmail all the world: "Feed us—or the consequences will be unpredictable."

[PROFIL] Do you believe President Gorbachev's assurance that Soviet foreign policy will not change?

[Landsbergis] If the principle of "the powerful decides what is right" again dominates domestic policy, this principle will also be expressed in foreign policy. At the Paris Helsinki conference, Gorbachev posed an ultimatum to the Western states: Either myself or the foreign ministers of the Baltic states. The Baltic ministers were expelled from the conference hall.

[PROFIL] Why are there still no negotiations between you and the Soviet leadership in Moscow?

[Landsbergis] Official negotiations have not even been started. First of all, the conditions under which negotiations are held must be established. This has not happened until now. A working group was established which has to work out an agenda. At the same time, groups of experts have started their work. Actually, I intended to go to Moscow before Christmas as the head of the Lithuanian delegation to the negotiations. The meeting would not have meant the start of official negotiations, because, as I said, no agreement could be reached on the formulation of the agenda. Therefore, the fact that these talks did not take place does not mean very much.

[PROFIL] You demand 300 billion rubles [R] from the central Soviet Government.

[Landsbergis] Yes, this is correct. The R300 billion are those losses that developed in connection with the deportation of Lithuanian citizens to Siberia. This is our answer to the standard question of the Soviet leadership: "How much do you want to pay for becoming free and independent?" We have not started with making demands; this was done by the central government. You may consider our bill a demand in return.

[PROFIL] You are speaking of an "insidious occupation" of the Baltic states. What do you plan to do against this?

[Landsbergis] I said that we have to prepare for passive, non-military resistance. TASS immediately turned this into "massive" resistance. Perhaps this was a printing error; perhaps it was deliberate. The Soviet media interpreted this as "Lithuania's readiness to engage in aggressive activities." Everyone can see, however, that the Lithuanians and the other Baltic states are trying to keep as calm as possible even though the Soviet troops are continually trying to destabilize the situation. If they turn to an open form of occupation, I warn that a spontaneous military resistance by the Lithuanians is certainly a possibility. So far, there have not been any open interventions by the occupation power in our domestic affairs. We were able to develop our state institutions independently from the USSR. Now, however, they are starting to interfere, to provoke us, to act as an occupation power, which might overthrow the legally elected government at any time and establish a military government.

[PROFIL] Do you want your own army?

[Landsbergis] When I said that armed resistance in Lithuania would be possible, I did not mean a military force, simply because we do not have any. But the situation might get out of control, might develop into a political wildfire among our population. The Soviets might establish a military administration of the Baltic states with the center in Riga (Latvia), where the Army High Command has its seat. I said that if we have to think about this possibility, we would also have to consider the formation of special self-defense groups.

[PROFIL] KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA said that there are already military patrols checking the citizens in Klaipeda (Memel).

[Landsbergis] Yes, that is correct. Luckily, there have not been any clashes so far, but it is an example of the insidious occupation, of how the Red Army is starting to interfere in the life in our cities. It is showing its muscles and its future power. It is making threats. Last spring the Soviet leadership forbade our citizens to own hunting or sports weapons. This is strange, and it simply provokes our citizens. Such excesses are becoming increasingly frequent.

[PROFIL] The Soviet media claim that you are oppressing the Russians and Poles in Lithuania.

[Landsbergis] Certainly, the policy of the new government is difficult to understand for a part of these people, and this part expresses real anger. For me it is depressing to hear from the West that Russians and Poles—one-fifth of the overall population—are against Lithuania's state independence. This is not true. Opinion polls show that more than half of the non-Lithuanians are for independence. Their percentage is always increasing. The people slowly begin to understand what it means to live in a free country with just laws.

[PROFIL] But it is unrealistic to expect that Lithuania's sovereignty will now be recognized. Lithuania's borders are still being guarded by the KGB. Lithuania's citizens are forced to serve in the Soviet Army.

[Landsbergis] The USSR obviously wants to keep all annexed states—even four stony islands in the Japanese Sea, whose return to Japan would bring big advantages particularly to the eastern parts of the USSR. Moscow is sticking to the old imperial methods: "Each centimeter of land on which our soldiers ever set foot will remain Soviet territory forever." This primitive standpoint must change. Gorbachev has repeatedly declared a change in course. If he does this in talks to us, too, the question of our independence will be settled. This might take place more quickly if the Western countries were more active concerning this question. But these countries are now bound by the Gulf crisis, and we can hardly expect them to exert pressure on the central Soviet Government. The situation in the USSR could also change for the worse. A dictatorship, however, would not exist for long. The wheel of history is turning into one direction only—into the direction of freedom, democracy, self-determination of nations, and harmonious cooperation among states.

Lithuania Drops Condition for Moscow Talks

PM0201114391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Dec 90 Union Edition p 3

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent Nikolay Lashkevich from Vilnius under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Is Lithuania Moving Toward Compromise?"]

[Text] Lithuania is abandoning its condition demanding the prior signing of a protocol on beginning interstate talks with the USSR—this is the decision of the republic Supreme Soviet.

The resolution "On Interstate Talks Between the Lithuanian Republic and the USSR" notes that the decision in question was taken because "the USSR delegation is unwilling to sign the protocol." Thus the Lithuanian delegation receives the legal "go ahead" to enter into talks without the protocol envisaged earlier. A number of documents regulating the conditions for the talks has been withdrawn. Nevertheless, the resolution points out that this does not open the way for "violations of Lithuanian state sovereignty."

It is well known that one of the obstacles in the way of talks was Lithuania's firm standpoint on starting official talks only after the signing of a special protocol stipulating, in particular, recognition of the independent status of the Lithuanian state. This condition was not acceptable to the USSR delegation, and consequently the two-way talks were constantly breaking down. Consultative meetings of workings groups proved extremely difficult and effectively ended in impasse. Now, however, Lithuania has moved toward a clear compromise, realizing that obstinacy and inflexibility could have extremely undesirable consequences. The very process of talks, so highly valued by the Lithuanians, was jeopardized. "The withdrawal of the documents laying down conditions for the start of talks is meant to move the talks with the Soviet Union out of what amounted to deadlock" was [Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman] V. Landsbergis' comment on the legislature's resolution.

Lithuania Adopts State Control Department Act

LD2812220990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 28 Dec 90

[Report on the Lithuanian Supreme Council's 28 December session]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The session concluded debates on and adopted the statute of the State Control Department. This document deals with the structure of the State Control Department and its competence, the rights of the controllers, the basis and order of accountancy, of the termination of labor contracts, and of the dismissal from work. It also deals with the problems of organizing the department's work. The statute has a clause that the membership in political parties by the department officials is suspended for the duration of their service. In the debates on the statute, there were many discussions concerning the clause dealing with the dismissal of the officials from their posts. A decision of the Supreme Council was adopted on the order of coming into force of this law, corresponding amendments were made in the law of the State Control Department, the republican labor law and in the code of the violation of administrative rights.

Deputies adopted two resolutions which have been discussed at a previous sitting: on delegating the deputies to [words indistinct] and on forming a provisional economic reform commission. [passage omitted]

Klaipeda Party Official Discusses Union Treaty

91UN0583A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Dec 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with I. Bremkauskas, first secretary of the Klaypeda city party committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (loyal to the CPSU), by Captain 2d Rank V. Gromak under the rubric "Union Treaty: The View From the Republics"; place and date not given: "One Cannot Overcome the Problems Alone"]

[Text] **The conversation did not quite begin in the usual manner. Iozas Stasiyevich asked me the first question himself: What do I think about the food aid being given us by the Western countries? It turned out that Bremkauskas' mother is living in the United States and has sent him a package. Salt, rice, tea...**

[Bremkauskas] Of course I telephoned her and thanked her, but I was as ashamed as I could be. We have so much of that same salt sitting around on the railroads! Our disorder is to blame for everything, and we always turn it into a political matter. That is how it is with the Union treaty.

[Gromak] Is there a real chance that the Union treaty will stabilize the situation?

[Bremkauskas] In my opinion we should have renewed the Union treaty a long time ago. We, as always, are late. I am convinced that the logic of the processes taking place in the Soviet Union should urge even those republics that are hesitating for various reasons to take part in the treaty. Life proves that one cannot overcome the enormous problems in the economy and in interethnic relations alone. That, of course, does not mean that all the republics will accept the draft which has been proposed today...

[Gromak] What does not suit you personally in the published draft of the treaty?

[Bremkauskas] For the most part the document makes a good impression, but I did not find a word in it about the militia. These days each republic wishes to create its own militia. That must not be allowed. In a multiethnic state there should be one federal militia. A republic may create a municipal militia subunit along the outline of people's detachments.

Only by having a federal militia can we ensure execution of both Union and republic laws.

[Gromak] You often visit the enterprises of Klaipeda and the villages in the countryside. What do the workers and the members of the kolkhozes [collective farms] say about the draft of the treaty?

[Bremkauskas] The main thing is that many are coming to the realization that a Union is necessary. They express the thought everywhere that the treaty should be signed as quickly as possible. First and foremost the Union treaty is stability of politics. In order to live normally, we have to stabilize political questions, and do something in earnest about the economy. People are saying, "Enough idle talk..."

[Gromak] But V. Landsbergis again declared recently that Lithuania will not sign the Union treaty. What could that lead to?

[Bremkauskas] It will not lead to anything. Those republics that do not sign the new treaty will be stuck with the old ways. By not signing the new treaty any individual republic may lose a part of its economic and internal freedom.

Let us consider: Why are Mr. V. Landsbergis and Ms. K. Prunskiene so stubborn? What are they counting on? The main hope of the separatists is for integration with the Western world. The West, however, is not in any hurry to greet Lithuania with a hospitable embrace. On the contrary, the Western countries are not at all interested in a change of borders and increasing political instability in the USSR. Hoping for support from abroad is the first error of the separatists. The second error is hoping for unconditional support within the republic itself. But that support does not and will not exist. Today 80 percent of the Lithuanians living in rural areas do not support the policy of the separatists.

[Gromak] Nonetheless, what if the ambitions of the republic's leadership prove stronger than common sense? What will that lead to?

[Bremkauskas] Lithuania may find itself in a very strange legal situation. Those republics that sign the Union treaty will live by the new laws: That is, they will have the rights of states with broad sovereignty and enjoy at the same time all the advantages of economic integration with the other Union republics. But we will be in an unprofitable situation. And that will contribute to a worsening of the economic and political crisis. Then we can look forward to a dramatic outcome...

Lithuanian Labor Party Official on Treaty

PM3112155090 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Dec 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with G.V. Kirkilas, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel O. Vladykin under the rubric "Union Treaty: View From the Republics"—date, place of interview not given: "Politics Is Not War"]

[Text] [Vladykin] We know that the extraordinary congress of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party convened at the beginning of December continued its work as the founding congress of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party. It adopted the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party statutes and policy directives. I would like to know more specifically, Gediminas Vitautovich, what your party's position is regarding such a burning issue as the prospect of the republics signing the new Union Treaty.

[Kirkilas] The draft Union Treaty presented to the Fourth Congress of USSR Deputies, in our view, is yet another attempt to foist on us a standardized model of state structure. But remember that the republics have different national traditions and levels of economic development, and each of them has its own historical experience in becoming part of the USSR... Therefore we cannot formulate at a stroke the entire state system of the Soviet Union as a whole. The republics should be given the opportunity to determine for themselves what level of sovereignty each will be able to have, depending on their geopolitical and economic position, internal situation, and so forth.

I think, however, that whatever the Union finally becomes, it is necessary right now to give substance to interrepublic relations in certain individual areas.

[Vladykin] From what you have said, can we draw the conclusion that the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party does not exclude the possibility of Lithuania signing the Union Treaty on its own terms in the future?

[Kirkilas] Yes, that is possible. If the points I mentioned, together with the time factor, are taken into consideration. Why hurry events?

[Vladykin] Well, OK. Let's suppose that favorable conditions for this materialized... What role would you then see Lithuania playing in the Union—component of a federation, or a confederation?

[Kirkilas] At the moment it's difficult to say. The Union will most likely become a mixed state formation. Lithuania's status will clearly for a long time not conform to either of those mentioned by you, but will remain uncertain. Let us call it conditionally a "transitional status."

Don't think that we are defending the Lithuanian government's position here. We have a fairly critical attitude toward the kind of rhetoric used by the present leadership of the republic against the Union. Politics is not war, where one side is ranged against the other. We should see each other as partners. And in order to defuse the political situation which has formed, we need to conduct the most lively talks between Lithuania and the Soviet Union at all possible levels.

[Vladykin] What then is your attitude to the fact that the republic has already formed and is intensively developing its own military structures, without consulting the USSR leadership or the Armed Forces command at all?

[Kirkilas] You are talking about the regional security department. In our view much is still not clear here. It looks as if within the department itself they haven't worked it out yet: What do they see themselves to be? If it's a customs department, then let that be its name. If it's a border security service, its role should likewise be clearly defined. Unfortunately, the department's activities often exceed those limits it has seemingly set for itself.

[Vladykin] In Lithuania, I believe, you often hear statements about "military pressure from Moscow." What do you think about that?

[Kirkilas] The arguments about the threat of a so-called second occupation are from a logical point of view nonsense. The Soviet Army currently has garrisons in Lithuania. It has no need to bring in any new contingents. Those which are already there would suffice if there was any need to use military force. Therefore statements of this kind are more a political metaphor than a reflection of reality.

In general Lithuania must understand the present defense situation of the Soviet Union as a whole, and grasp the general strategic situation in Europe. Insofar as Soviet military contingents are being withdrawn from East European countries, in many cases their paths cross Lithuania. This undoubtedly complex process should be regulated to the maximum degree at intergovernmental level.

It is also necessary to show understanding to Soviet servicemen themselves, since they are obliged to serve in some specific area regardless of their own will. This includes Lithuania. What have they done to deserve the insults directed at them?

True, it has to be said that the present situation in Lithuania has become somewhat distorted by the general political processes of rebirth. The military should also understand us. Attempts to create our own military formations and various state appurtenances may to some seem like throwing down the gauntlet, but this is a natural reaction to the incorrect nationalities policy formerly practiced in the Soviet Union. I am becoming more and more convinced that there is in recent times a deepening awareness of this in military circles.

Snieckus Considers Separation From Lithuania

91UN0577A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Dec 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by Major M. Sklyar, chief of the information department of the newspaper ZA RODINU of the Baltic Military District: "What the Residents of Snieckus Await"]

[Text] Not far from Snieckus the flat central European landscape grows smoothly into a fragrant pine paradise. To a transient passenger observing the surroundings through the murky glass of a diesel passenger train, the charming scenery can bring to mind many things, but not the Ignalina nuclear electric power station [AES]. But it is with it that the anxieties and hopes of this secluded corner of Latvia have been associated for the past two decades...

Recently, Snieckus—a settlement of power engineering specialists—became one of the sore spots on the map of the Republic, and a tight knot of economic, political, and national problems is not easing up but is getting tighter. What brought this about? We will begin with the fact that for many years now Snieckus authorities have been trying to change their present status.

"The arithmetic is simple," A. Kulakov, chairman of the settlement Soviet told me. "A large part of the income from the functioning of the AES 'slips away' from Snieckus without a trace. The Ignalina rayon center takes 8 million rubles [R], and Vilnius 'exports' another R17 million, and something is deducted for the Union budget. But Snieckus itself, which earns all of these millions through the sweat and nerves of its population gets...R330,000-R350,000 annually. This is barely enough for the organization of the settlement economy—I am not even talking about any kind of development. The status of the city of a republic subordination would change the situation noticeably. In such a case, Snieckus would have available a far greater share of the income of the Ignalina AES."

Would this kind of a decision be in keeping with the principle of local self-government? Of course. Therefore, I really and truly do not intend to try to understand the persistence with which the former and present authorities of Lithuania defend the "third-rate" legal status of Snieckus. V. Landsbergis, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic, who recently visited the settlement and the AES, also did not contribute any special clarity, sidestepping the problem with jokes that did not commit to anything and with the assurance that the problems of the power engineering specialists are on the "work bench" of the legislature and the government. You can interpret this terminology any way you choose...

Events of recent years have shown more than once: When the "people above" do not want to resolve specific questions or are slow in resolving them, the "people below" take things into their own hands. Snieckus was no exception. Convinced that methods of "municipal diplomacy" will not work, but will only transform the illness from a critical one to a chronic one, the settlement Soviet assembled at a session, the results of which reverberated for some Lithuanian politicians like thunder in a clear sky.

The status of the city, not a new question, was put on the agenda. But this time the deputies made it clearly understood that the republic authorities missed the opportunity for a mutually acceptable agreement. In any case, assuredly not one of the three concepts for the development of Snieckus that were presented at the session will satisfy Vilnius (although official dissatisfaction has not yet been heard).

The first version, for example, provides for the continuation of Snieckus as part of Lithuania, but with the indispensable supremacy of the laws of the Union. The second version is more radical. Considering the debatable character of the territory on which the station and settlement are situated, and the geographical proximity to the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] (it is just a little more than three kilometers to the border), a transfer to the jurisdiction of the neighboring Union republic is possible. It should be taken into account, incidentally, that almost half of the electric power produced by the reactors of the Ignalina AES is consumed by Belorussia...

Finally, the third version (it is this one that is defended by the chairman of the settlement Soviet and his closest confederates): Snieckus is given an extraterritorial status in the USSR structure—with direct subordination to Moscow. In addition, the AES becomes the property of the work collective, and all questions associated with the operation, supply, and taxation of the station and the settlement (in this case, very likely, no longer a settlement, but a city) are decided in the course of negotiations between Lithuania and the Union...

It is paradoxical, but a fact: Despite its external ultraradicalism, the last of the versions most accurately reflects the existing realities. First of all, the AES complex, including the production buildings, technological "filling," residential buildings, and social infrastructure—this entire diverse and expensive complex—was financed from the Union "purse." We go farther. The AES is vitally important not only to Lithuania and Belorussia, but also to Latvia and to Kaliningrad Oblast. As a matter of fact, it came into being as a necessary link of a common power system of the country's northwest. No matter how much today's Lithuanian leaders advertised their peaceful disposition and interest in cooperation with the USSR, the Ignalina AES in a crisis situation can be used fully by them for economic and political pressure on the Union.

Now the other side of the same coin. Imagine that the negotiations of Lithuania and the Union come to a dead end and an economic blockade of the Republic was reinstituted. In this case, not having the status of a Union enterprise, the AES will die. Without the raw material, scientific-technical, and personnel support of the Union, the station absolutely is not viable. And there is one more extremely important aspect—the international one. Lithuania is striving for state independence. But then its jurisdiction over the Ignalina AES can acquire a different level.

It is possible, of course, to firmly persuade the world community of the strictly peaceful nature of the station, but today you cannot appease a planet that has learned of Chernobyl. The "peaceful atom" in incapable or evil hands is much worse than the hydrogen bomb.

The Lithuanian leaders, naturally, understand the unresolvable internal contradictions of the demands for "sovereign" rights of the republic to the AES; therefore, in recent weeks signs were seen of their readiness for compromise solutions. Proposals appeared in the republic press, for example, to transform the station into a joint Lithuanian-Soviet enterprise or joint stock company.

In a word, the reciprocal impulse from Vilnius at first encouraged the leaders of Snieckus. But not for long. The vigilant Lithuanian Ministry of Power and Electrification does not want half measures. It is energetically bringing pressure on the government, demanding immediate nationalization of the AES. The residents of Snieckus have no confidence that the government "bastions" will not fall. This fortifies their resolve to go to the end...

However, am I not too boldly representing the "voice of the settlement Soviet" to be that of the "voice of the People?"

The results of the referendum held in Snieckus back in April serve as the best answer to this question. Eighty-one percent of the residents of the settlement of 40,000 expressed a decisive "no" to secession from the Union, and just as many gave a decisive "yes" to Union jurisdiction over Snieckus and the Ignalina AES... This does not mean that there is no opposition in the Snieckus Soviet. City branches of "Sajudis" and of the Lithuanian Social-Democratic Party are not numerous, but they are very active. In their hands are the editorial offices of the settlement radio and several formally independent newspapers. On 7 November, a group of national radicals succeeded in organizing an incident during the October demonstrations...

A silent "opposition of fear" resists open political opposition and the settlement Soviet. Many residents of the settlement, internally fearing a break with the Union (an overwhelming majority of the population of Snieckus are Russian-speaking specialists who arrived here from various corners of the country) are no less afraid of a conflict with Lithuanian authorities. The reasons for this fear were explained to me in the settlement national cultures center. People, for example, think that status can be demanded only when the fate of the Union itself is decided. But for Snieckus residents a break with Lithuania would certainly mean a worsening of the well-being of the people, because the lion's share of food products and consumer goods comes here from Vilnius.

Even greater qualms are caused by the "Belorussian version." The Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet has not yet shown an interest in Snieckus. And, to put it mildly, in general the Belorussians have a guarded attitude toward nuclear power. We can understand them...

To put it briefly, there is no unanimity on the question of the new status of Snieckus.

...In the very center of the settlement, a massive granite stone lies on a high pedestal. In the summer this unusual obelisk became 15 years old. It is intended to immortalize the labor of the builders who in a few months erected an excellent modern settlement. These people believed that a happy fate awaited Snieckus. I also want to believe this.

Australian Minister Affirms Soviet Lithuania

LD2812120490 Moscow TASS in English 1156 GMT 28 Dec 90

[By TASS correspondent Viktor Kuznetsov]

[Text] Canberra December 28 TASS—Prime Minister Robert Hawke of Australia told Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene today that although Australia supports Lithuania's desire for independence, his government believes that Lithuania is part of the Soviet Union, the SBS TV network reports.

Agriculture and Energy Minister John Kerin, commenting on Lithuania's wish to establish direct trade relations with Australia, said that Australia has trade agreements with the Soviet Union and intends to comply with them.

Popularity of Lithuania's Prunskiene Asserted

LD2712212990 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 27 Dec 90

[Text] Kazimiera Prunskiene remains the most popular politician in Lithuania. Lithuanians were polled in the last days of the outgoing year. Forty-nine per cent of the polled gave preference to the republic's prime minister. The chairman of the Lithuanian Democratic Party of Labor, Algirdas Brazauskas, placed second.

RSFSR

Yeltsin Hopes for Stabilization in New Year

LD3112174690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1548 GMT 31 Dec 90

["Pre-new year interview" with Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet chairman Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, by correspondent Yuriy Korotkov, place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Yeltsin] If the issue concerns the Russian Federation, then it seems to me that we have succeeded for the first time in many decades—by decisions of the first congress of people's deputies—in declaring the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. Moreover, such a sovereignty where the majority of... [changes thought] it will carry out the majority of functions, the functions of power, and only a part of them, six such ministries will be delegated by it to the Union. [as heard] This has a great psychological significance for the people of Russia. Of course, this follows from a practical point of view as well, because Russia, generally speaking, has not had its own statehood. This is perhaps the most important thing, as significantly more has been successfully achieved than has not been achieved.

[Korotkov] What, for example?

[Yeltsin] We have not succeeded in achieving a better life for people. The people, of course, are now very seriously worried because foodstuffs are being sold on a stop and go basis, on the production of ration cards, in the very minimum amounts. We cannot of course live like this. For this reason the second extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation, at the end of November and in December, considered the issue of agrarian reform. We are increasing expenditure on agriculture during 1991 by 40 percent and consider that it is only in this way that we may extricate ourselves in some degree from the situation and feed the people of Russia, since once it fed itself, and even sold foodstuffs abroad. Whereas we are now receiving parcels—we are of course grateful to those who are sending them—but all the same Russia can resolve this situation itself. I think that if we do fight for the implementation of the decisions of the Second Congress of People's Deputies, we will nevertheless solve the question. If not in 1991, then in 1991 we will improve things a little and in 1992 will improve things significantly. I believe this.

[Korotkov] Boris Nikolayevich, in personal terms what was this year like for you? Or perhaps you do not ocnsider that you have had a personal life.

[Yeltsin] In personal terms it was very difficult. The elections went very well and quite normally, in general. But as for the election of the chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet back at the First Congress of People's Deputies, you know what dramatic situations there were there sometimes, and victory was of course hard won at the cost of much anguish.

[Korotkov] I gather that you nevertheless link your personal life with your public life?

[Yeltsin] Well, I perhaps have no other personal life. I do of course have a family: I have a wife and two girls, my daughters, a son-in-law and two granddaughters and one grandson.

[Korotkov] But you don't have enough time to give to them?

[Yeltsin] Unbelievably little time.

[Korotkov] Boris Nikolayevich, what do you expect of the new year?

[Yeltsin] I hope that if we can get through the winter, perhaps by the middle of the year, there might already be a little bit of stabilization. In accordance with our program, it must come. If there is stabilization, then I hope that 1991 will be a better year than 1990.

I want once again to congratulate all citizens of Russia, all peoples of our multi-ethnic Russia on the new year. In spite of everything, some sort of feeling of optimism glimmers in everyone at the beginning of the new year: Everyone firmly believes that things will be better. And I think that if people still trust in us, trust in the Supreme Soviet, the leadership and the government, then we shall do everything to ensure that their hopes are not disappointed; and the word that was given, two years for stabilization, the third year to improve people's standard of living, this promise will be fulfilled. I wish success to all citizens of Russia, both young and old.

I thank Mayak for our constant, very close and always very objective contact.

Yeltsin Appeal to Russians Abroad Reviewed

91UN0613A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Dec 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Eduard Volodin, member of the Coordination Council of the United Soviet of Russia: "Regarding B.N. Yeltsin's Appeal: Which Wave to Ride"]

[Text] [Following facsimile of Yeltsin appeal is published next to article] APPEAL from the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia to compatriots abroad.

Esteemed Compatriots!

My words are addressed to you who live in various countries of this immense world.

Today Russia is the successor to a great state which has existed for centuries and is experiencing—to use an eloquent phrase from Tyutchev—"fateful minutes of peace." Indeed, the year 1990 was a turning point in history. More and more people understand that we cannot go on living as we have been. [words illegible]

We are awaiting a response, we are awaiting suggestions, and we invite you to work with us in any form that is acceptable to you. I would like to assure you, esteemed compatriots, that your knowledge, experience, and participation will be accepted with gratitude. Only through joint efforts will we be able to restore our homeland!

During these Christmas days I would like to sincerely wish that a bit of Russia will always be cherished in your hearts and will show you the way to success.

B.N. Yeltsin, 25/12/90 [end facsimile of appeal]

Russians have been waiting for this appeal for a long time. Any reasonable person understands that the civil war was a national tragedy and the people who went abroad were not inveterate monsters at all but people who had their own truth and love for Russian. Now the chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, B.N. Yeltsin, has appealed to our compatriots abroad for cooperation. This is an important event in our national life and I heartily welcome it as the first act to unify our single national body.

The content of the appeal and its basic ideas are an altogether different matter. Since my articles about the new Russia and emigration have been printed in the Russian press abroad, for me to remain silent now would mean that my viewpoint was erroneous and the ideas in the appeal are fair. But one can judge how right and fair they are from the following.

The author states that "today Russia is the successor to a great state which existed for centuries." I hope that I have a correct understanding of what is said and that it means succession including the law, social classes, territorial structure, and borders of the Russian Empire as of 1 August 1914. This interpretation is even more fair since B.N. Yeltsin in his brief appeal repeatedly distances himself from the events of the past 70 years and declares 1990 the beginning of a rebirth. Thus there arises the problem of the recognition of Poland and Finland as independent states and the territorial division between Turkey and Iran. As concerns the structure within the state, Russia, judging from the declaration of succession, should enter into legal and political relations with the state formations that have appeared on the territories of the former provinces and general governorships.

As the reader understands, this strict adherence to the principle of succession already pushes us toward an explosion of interstate and interethnic relations, and I hope that those who composed the appeal had simply not thought about this. As concerns the modern state of affairs, the 1990 model of succession looks like this. The present RSFSR leadership already has hasty agreements with a number of "Union republics," thus recognizing the borders of the Russian Federation, which are artificial, encroach on Russians, and contain possible interstate contradictions. And if we look at how sovereignties and free economic zones have been bursting out on the territory of the RSFSR since last summer, what kind of Russia can we be thinking of? No, there is no unified and indivisible Russia of the past but a conglomerate of federal districts and territorial communities in which Russia herself will be reduced to the size of the great Muscovite principality before the reign of Ivan III.

It is worthwhile to pay attention to the constitutional structure of Russia in connection with the problem of succession. The constitutional commission under the leadership of B.N. Yeltsin has developed a draft of the Fundamental Law, carefully transcribing the Declaration of Independence of the United States and not even glancing at the code of laws of the Russian Empire. Is the succession good and what is this Russia to which you, our foreign compatriots, are being invited?

The most striking thing is that, appealing to our foreign compatriots, the author of the appeal did not want to recall for our edification the experience we have already had in relations with our compatriots who are now living in the Union republics. The Baltic republics are adopting discriminatory laws, ethnic Russians are being degraded to second-class citizens, and the current leadership of the RSFSR stubbornly refuses to see this and continues to play its radical-democratic political game with the nationalists and nationalist leadership in the Baltics. Perhaps this is a basis for further cooperation with Russians outside the country? Or will there be double bookkeeping for Russians "in the Union republics" and Russians abroad?

B.N. Yeltsin considers the most valuable achievements of civilization to be the market, the rule-of-law state, democracy, social partnership, and pluralism. As we can see, these do not include conciliation, communality, fidelity to the homeland, and self-sacrifice as indispensable characteristics of the life of prerevolutionary Russia. So is it full steam ahead to Western society in American clothing? Why then should there be any discussion of "rebirth"? It would be more correct to use the term "degeneration" here, but, as they say, we have already been through that.

Why such a leaning to the West and why such disparagement of Russian national-state traditions? There is no need to spend a lot of time guessing here—the text of the appeal explains everything itself, namely where it speaks of those who left Russia with a one-way ticket. As we know, the first wave of emigrants after the civil war did not have such tickets. Nor did the so-called "displaced persons" after World War II. For both of these groups it was an insult to be given the right to dual citizenship which is mentioned in the appeal. So one can say simply that the spirit and letter of this appeal is addressed to the third wave of emigration, and this is what determines the content of the entire document. It is no accident that the author speaks of Russians in the old meaning of the word and not the modern Russians. It all comes together.

And as though confirming my conclusions, B.N. Yeltsin recalled the Christmas holidays when he read the appeal. And he read it on 25 December 1990—the actual Christmas Day according to the Catholic and Protestant calendars. The Christmas holidays for Orthodox believers begin (new style) on the eve of the birthday of Christ, 6 January 1991, and last until the end of the holiday celebration on 13 January 1991. So whom was B.N. Yeltsin addressing and why did he replace the traditional Russian path to peace and goodwill with the path to success? A strange focus.

In the future we still have to discuss Russia, her destiny, and the paths to the future.

RSFSR Premier Meets With UK Ambassador

LD2912161290 Moscow TASS in English 1519 GMT 29 Dec 90

[Text] Moscow December 29 TASS—Russian Prime Minister Ivan Silayev today received the British ambassador to the Soviet Union, Sir Rodric Quentin Braithwaite, at the latter's request.

Silayev briefed him upon the Rusian Government's efforts to tackle social and economic problems in the republic and upon approaches to implementing the 1991 republican budget endorsed by the Russian parliament.

He pointed out Russia's desire and readiness to solve all economic and financial issues directly with other constituent republics in the interest of the Soviet Union's functioning as an integral economic whole, with regard for the real interests of all its members.

Confidence was expressed that the republics would find a common language and form a federal budget meeting the requirements of the current stage in the development of the USSR. [sentence as received]

Silayev Congratulates Literary Prize Winners

LD2912185890 Moscow TASS in English 1746 GMT 29 Dec 90

[Text] Moscow December 29 TASS—Although Russian writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, awarded Russia's Prize for Literature 16 years after being expelled from his homeland, was not present at a ceremony here today, his name, mentioned among prize-winners, was met with applause.

The presentation of 1990 Russia's Prizes for Literature and Art was held at the republican House of Soviets. Russian Prime Minister Ivan Silayev congratulated the prize winners and expressed hope that they would further promote the revival of Russian cultural identity.

Nikolay Malyshev, chairman of the Commission of the Presidium of the Russian Government for Prizes, reaffirmed the intention to award the prize to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, despite the fact that the latter refused to accept it.

RSFSR Finance Minister Views Resignation

PM0101164991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Dec 90 Union Edition p 6

[Report on interview with former Russian Finance Minister Boris Fedorov by M. Berger, place and date not give: "Boris Fedorov: 'I Don't Want To Maintain Illusions'"]

[Text] As already reported by IZVESTIYA, the last "500 Days" program author remaining in the Russian parliament has submitted his resignation.

During the almost six months of his work in the Russian Government, especially recently, Boris Fedorov has repeatedly spoken of the ever-growing pressure being put on the Ministry of Finance by those without the necessary competence in both the government and parliament. The main effect of this pressure is to increase the budget's expenditure element, that is, to make newer and newer unplanned payments while avoiding tough and not very popular measures to increase budget revenues. Some weeks ago, when I wrote about Fedorov for the international journal DELOVYYE LYUDI [BUSINESS PEOPLE], the way the interview went made me conclude the piece with the following paragraph: "Fedorov, who is faced with protecting the republic's budget, does not intend to be led by anyone but intends to be guided only by sound economic sense and the republic's interests, while not forgetting that the Russian economy is part of the Union economy. But now, to tell the truth, I do not know whether with such views Fedorov will still be minister by the time the journal comes out. The minister is not inclined to give in to pressure from those without the necessary competence, but if the worst comes to the worst he will give up his post."

The journal came out a few days ago and, unfortunately, the forecast came true.

"Back in July-August the republic had the chance of getting on course for radical economic reforms quite quickly," Boris Grigoryevich says. "A fundamentally new government had been formed, many new people had arrived, and binding promises were given to many people. We had a real chance to implement reforms consistently in Russia. Even after [Former Deputy Premier of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR])] G. Yavlinskiy's resignation the hope was preserved that the practical actions of the Supreme Soviet and government would be directed toward the implementation of the program adopted by the Russian parliament, especially as [RSFSR Council of Ministers Chairman] I. Silayev had declared the start of the 500 days countdown. However, virtually none of the draft laws, the package of which was an important element of the "500 days" program, has been adopted in that time. And the whole past six months of the new government's existence have shown that there are no real reforms in Russia—and most likely there won't be any.

[Berger] "But you belong to the body of people who must and can fight for the implementation of the scheduled policy of reforms."

[Fedorov] "You can't be in opposition to the government of which you are a member. But we are deceiving people by promising reforms and not carrying them out. Nor will finances be improved with the policy we are conducting. By staying at my post I would merely be maintaining the illusion of reform, which I naturally do not want to do."

[Berger] "What are your specific disagreements?"

[Fedorov] "To all intents and purposes the government of which I am a member does not have its own policy but swims with the current, belatedly reacting to events of one kind or another, and papering over the cracks."

[Berger] "That is, it works in the same way as the Union government, which many people, you included, sharply criticized precisely for inconsistency and using 'fire service' principles of operation?"

[Fedorov] "That's just it. Except that we, it must be honestly admitted, do it with less competence and know-how than the Union government."

[Berger] "That means the divergences are not only over questions of formulating a budget?"

[Fedorov] "The budget and the attitude toward it is a most important problem. No way can I agree with the superficial approach to the interrelation between the Russian and Union budgets, or with the constant inflation of the deficit. But it's not just a matter of this. The government's activity is full of populism and the desire to please everybody, and to do this we are constantly engaged in handing out money and benefits, which is simply leading to Russia's bankruptcy.

"Many important decisions are made without the participation of government members, even in cases which concern them directly. Today, for example, the Russian Government guarantees for credits worth a total of around $2 billion were issued, although sums of only $15-18 million were agreed with the RSFSR Ministry of Finance. But some guarantees simply look improper. For example, the guarantee issued by Yu. Skokov, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, for $9 million to his former association "Kvantemp." Another deputy, G. Filshin, granted a commercial company monopoly rights to all sunken ships and scrap metal in the republic's territory. What does such encouragement of monopolism have in common with the market?

"In a word, the lack of real steps toward the market and the present government's inability to assume real power impelled me to take this step."

I would like to add one thought to what has been said by Fedorov. In a short time the Russian minister of finance managed to win respect and recognition abroad and from leaders of the leading state and commercial financial institutions. And his departure cannot fail to influence credit policy in relation to Russia.

RSFSR Foreign Minister Discusses Role

91UN0589A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 26 Dec 90 p 3

[Interview with RSFSR Foreign Minister A.V. Kozyrev, by A. Vasilyev; place and date not given: "The Embassy Scribe: This is what RSFSR Foreign Minister A.V. Kozyrev Would Have Been Called Had He Lived in Muscovy in the Times of Ivan the Terrible Rather Than in Soviet Russia"]

[Text] *I met Andrey Vladimirovich Kozyrev for the first time at a roundtable, where scientists, journalists, as well as "party hacks"—Cadets, Social Democrats, Anarcho-Syndicalists, etc.—had gathered to discuss the outlook on Russia's foreign policy.*

The ministry shared its plans. Among planned undertakings are, for instance, the creation of a new department for liaison with emigres—former citizens of Russia living abroad—as well as a new department for public liaison. Its task will be to study the outlook of different strata of the population and of political and popular movements on various problems of international policy in order to take it into account in the ministry's work. Another undertaking under development will be to establish in the Union republics so-called Russian Houses which will become a part of Russia for those Russians who live outside its borders.

The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Ministry of Foreign Affairs intends to send to Soviet embassies abroad information about the parties operating in the territory of the republic and to demand that embassy personnel treat anarchists the same way they treat Russia's communists—with respect.

A few days later I had an opportunity to interview Russia's foreign minister one-on-one.

[Vasilyev] Andrey Vladimirovich, as far as I know, you served as a department chief in the all-Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs before taking this job.

[Kozyrev] Yes, I am a career diplomat. I graduated from the Institute of International Relations in 1974, and in 1977, while working full time, defended my dissertation on detente. I have worked inside the Soviet Union ever since. In this sense I have had an unusual career since I have not served a tour of duty abroad.

[Vasilyev] In what respect is your work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia different from your work in the all-Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

[Kozyrev] I must say that the differences are quite substantial. We are trying to create the foreign policy segment of Russia's sovereignty almost from scratch. That is why, when I was asked to put my name in for this position, I immediately agreed, because for me it was an opportunity to tackle something fresh, to start a new life.

The complexity of the tasks before me is in finding the right balance between the foreign policy activities of the RSFSR and the USSR. Until recently, the USSR was a unitary, totalitarian state in which all internal and foreign policy decisions were made by the party bureaucrats acting in the name of all the peoples of the Union republics. Now that we are facing the dismantling of this structure, there are democratization processes taking place, and among them is the rebirth of the national and state identity of many peoples populating the Soviet Union. The republics have declared that they want to be real sovereign states; Russia also wants to be a sovereign state, but within the renewed Union. That is, we do not want to secede from the Union; we want the Union to become a true democracy that would represent the interests of all its peoples.

[Vasilyev] Until now our foreign policy has been formulated in a one-party environment. What changes do you expect to see now that there are many parties entering the political arena?

[Kozyrev] In a civil society, the opinion of all political parties and groups—existing on a constitutional basis, of course—is taken into account, including in the development of foreign policy. The main battle in this case is fought on two levels: first, during the elections, when the people elect those who, in their opinion, reflect their views best; and then in the parliament, where—depending on the strength of their representation—the parties may strive to have their views reflected in state policy. But after a state policy is adopted, the executive organs should carry it out to the letter. In that they should be guided only by parliament's directives and not by their party preferences.

When at work, Ministry of Foreign Affairs employees should only be state employees. Their party affiliation, religion, personal tastes and hobbies should be left at home. There they can worship any god and vote for any party. In this way the issue of party affiliation is resolved without falling into one of the two extremes. The first extreme is when all state employees are appointed from the ranks of only one party and they carry out that party's line. The other extreme is for everybody to renounce their party affiliations. Although such practices do exist in some countries, I consider them excessive.

[Vasilyev] How would you characterize the relationship between the center and the republics in foreign policy development?

[Kozyrev] The president says that the old Union does not exist anymore, while in the area of foreign relations everything remains as if a unitary state existed. However, each of the sovereign states which will sign—or, perhaps, will not sign—the Union treaty, should do it voluntarily. To do that they should first identify their own interests. Then, when these interests are compared, it will become clear where they coincide, and where they differ. There are many tasks in foreign policy that would be better and easier solved collectively. In bilateral agreements between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], the Belorussian SSR, and Kazakhstan, for instance, there are clauses which directly say that the republics intend to interact in the sphere of foreign policy. So much for the disintegration of the Soviet Union! The question that immediately comes up is how to interact. We need coordinating mechanisms, and that is the role of the center. The difference is that this is not an attempt to keep the old totalitarian center, but to formulate foreign policy from the bottom up, proceeding from the republics, based on their interests. But the Union will exist, and therefore there will be some all-Union foreign policy functions.

The RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan are among the largest states in the world. Why should we attempt to erase the differences between them, as the old system tried to do? There are many functions the republics should take upon themselves, including the implementation of their foreign policy goals. I think that in the area of defense and arms control talks the center may take up to 70 percent of the work upon itself, while the republics will only help clarify positions and promote their own interests. What do I mean by that? For instance, any arms control agreement will first of all affect Russia, because we have the lion's share of military industries, raw materials, and human resources. Therefore, any reduction or increase in armaments is first of all an issue of social guarantees for the citizens of Russia. All of these are Russia's vital interests. That is the remaining 30 percent.

Take another example. For instance, relations with another country, say, Finland. Of all the republics it only has a common border with Russia. There is a huge flow of economic relations, including cross-border trade, and common ecological problems. Here the proportion should be reversed—30 percent should go to the center, because Russia cannot monopolize its relationship with Finland and other republics will want to cooperate with it too. I think that this approach could enrich our international relations right now.

[Vasilyev] It is known that Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze has played a very important role in USSR's domestic policy. Do you see for yourself an opportunity to influence Russia's domestic policy?

[Kozyrev] I have tremendous respect for Shevardnadze and, of course, I would like to play a role in the life of Russia comparable to the one he has played in the life of the USSR. The positive changes in international life that we link with new thinking are in many respects his personal contribution. The same goes for domestic policy.

But I must say that what has been traditionally considered domestic policy will be one of the main directions of work for Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I am talking about establishing new, non-imperial and non-totalitarian relations with the sovereign republics. The relationship between Russia and the other republics should be based on universal norms of international law, first of all the norms of human rights. This is the key to solving many inter-republic, interethnic problems in a civilized way instead of the means traditional for the totalitarian regime—spetsnaz, OMON [special mission militia detachments], and "cheremukha" [riot-control gas], which only aggravate the situation; while they may freeze the confrontation temporarily it will flare up later anyway.

[Vasilyev] What can you say about the continuity of the USSR's treaties for Russia?

[Kozyrev] We should not destroy the already existing legal framework of treaties. We did something along these lines in 1917, and nothing good came of it. Current international law works in the interests of all peoples and all states. Of course, Russia should uphold the treaties and agreements, first of all the UN Charter, the Helsinki Accords, etc. This is something we should value. The agreements that are signed hastily, especially those on loans and credits are, however, quite another matter.

All of this is being done in a new environment. The degree to which actions aimed at obtaining loans take these changes into account is an open question for me. Previous loans have already gone down the drain. The practice of an apparatus approach to business has not proved effective. This is not an artificial parade of sovereignties, as some people here joke. This is a legitimate right on the part of the people to protect themselves from the arbitrariness of the bureaucratic machine. Now that the republics have held elections, acquired new parliaments, and declared sovereignty, and are creating new economic structures it is more than just strange to continue acting the old way in the new environment.

Russia will have to pay for these loans. Therefore we should take part in deciding whether to obtain them, and if so, what to spend them on. Otherwise, as the RSFSR Supreme Soviet has already announced, such debts will not be recognized. This is not legal nihilism. We are simply saying that this activity should be brought in line with the new situation.

[Vasilyev] Andrey Vladimirovich, how do you resolve the problem of Russia's representation at international forums? I know that this has become an especially touchy issue on the eve of the Paris Conference.

[Kozyrev] As far as I know, many republics have raised the issue of their participation in the European process, and first of all, in the Paris Conference, with the all-Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We would have been quite satisfied to have several authorized representatives of Russia among the all-Union delegation. As far as I know, other republics were prepared to accept the same. The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to our request and sent us an invitation to designate a representative to the Paris Conference. I must say, though, that this was done at the last moment. Our representative managed to jump on the rear platform of the last car on the last train leaving for Paris. We had to swallow our pride in this case. It was not just a question of our presence at the forum. The main point is for the new mechanisms set in motion in Paris within the framework of the European process to function now with the participation of the representatives of Russia and other Union republics.

Dagestan's Reshulskiy Ponders Union Treaty

PM0101114991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Dec 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic People's Deputy S.N. Reshulskiy, second secretary of Dagestan CPSU Oblast Committee, by correspondent Lieutenant Colonel S. Pashayev under the rubric "Union Treaty: View from the Republics"; place, date not given: "With the Participation of Autonomous Entities..."]

[Text] [Pashayev] Sergey Nikolayevich, many people have noticed that the Dagestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic has not participated in the notorious "parade of sovereignties." What lies behind this?

[Reshulskiy] A draft document on the republic's sovereignty was discussed at the Congress of Dagestan People's Deputies. And various views, in favor of and against declaring sovereignty, were expressed quite thoroughly.

Mindful of the fact that the proposed draft declaration of sovereignty was given an ambivalent reception, the congress set up a conciliation commission which, in my view, worked very fruitfully. In the final analysis, it submitted this proposal: not to put the draft to the vote but to grant the conciliation commission the powers of a permanent organ and to enable it to evaluate all the proposed versions once again in greater depth and to find an approach to their generalization. This was perceived as the most sensible option, and it was approved.

[Pashayev] And how long will this situation last?

[Reshulskiy] I agree with those who believe that the republic needs sovereignty. Sovereignty as a mechanism for protecting the rights of citizens of the autonomous socialist republic. But the starting point for this—this too was proposed—must be the conclusion of the Union treaty and the federative treaty. They will define who we are and what goal we set ourselves. So it is certainly not a question of isolation in this case. This is not supported in the republic and, moreover, it is categorically denied. This formula is supported: Dagestan as part of Russia, as part of the Soviet Union.

[Pashayev] How are the priorities ordered? What must be the procedure for concluding the treaty?

[Reshulskiy] I believe that even some three years ago we should have defined the principles of and concluded the Union treaty, and probably developed further the priorities of all the components making up this Union. History and the life of our country have evolved in such a way that I, for example, cannot imagine how we can divide ourselves or divide our Union up into sovereign states. Divide ourselves in order then to seek with agonizing difficulty ways and forms of unification? In my opinion, there is one way: the Union treaty, then the federative treaty.

[Pashayev] The draft Union treaty has been published and has provoked many arguments. How do you see the participation of autonomous entities, particularly Dagestan, in the process of elaborating and adopting this document?

[Reshulskiy] To be brief, we see the participation of all autonomous republics with rights as subjects in the conclusion of the Union treaty. In other words, both union and autonomous republics, it seems to me, must definitely participate in the conclusion of the Union treaty. On equal terms. If I am to speak of the actual draft proposed by the USSR president, it is, of course, contradictory. And so the assessments are also contradictory. At first sight, you get the impression that, in drawing up the draft, the authors tried to unite and combine different viewpoints. This is evidently how it is in actual fact. But what would I point out as being positive? Above all, people here still proceed from the rights of man, wherever he lives in the Soviet Union and whatever nationality he is. Then from the rights of peoples and nationalities. And, third, the document combines the rights of man and the rights of peoples and nationalities. This is probably the most important thing.

[Pashayev] You have spoken of the pluses, but what minuses do you see in this draft?

[Reshulskiy] You understand, it is already time for us to define our position clearly and unequivocally. To state clearly and unequivocally to everyone and to oneself just which path we are choosing today. And here, on the one hand, everything seems to be aimed at creating the Union, while on the other it seems, on a number of points, to be a question of a confederation.

[Pashayev] Various deadlines are given for concluding the treaty. What is your view of the duration of this process?

[Reshulskiy] In general, I believe that at some time to come we will call this period another period of racing on ahead. It is from this that I proceed. Recently we have very actively tackled the reconstruction of the political system. We have lost sight of the fact that the economy and politics are two interconnected categories. While tackling the reconstruction of the political system, we must on no account forget the reconstruction of the economy. The process of attaining sovereignty ought to start with our enterprises, with our basic economic principles.

And so we have approached the time where the old economic ties no longer operate, but there are no new ones. But, by destroying the old ties and offering nothing in exchange, we could provoke, figuratively speaking, an "economic Chernobyl."

The Union treaty is the basis which strengthens economic ties. Unless we now decisively take the path of renewing the Union treaty and concluding and establishing these ties, then I believe that it is naive to count on stabilization. It is hard to say now how much time we have left, but years, in my opinion, would take us beyond the brink of a catastrophe. We could be speaking of a time of less than a year.

Russian Front Leader on Takeover of Power

PM0101150791 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 22 Dec 90 p 7

[Report on interview with RSFSR People's Front leader Valeriy Skurlatov by Elisabeth Nordgren; date, place not given: "'National Forces' Want To Take Over After Gorbachev"]

[Text] Perestroyka under Gorbachev's leadership has failed. The people's patience is at an end. In early January a state of emergency is expected to be declared throughout the Soviet Union, where the situation is approaching anarchy and chaos. At present the situation in Latvia is most critical.

As if it is not enough that Shevardnadze has been squeezed out, forces in the Russian Republic are now planning to sideline Gorbachev and Yeltsin.

Thus said historian Valeriy Skurlatov, the man behind Yeltsin's erstwhile political program, one of the leaders of the People's Front in the Russian Republic, and who is active on the national salvation committee which was formed this fall.

The national salvation committee, which works together with "democratic forces" within the Soviet Army and has support among the people, has already formed a sort of shadow government, the government of national salvation, which is planning to take over the government of the Soviet Union.

The leadership will comprise a collective ruling body as in Romania. Within the next few weeks the committee will call a political general strike in the country. In mid-February 1991 the democratic forces, from people's fronts and social democrats to right-wing parties, will be called to attend a joint forum, according to Skurlatov.

"The foreign policy which the Soviet Union has pursued particularly on East Europe and the unification of Germany has failed. We believe the Soviet Union received far too little in payment for the unified Germany, if you compare, for example, what China got when the country signed a friendship and aid treaty with Japan.

"Shevardnadze's departure means that Gorbachev's foreign policy is collapsing in the same way that his domestic policy is. We are now seeing the beginning of Gorbachev's rapid departure, since his policies have been hit by a severe crisis."

Asked what will happen next, Skurlatov replied:

"Gradually Gorbachev and his government will step aside; power will be taken over by more purposeful forces in the Army, the arms industry, and the 'national government.' Up to now the Soviet Army has always been closely tied to the central government in Moscow, but now democratization processes are taking place there.

"Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov is a political nonentity who only has bureaucratic power. A kind of 'neo-Decembrists' [reference to December 1825 mutiny by troops of Russian Imperial Army whose leaders were opposed to the prevailing autocracy and serfdom characterizing the reigns of Tsars Aleksandr I, who died in November 1825, and his brother, who succeeded him as Tsar Nikolay I] are in the process of detaching themselves from the Army and showing their solidarity with our struggle. We also are in close contact with Colonel Viktor Alksnis, a Latvian member of parliament from Riga. Last Thursday he demanded Gorbachev's immediate resignation.

"This cooperation with the Army's forces does not mean that we will return to some form of dictatorship. It is more a question of realizing a progressive form of government, a sensible democracy with private ownership and a market economy."

According to Skurlatov, this is not a military coup but a constitutional transfer of power led by the "forces of the center."

"First we will contact the leaderships of the republics. If they will not back us, we will turn to the opposition. Our committee is actually trying to avoid a civil war."

RSFSR-DPRK Cooperation Agreement Signed

SK2912090590 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 26 Dec 90

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] As we have already reported, an intergovernmental agreement on trade and economic cooperation between the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] and the DPRK was signed in Moscow on 25 December.

The agreement was signed between (Viktor Yachenov), RSFSR minister of (?external economic relations), and Chong Song-nam, DPRK minister of external economic affairs.

Station correspondent (Vladimir Morodov) writes the following: This is the first intergovernmental agreement which the DPRK has signed not with the central Union government but with a federated government of the Soviet Union.

The agreement signed in Moscow stipulates basic principles on trade and economic cooperation between Russia and the DPRK. It will be effective on 1 January 1991. The period of cooperation is indefinite. The agreement will be effective until one side informs the other of the suspension of the agreement.

All settlements and payments will be made by the international [words indistinct], that is, by convertible notes according to current world prices and on the basis of contracts between Russian and Korean organs.

The RSFSR and DPRK Governments agreed to immediately issue permissions of all joint [words indistinct] and to promote a new type of development of cooperation in all ways. The agreement refers to terms for joint venture enterprises, production cooperation, and construction projects.

To pool efforts, Russia and the DPRK will organize a joint committee for trade and economic cooperation.

Organs of the signatories will directly decide on fields of Russian-North Korean trade and economic cooperation.

The DPRK delegation expressed its interest in cooperation in jointly developing fuel and power resources and in the agricultural, forestry, and wood processing fields.

After signing the Russia-DPRK agreement, the ministers of the two countries issued brief statements.

(Viktor Yachenov), RSFSR minister of (?external economic relations), said the following:

[Begin recording in Russian with superimposed translation into Korean] We have witnessed a historic event. As an independent state, Russia has signed the first intergovernmental agreement on trade and economic cooperation with a country in Asia and the Pacific. We have already signed these kinds of agreements with East and West European countries.

The DPRK has become a pioneer among the countries in Asia and the Pacific. Russia has traditional relations with Korea. In addition to (?difficult) problems, we have many things in common.

Our principle is not to interfere in the internal affairs of other peoples. What we hope for is the reunification of Korea. [end recording]

Chong Song-nam, DPRK minister of external economic affairs, said the following:

[Begin recording] The agreement between our two countries is an important document to expand and strengthen friendship and cooperation in the economic, trade, and technological fields. In the future, we will also support and honor the independence of the RSFSR and develop the friendly and cooperative relations on the principle of mutual equality and reciprocity.

[Words indistinct] have made it possible to [words indistinct] and to develop the economies of the two countries and improve the people's standard of living.

I think that [words indistinct] is the most vivid cooperation in conformity with the tenor of history. [end recording]

Council Lifts White Sea Coast Border Zone

LD0201140291 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1230 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Text] I do not know whether this will please you or not, but from now on it will be possible to visit the Solovetskiy Archipelago without a special pass. The USSR Council of Ministers has lifted the frontier zone along the coast of the White Sea, so that now even foreigners can come here when they want. In the northern part of our country only a few islands remain closed, including Novaya Zemlya where, as you know, the world-renowned nuclear test ground is located.

Tatar Official Sabirov Arrives in Turkey

TA2512203390 Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish 1800 GMT 25 Dec 90

[Text] Mukhammat Sabirov, chairman of the Tatar ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, arrived in Ankara today. He was received at Esenboga Airport by Industry and Commerce Minister Sukru Yurur. In a statement, Yurur said that industrial and commercial cooperation to be undertaken between Turkey and the Soviet republics could create markets in third countries.

The visiting prime minister and the accompanying delegation then called on Yurur in his office and conferred with him for some time. Sabirov also visited State Minister Mehmet Kececiler. During the meeting, Kececiler said that recent world developments created new economic opportunities. Kececiler noted that efforts are being exerted to realize the Black Sea economic cooperation region project.

Tatar Republic Restores Contacts With Turkey

LD0101100291 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 1 Jan 91

[Text] The Soviet republic of Tatariya, in the Volga area, has restored its contacts with Turkey, suspended over 70 years ago. A protocol on development of trade and economic cooperation was signed in Ankara on the eve of the new year. Tatariya will also export raw oil, petrochemical products, and timber. It will be importing from Turkey foods and consumer goods.

It is planned to set up a number of joint ventures and start restoring historical monuments for the development of tourism. It is also planned to set up a Tatar-Russian-Turkish company.

Gasoline Shortage Causing Problems in Far East

LD2912120590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 29 Dec 90

[Summary] Almost 90 percent of cars in Vladivostok—"and not just there"—are standing idle, and "its a mystery how the remainder are continuing to run," correspondent Oleg Padenko from the city. "There is absolutely no gasoline at the filling stations. This has gone on persistently for some time. I even know that it has gotten to the stage where at night, in their anger, people wanting gas have been smashing pumps and even setting them on fire." (Georgiy Nikolayevich Nadenenko) general director of the Maritime Kray Goskomnefteprodukt association, says that there is a strong demand for 93-octane gas for private vehicles. The kray's annual allocation of this was used in 11 months, while only 70 percent of November's quota was delivered, and only 30 percent of December's monthly amounts are being supplied. In Magadan oblast, Sakhalin and Kamchatka the situation is "even worse." He suggests that a proportion of the gas products that are currently exported should be diverted to the domestic market. "Because of the fuel shortage," Padenko resumes, "flights from Vladivostok airport to Khabarovsk, Chita, Blagoveshchensk, Tashkent, Leningrad, and many other towns have been dropped. The maritime and fishery fleets and the railways are beginning to experience serious interruptions in fuel supplies."

Russian Unions Council Issues Economic Appeal

LD2812192790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 28 Dec 90

[Text] The council of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] independent trade unions adopted an appeal to trade unions of the republic today. It says, in particular, that the critical situation regarding the economy, the wild outburst of the market, and unregulated rises in prices has led to an acute aggravation of the material situation in which a broad strata of population find themselves. Trade unions ought to express their attitude on the fact that the adoption of vitally important laws is being delayed by RSFSR and USSR legislative bodies. A list of goods, prices for which will be supervised by the state, should be approved by no later than next February. It is necessary to determine a minimum consumer budget and a minimum salary on its basis in the territory of the republic.

Trade unions also demand that official data on price rises for prime necessity goods should be published monthly and that amounts of compensation should be determined. The Russian trade union center insists on the rapid drawing up of a program fighting against forthcoming unemployment.

If these demands are ignored within the next two months, the council of the Federation of Independent Russian Trade Unions retains its right to hold collective actions in March in order to defend trade unions.

RSFSR Economic Crime Figures Examined

914D0089A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 51, Dec 90 p 1

[Response to an ARGUMENTY I FAKTY reader's question by Colonel Yu. Lushchay, department chief of the RSFSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Chief Administration on Combating Theft of Socialist Property and Speculation: "Economic Crime"]

[Text] **There is more and more being written lately about economic crime. How does Russia look in this respect?—P.Yelkin, Syzran.**

We asked Colonel Yu. Lushchay, department chief of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Ministry of Internal Affairs Chief Administration on Combating Theft of Socialist Property and Speculation, to answer this question.

The situation does not look too good. The criminological situation in the RSFSR economy shows a clearly visible rise in negative tendencies. Here are some figure and facts. **During the first 11 months of 1990, 138,500 economic crimes have been registered; this is 2.8 percent more than during the same period in 1989.** More than half of these crimes are of an especially dangerous nature: theft, speculation, bribe taking, illegal hard currency operations.

What is more, almost every 10th case among known cases of theft of state and public property fell into a large-scale or extra large-scale category. The internal affairs organs have uncovered 31 percent more of this type of crime this year than in 1989. The number of proven facts of speculation grew by 15 percent, while violation of the hard currency operations regulations—by 34 percent. **The RSFSR accounts for 56.6 percent of all uncovered economic crime in the country. It is also alarming to realize that economic crime creates the foundation for the growing organized crime, supplying the latter with both resources and "cadres."**

What is the explanation for such sad facts? There are many reasons for this. As to the fictitious economy, this is a direct result of the command administrative system. Padded reporting, window dressing, cheating—they are all the result of desire to fulfill the plan at all costs and to receive unearned bonuses. **According to scientific research, in the country's economy double counting alone exceeds 500 billion rubles [R]. Padded reporting constitutes between one and two percent of the total work volume, depending on the industry branch, and is estimated to be R15-30 billion worth.** All of that creates grounds for abuse.

Among other reasons for this rising economic crime are the worsening crisis, poor legal framework for the newly developing economic relations, the imperfections in the criminal and civil code, and insufficient manpower and resources involved in the immediate action of combating especially dangerous social phenomena.

It should be conceded that in these complex circumstances the law enforcement system has not kept up with the increased demands on it.

The courts have become more lenient towards shadow economy dealers. This is especially noticeable in the area of combating most serious law violations. For instance, while the crime rate went up in real terms between 1987 and 1989, the number of those convicted for large-scale and extra large-scale theft of state and public property fell almost by one half.

The courts seldom use such additional measure of punishment as confiscation of property. During the first six months of this year, of all convictions handed down on the basis of Article 93 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, it was used in two out of six convictions in Novosibirsk Oblast, two out of five in Yakutia, and in three out of 11 in Yaroslavl Oblast.

One cannot avoid mentioning another fact: While the intensity of work of law enforcement—and especially operational—personnel increased dramatically, the low efficiency level of administration of justice remains. **More than half of all materials on crime—mostly of a minor nature—have been disposed of without filing criminal charges.**

One more important reason for the explosive growth of shadow economy. **The existing practice of operational-investigative activities does not ensure effective combating of recidivist crime.** Repeat offenders have been identified in only one out of 16 crimes. Ninety-four percent of the detained suspects are treated as first-time offenders. This attests to the fact that the war on crime we have declared is being conducted under conditions of extremely limited informational capabilities of the law enforcement organs, and their limited knowledge of the adversary.

Leningrad Soviet Discusses Transportation

LD2912143290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 29 Dec 90

[Text] Today the regular session of the Leningrad Soviet ends. It discussed a most acute issue for the city: the transportation complex, but no decision was made. There has been no decision on the plan for complex economic and social development or on the city budget for next year. The deputies restricted themselves to general conversations far from reality by discussing the position of the inhabitants of Leningrad during the blockade [in World War II]. A decision was made on holding a session every month, although a number of deputies correctly noted that it is better to do more real work than have sessions. Sobchak, chairman of the Leningrad soviet, is in serious confrontation with a significant number of deputies.

Yelnikovo Rail Disaster Investigation Continues

PM0101153091 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Dec 90 Union Edition p 1

[IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Kulagin report from Kursk under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Yelnikovo—End of December"]

[Text] The railroad track is open, but the victims of the disaster are still being counted.

As Major Valeriy Vasilyev, chief of the militia line division at Belgorod station, announced, it was clear by the morning of 29 December that the two passenger trains—Nos. 22 and 237—involved in the disaster were carrying approximately 870 people.

Over the last two days, Valeriy Pavlovich Dunayev, a passenger who was traveling to Kamensk-Uralskiy, died from burns in the Kursk Oblast hospital. Sergey Aleksandrovich Sergeyev, assistant engineer on the Kislovodsk-Leningrad train, also died in hospital. The body of Nikolay Dmitriyevich Gerasimov, the engineer on the same train, was found at the scene of the disaster....

Victor Bulygin, deputy chairman of the state commission to investigate the circumstances of the disaster at Yelnikovo station on the Southern Railroad, said that the flow of traffic on the damaged section of the main line has been fully restored on all lines and in both directions. In addition, Belgorod Oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] has decided to lay a communal grave at the scene of the disaster and construct a monument to the dead, the total number of whom is not yet known.

Representatives of the investigation in Belgorod refused to give any information on the progress of the investigation into the causes and scale of the disaster over the telephone. However, the Kursk Oblispolkom Commission for Emergency Situations has information indicating that one reason for the tragedy was elementary neglect on the part of the Yelnikovo station duty officer and the switchman, both of whom grossly violated the rules governing the use of the railroad signaling system and the procedure for maneuvering trains.

But the final conclusions are a matter for the investigation.

Station Partially Reopened

PM0201085191 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 24 Dec 90

[Announcer-read report over video from train crash scene in Belgorod Oblast; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Train traffic has resumed through Yelnikovo Station in Belgorod Oblast where a rail crash occurred on the evening of 22 December.

According to a report from the Belgorod branch of the Southern Railroad, traffic resumed this morning on the damaged section of the railroad, though only on one track. Special railroad detachments from Belgorod, Staryy Oskol, and Kursk took 36 hours to restore the one kilometer or so of damaged track. Work went on around the clock. Steps are now being taken to complete the repair work as soon as possible.

Most of the passengers from train No. 22 which crashed have departed by rail for their destinations. Several dozen persons injured in the crash are receiving medical attention in the oblast's hospitals.

A government commission for the elimination of the consequences of the rail crash which is headed by Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, continues its work in Belgorod.

Central Caucasus TV Transmitter Commissioned

LD2712113290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 27 Dec 90

[Text] The inhabitants of the distant settlements in the Digora Gorge will receive color Central Television programs on New Year's eve. The new powerful automatic relay transmitter assembled by the communication workers of North Ossetiya in the mountains of the Central Caucasus was put into operation today.

Kamchatka TV To Begin Broadcasting

LD2712113390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0930 GMT 27 Dec 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] This report from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy may be regarded as a piece of cultural news. The TVK-Komko Kamchatka television company will begin broadcasting in January 1991. It will broadcast its programs on the first channel from 2000 till 2400.

Leningrad TV Company To Begin Transmission

LD3012204490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 30 Dec 90

[Text] A new Leningrad Television company, TS1, goes on the air after midnight today. The Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies has become its boss. The television company will operate twice weekly on the channel which carries the broadcasts of Leningrad Television. The collective has set itself the task of covering the problems of the spiritual and moral rebirth of the individual, of the village dweller in the first instance, and the economic and cultural links between the Leningrad region and other regions of the country and world. The processes of creating a free economic zone and ecological issues will be covered, and nondocumentary and documentary films will be shown.

New Murmansk Paper's First Issue Appears

LD0201144491 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Text] The first issue of VECHERNIY MURMANSK [EVENING MURMANSK] newspaper was published today. The editorial address to readers say that the credo of the new publication is independence of any parties and public and political movements, objectiveness in its reports, and impartiality in its opinions. The journalists of the new newspaper promise to show subscribers the life of northerners as it is in reality. The newspaper will be published three times a week.

Western Republics

Belorussia, Ukraine Conclude Relations Treaty

PM0101142591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Dec 90 Union Edition p 1

[Nikolay Matukovskiy report under "Direct Line" rubric: "Republics Conclude Treaty"]

[Text] Minsk—On 29 December Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman L. Kravchuk and Belorussian Supreme Soviet Chairman N. Dementey signed a treaty on the fundamentals of relations between the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and the Ukrainian SSR.

The treaty's first article runs as follows: "The sides recognize each other as sovereign states and undertakes to refrain from actions which could damage their state sovereignty." The treaty's second and third articles are exceptionally important in the light of current political events. They guarantee all USSR citizens living in the Ukraine and Belorussia the right to be a citizen of the side on whose territory they live. Each of the sides undertakes to guarantee the other side's citizens living on its territory equal rights and freedoms with its own citizens.

Collaboration in foreign policy; securing human rights and protecting citizens' rights; the management of energy, transport, and communications systems; cooperation in the field of environmental protection, including on preventing the cross-border transfer of pollution and participating in the formation of comprehensive international ecological security systems; and many other things were recognized as common goals by both republics.

The exchange of the instruments of ratification will take place in Kiev. The treaty has been concluded for a 10-year term. Its validity will be automatically extended for a further decade if neither of the sides declares a wish to denounce it.

Officials Comment

LD2912152890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 29 Dec 90

[Text] A report has just been received from Minsk about the signing of a treaty between the Ukraine and Belorussia.

Belorussian Supreme Soviet Chairman Dementey said the section of the document which guarantees the equality of the rights and liberties of the citizens of the two republics in their territories, including the preservation of ethnic, cultural, and linguistic independence is extremely important.

The Ukrainian legislature's chairman Kravchuk stressed that the meeting of the two delegations on the eve of the New Year and the anniversary of the USSR's formation shows that the foundations are being laid for a new union of sovereign states.

Belorussian Foreign Minister Interviewed

91UN0607A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 Dec 90 p 1

[Interview with Belorussian Minister of Foreign Affairs Petr Kravchenko, by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent Ye. Ovcharenko; in New York, date not given: "An Office With a View of Chernobyl"]

[Text] New York—Time strikingly changes people's roles. Many people who have risen in the epoch of changes were virtual dissidents yesterday, and have now become members of the legislature. There is no such contrast, however, in the biography of Petr Kravchenko, the current minister of foreign affairs of Belorussia. From the point of view of a Philistine, his past is even somewhat odious: He is from the party functionaries, the "nomenklatura." Yet, it appears that the people know their way around the block: In the second round of elections to the republic Supreme Soviet, he pulled in 65 percent of the vote, becoming one of the few party functionaries to win in Belorussia.

Kravchenko shrugged his shoulders: "How does one become a minister? I have a biography which is not typical for our time: Having worked for six years as a secretary of the city party committee, I decided to try and run for legislature. I was nominated in the Ninth, Avtozavodskiy District of Minsk. The leader of the People's Front ran in the neighboring Eighth District. This is where he and I rocked the boat in different directions.

The struggle was very difficult. Six candidates were nominated in our district, including Anatol Susha, president of the Union of Cooperative Members, who ran against me. He bought a color TV set for every day care center and every school in the rayon. What could I do? Spend 500 rubles [R] of my own money to print election handbills, that's it.

[Ovcharenko] However, it appears that diplomacy cannot by any means be called the vocation of your life, a profession to which you have aspired?

[Kravchenko] At one point in my younger years, I dreamt of becoming a diplomat and tried to transfer to the MGIMO [Moscow State Institute of International Relations]. Later I defended a candidate dissertation on the issues of economic and cultural relations between Belorussia and foreign countries in the 1920's and 1930's. That is, I was homing in on it. Suddenly, in 1980 I ended up close to the target: At the time, I worked as the chief of the department of science of the city party committee, and they proposed that I go to Moscow to study at the Diplomatic Academy. I almost agreed, but they told me: Be decent about it; you have been chief for just a month, there is no end of work here; we gave you an apartment, and you are looking toward Moscow... I stayed.

I did not hesitate, however, when the chairman of our Council of Ministers suggested that I take the position of minister of foreign affairs. It is premature to discuss whether diplomacy is my vocation because this happened this summer.

[Ovcharenko] What do you imagine the division of responsibilities to be between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of "the great power" and those of the republics? I for one do not share the opinion of colleagues who are overly responsive to the spirit of the times and who advocate the transfer of all of Moscow's foreign policy powers to the republics. It was precisely the case of interaction and prompt decision-making by the international community during the Persian Gulf crisis that showed this: There are global approaches and issues which it is hardly expedient to begin dividing now into 15 parts, including from the point of view of response times. What is your point of view?

[Kravchenko] I believe that in a union of sovereign states—and this is exactly the kind of political entity that is now emerging—foreign policy should be somewhat two-tiered. For example, we look at the strategically significant directions: international cooperation in the sphere of space or international security, UN issues, regional situations. Why look in every republic for a system of approaches or assessments regarding Namibia or the Palestinian issue if they have already been worked out by the "Union" mind? I am, however, an absolute and frank proponent of an independent foreign policy line for sovereign Union republics when regional bilateral relations are concerned. For example, I fail to understand why they should explain to us from Moscow how we should structure relations with our Polish partners. These are the issues on which absolutely no coordination with Moscow is required.

Therefore, I am in favor of a reasonable combination of the two principles, though I do foresee movement toward creating our own legations abroad. Indeed, this is difficult but primarily for financial considerations rather than due to legal and political circumstances.

[Ovcharenko] What will be Belorussia's path toward sovereignty?

[Kravchenko] You cannot proclaim sovereignty and be born absolutely free tomorrow. Movement toward sovereignty should be consistent; this will take years.

The Belorussian path to sovereignty is slow, quiet, and civilized in the European manner; it corresponds to the stable tradition of our tolerance and respect for the peoples residing in the territory of the republic and takes into account the slow but steady growth of the ethnic awareness of our people. We are different from the Baltic area and Transcaucasia; we are in favor of achieving the same objectives but by different methods, within a different time frame, and under different circumstances.

[Ovcharenko] In an environment of freedom and the need to structure your relations with partner countries yourselves, can your Ministry of Foreign Affairs count on diplomats who report to the Union either moving over or simultaneously representing the interests of specific republics abroad vigorously?

[Kravchenko] There are a great many circumstances which hinder the opening of our republic's embassies and consulates. Many sovereign republics still do not understand how much these legations are going to cost. At best, each of us will have an opportunity to maintain four or five of them. It needs to be understood that foreign policy is an expensive endeavor. For now, I am embarrassed to ask my government and my people for money to open such missions. We are going to have the first consulate in Bialystok, however. Switching to a mass opening of legations at present would nevertheless be an unforgivable waste of money.

My way, incidentally, as well as that of my Ukrainian colleague, is for Belorussian diplomats to appear at the Soviet embassies and become involved in commercial and consular affairs. As I have already said, however, I do not rule out our opening an embassy in, for example, Warsaw in the long term.

[Ovcharenko] Is the Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs cooperative?

[Kravchenko] Yes, generally. There are no categorical objections on their part. When we switch to practical affairs certain difficulties do occur at times.

[Ovcharenko] Here, in New York, at the UN, we have witnessed your indisputable success as a diplomat: The Second Committee (economic and financial issues) of the 45th UN General Assembly Session unanimously adopted a draft resolution on international cooperation in overcoming the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station. You succeeded in persuading your colleagues despite this being a difficult issue. At a press conference, however, when you appealed to the public through journalists, I felt somehow ashamed because of a number: Thirty million is required to accomplish priority tasks—build a housing-construction combine, purchase individual dosimeters, and so on. Our economy is in horrible shape, yet 30 million is not that big an amount on the scale of the entire country. It would be nice if the kind West donated anything at all to us, but can't we really scrape up the 30 million for these immediate needs?

[Kravchenko] For now we cannot. Take into account the fact that this number is being revised upward very quickly. We need more. When we determined this statistic in the republic we displayed astounding modesty; it should be considerably higher. In the coming 10 years, we will need approximately 20 billion. However, at present I merely grasp at what needs to be done right away: procuring vitamins, juices, and individual dosimeters in order to remove the people's psychological stress, and acquiring equipment for oncological centers under construction.

[Ovcharenko] The UN is not a bank; they give money here seldomly and in small amounts. Why did you fight that much for the adoption of this draft resolution?

[Kravchenko] Indeed, so far we have not received any hard cash that would make a "ringing" noise. There are many plans behind this "nothing." It was really a struggle to have this resolution adopted: The catastrophe occurred four years ago, and when we first appeared here with our idea they looked at us as if we were strange. They all understand that this was a tragedy. They immediately ask us this question: Where were you before? Why did you not act so vigorously before? We prepared about 20 drafts of the resolution. There were many differences which I would reduce to the following: the apprehensions of the developing countries that the spring of aid to them will be reduced and will flow in a different direction; objections by a number of Western countries to the allocation of UN budgetary funds for such purposes. This is why we agreed to voluntary contributions being transferred to the Chernobyl Fund. A working group will be created with the participation of the representatives of the UN and major international organizations headquartered in Europe. It is also important that one of the deputies of Perez de Cuellar will be appointed coordinator for implementing the resolution. In the long run, it will be possible to adopt a special Chernobyl program which will coordinate the microprograms of all international organizations.

There is one more aspect: We have prevented some countries from marginalizing the topic of Chernobyl and will keep it "in the limelight" continuously—year after year, as, for example, the Namibia or Palestine problems.

We knew from the very beginning that this resolution would not automatically turn into money. We can call on other states and appeal for charity on the basis of this resolution. In many countries, UN resolutions are duly respected, unlike in our country.

We should infuse the people with confidence that something is changing in the world, and that we have not been left to our own devices.

One more thing: Everything that we did here in this regard we, Russia, Belorussia, and the Ukraine, did together. We did it as brothers. The Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs helped us greatly in this. Please understand that my political weight would have been plain inadequate for negotiations with many countries.

Grodno International Phone Exchange Commissioned

LD2712195890 Minsk Domestic Service in Belorussian 0515 GMT 27 Dec 90

[Summary] The country's first transit-computing international telephone station has been commissioned in Grodno. It is very compact—occupying only 35 square meters; while its Soviet-made sisters occupy, as a rule, two-story buildings. The station can work in intra-city, inter-city, and international modes. Its main task is to ease the load in western parts of the republic without Moscow's assistance and link up with telephone lines of Europe.

Draft Law on Belorussian Enterprises Published

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For this draft law published in the 3 November SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, see the JPRS Report Soviet Union: Economic Affairs, JPRS-UEA-90-044, 18 December 1990, pages 9-20.

Ukraine To Tighten Commodity Prices Policy

PM3112105390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Dec 90 Union Edition p 1

[Correspondent Sergey Tsikora report under "Direct Line" rubric: "How To Restrain Unrestrained Prices"]

[Text] Kiev—Head of the Ukrainian Republic L. Kravchuk has called contract prices blatant banditry in the economy and has reported that in the new year January will become a month of imposing order on prices everywhere in the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].

Meeting with journalists on the eve of the new year, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman said that very soon the republic will adopt a document "which will regulate contract prices. But not by administrative means, but via a financial system."

In state and cooperative shops today one can see goods for sale at 10 times yesterday's price. Women's boots are now being sold for 1,000 rubles [R] and men's pants for R500. How do they intend to fight such arbitrariness in industry and trade in the Ukraine? It is proposed to introduce a maximum profit level figure. It will fluctuate somewhere in the region of 30 percent. If an enterprise or a trade fixes a price which raises the profit level up to, say, 50 percent, then the financial organs will instantly confiscate the unlawfully obtained money. For deceiving the purchaser a second time the culprits will immediately lose their manager's seats, will pay a 100-percent fine, and their whole profit will be handed over to the state revenue.

"We intend to move decisively from words to deeds in protecting the consumer and imposing order in the market," Kravchuk says. "An operations headquarters for implementing the Ukraine's economic treaties with other republics is being organized under the government. This will enable the situation to be kept under control and stoppages to be avoided at enterprises working on imported raw material or dependent on the arrival of subassemblies."

Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Adopts Militia Law

PM3112144990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Dec 90 First Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel V. Bilan report under "Direct Line" rubric: "Law on Militia Adopted"]

[Text] Kiev—A debate lasting many days erupted in the republic legislature over a Law on the Militia. Lieutenant General A. Vasilishin, Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] minister of internal affairs, demanded the universal attention of the citizens of the republic to the needs of the law-enforcement organs. The bitterest quarrels arose over the inclusion of the principle of departization in the law, but the majority of the deputies did not support this principle.

The law was adopted 20 December, with 288 of the people's deputies voting for it.

Ukraine's Kravchuk Views Union Treaty

LD3112154990 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 2200 GMT 28 Dec 90

[Excerpts] Leonid Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic Supreme Soviet, gave a press conference today on the results of the second session of the republic's legislature. For a whole hour he answered questions posed by Ukrainian and foreign journalists. [passage omitted]

He dwelled at length on problems of the Union treaty.

[Begin Kravchuk recording] The session was able to discuss the concept of the Union treaty. I must say that certain shifts have occured in the understanding of the issue. Whereas in October the Supreme Soviet, and the opposition in particular, repeatedly said No to the Union treaty, later, as you certainly observed, after we had worked out a concept and published it, different voices started to be heard even from the opposition's side. It even submitted a proposal. For example, Yukhnovskyy [leader of the opposition] submitted a draft of his own. In other words, we witnessed a beginning of constructive work. I think that life itself is the best teacher. It showed that if deputies sit idly, without doing a thing, then by means of referendum the people will vote in favor of the treaty. As such it will then be regarded as a document approved by the people.

Would it not be better, as I see it, to submit a draft treaty which would be in line with the people's desire and live within its framework, rather than with one imposed upon you which will not be to our liking and still be passed by the people?

In other words, we were able to step onto a constructive path, although following the fourth Congress [of USSR People's Deputies] and judging by the documents it passed, all those concepts and decisions on referendums and the nihilistic attitude to the sovereignties of the republics—I do not think that this is the best way toward consensus in our society. Say what you like, but to ignore the declarations on state sovereignty amounts today to the pursuit of a dangeorus, very dangerous policy. The previous experience shows that he who does not understand this can find himself, together with this policy, at a dead-end. [end recording]

The question whether any structural changes within the republic's government are to be expected in connection with Vitold Fokin having become prime minister was answered by Kravchuk as follows:

[Begin recording] Comrade Fokin, after having been confirmed in the post, said that he will introduce a new concept and structure by the beginning of the third session. That was why we did not bother to confirm those ministers who still remain. Judging by prelimary observations and consultations, I can reveal to you now that there will be serious changes. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Communists in Ukrainian Soviet Criticized

91UN0544A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA in Russian 9 Dec 90 p 3

[Article by V. Dolganov: "The Majority Won"]

[Text] It transpired indeed. Late in the week, the thing happened that should have happened long ago came to pass. "The majority" got sick and tired of standing on ceremony. "The majority" got sick and tired of playing democratic games and paying court to the opposition whose members could pull yet another stunt anytime—yank out the cards or fail to show up for a meeting. What is one to do in this case? One can roam the corridors, discuss and denounce in the lobby, but no work gets done. The work is at a standstill while the unfed people await their saviors. The work is at a standstill while "an enterprising entrepreneur" awaits the august nod for his activities that were illegal and "antisocialist" as recently as yesterday.

It is easy to understand the "majority" in this instance: Being "a vanguard," they are clear on all of this. There are drafts and bills, there are amendments and amended amendments. What we have here are crafty designs of the opposition.

This was how they adopted a "ukase" to openly hobble this opposition and deprive it of elementary legislative rights. They had it coming; there was no reason to stand on ceremony. They said that the same thing had been done in the Baltic area. To be sure, when those from the shores of a cold sea tried to keep in check their opposition—united fronts of workers and all sorts of retired-officer guilds—there was an all-Union outcry. The newspaper PRAVDA carried a leader: They said that "democrats" were clamping down on democracy. Now that our people have done it, it is hush-hush, and nobody is being criticized for "certain changes in the rules of procedure." If it goes on like that the parliament may turn into a party collective with its wholesale "rubber stamp."

Why argue, why scream? On Friday alone, they adopted a lot of all kinds of stuff. All of them were "in favor"—258, 227, or 266 votes. Nothing would have passed given the old rules of procedure (when 301 votes were required along with a quorum). Members of the opposition sit in the hall and laugh, or else applaud when generals (military, collective farm, or party) call on them to cooperate in a constructive manner. In general, the opposition sits around and prevents them from moving forward confidently and purposefully. Just once on Friday they tried to really stir things up when the issues of property were discussed. Then again, for the most part it was Pilipchuk who went for it. He must have gotten fat over there on Canadian food, and for this reason stuck his nose where he should not have. So what if his commission had coordinated with the government the wording of the crucial Article 14 of the law on property? At the last moment, comrades from the apparatus had made "a small correction." Land had been crossed out from the list of what all of us are allowed to own. Meanwhile, Pilipchuk kept harping on that thing of his: He said that this version had not been coordinated with a parliamentary commission. Fine, it had not. The majority leader clearly explained to everyone: Private ownership of land is a vestige of capitalism; it will besmirch our sacred and undecayed principles. The wording "without land" breezed through easily and simply to the buzz of comprehensive approval, with Comrade Moroz taking the lead.

Just one thing is incomprehensible now: If land is to be granted for use in perpetuity, how much of it will be granted, how, and by whom? Will rayon party committees decide again: He will get it, but you will not? Another thing is also hard to understand: How is the right to other property to be ensured since our mother the breadwinner still remains "an all-people's asset." Who are they, these "all people," where is one to look for them, and how can a lessee or another rural resident pester them for some land? There is a third unclear aspect. In the preamble of the same law (as well as in the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Ukraine) it is written black and white that all property forms enjoy equal rights. This somehow does not dovetail with that Article 14.

By the end of the week, however, the majority won an unqualified victory. They did not deign to respond to all kinds of trifles, such as retorts by some "nonconscientious" individuals to the effect that the peasants would now migrate to Russia en masse, or a multitude of letters from rural residents with a request to relinquish the breadwinner peaceably and amicably. They went right on. They took an interest in Khmara who was on a hunger strike. They took an interest, and left him in prison to "cool off." The press, for its part, gave an intelligible explanation: He already has a record; therefore, he can be counted among repeat offenders just as well. We know what repeat offenders are up to. You let him out, and he may well do something incredible yet again. It never occurred to his colleagues, nor did they care to know that Stepan Ilich "had done time" the first time around in Brezhenev's GULAG on political charges. Besides, the current case has been considered "political" by many people in our republic (to say nothing of the "Voices").

There was no time to pay attention to details. They had to work on Saturday, on a day off. They had to resolve the issues of local self-government and the rights of the militia. The deputies decided so on Friday night. Meanwhile, we learned about this at lunchtime. My colleagues will correct me if I am wrong, but the author of these remarks noticed the following: The cafeteria manager talked on the phone kind of loudly and resoundingly. She communicated to whoever it took that the proceedings of session would go on the next day, and that a full assortment of foodstuffs would have to be delivered in the morning. Could it be that the cafeteria manager was the one running the show?

'Democratic Forces' Congress Formed in Ukraine

LD2812185690 Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian 2200 GMT 27 Dec 90

[Text] Four parties from the Ukraine—the Party for Democratic Revival, the Social-Democratic Party, the Ukrainian Democratic Party, and the Republican Party—will become part of the Interrepublican Congress of Democratic forces.

The decision to create it was adopted during the meeting in Kiev of representatives of the Republican Party of Russia, of the United Democratic Party of Belorussia, and of the four aforementioned parties. The goal of the congress, as it was stated at the meeting, is coordination of efforts of the democratic forces in the three Slav republics to carry out transformation from the totalitarian system to democratic society without using force. The newly formed committee will engage in preparing and holding of the constituent conference of the Congress of Democratic Forces, which will take place in Kharkov at the end of January.

Chernobyl Plant Unaffected by Nearby Explosion

PM0101151191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Dec 90 Union Edition p 3

[Correspondent Andrey Pokrovskiy report from the USSR Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry under "Direct Line" rubric: "What Happened at AES"]

[Text] The echo of a "bang" at the Chernobyl AES [Nuclear Electric Power Station] site was heard far away: Any incidents occurring at the scene of the biggest nuclear catastrophe attract universal attention.

As they explained at the Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry, the functioning of an air fractionating installation was disrupted on the territory of a nitrogen-oxygen plant (next to Chernobyl AES). Hence the loud "bang." When this happened the installation's layout (kontur) and the nitrogen-oxygen plant's powder thermal insulation and glazing were partially damaged...

"This event has had no effect on the technological operating conditions of Chernobyl AES' generating units," A. Kontsevoy, chief of the ministry's Accident Control Main Administration, thinks. "More than that: On the international scale of events such an incident is classified at the AES as having a zero rating and no effect on the station's safety."

Caucasus

Georgian Supreme Soviet Adopts Deficit Budget

PM3112143990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Dec 90 Union Edition p 1

[Correspondent Besik Urigashvili report under "Direct Line" rubric: "Budget Deficit"]

[Text] Tbilisi—A Georgian Supreme Soviet session has approved the budget for Fiscal 1991. The budget deficit is 1.5 billion rubles. The deputies were unanimous that the situation in the republic's economy is very serious and that extraordinary measures are needed to get it out of the rut. A section of deputies spoke against adopting a budget with such a large deficit. The deficit is 18 percent, which is very big and a heavy burden on the population.

One of the main arguments in favor of adopting the budget was the fact that, if it was not approved, salary payments to the population would cease from the new year. This could cause destabilization and heighten social tension. But so far no specific proposals for overcoming the deficit have followed. It is clear that the Georgian economy faces a very tough year. The resolution on Georgia's social and economic development for Fiscal 1991 notes that consistent measures will be adopted on the formation of market structures and the destatization and privatization of property.

The draft law on the press and other mass media has been submitted for general discussion. Discussion of draft laws on judicial reform, immigration, elections to local organs of power, and of a number of others are also on the agenda.

Speaking at the session Zviad Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet, made a statement regarding the illegal armed formations on the republic's territory. He said that such formations must be abolished within a month.

Georgia's New National Guard Status Viewed

PM3112155790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Dec 90 First Edition p 1

[Colonel V. Kaushanskiy report under "Direct Line" rubric: "A National Guard Is Being Set Up"]

[Text] Tbilisi—The Law on Setting Up Georgia's Own National Guard which the legislature had been promising has seen the light of day. Z. Gamsakhurdia, the chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet, put his signature to it 20 December. Officially, the new structure will bear a double-barreled name: the Internal Troops-National Guard. A main administration, whose chief will at the same time be first deputy minister of internal affairs, will be set up under the republic Ministry of Internal Affairs to run the new structure. Provision has also been made for the post of commander, to be appointed by the legislature.

It is noteworthy that the enlistment of privates is envisaged on the basis of nationwide military service obligation for all citizens of the republic upon reaching the age of 18, while the enlistment of command personnel is envisaged on a voluntary basis, by contract.

Though it has only just been born, the new law has engendered a whole series of questions. Who will arm the guard? Who will provide it with uniforms, what is to be its training system, and how far is this innovation in keeping with the USSR president's well-known decree concerning the fate of nonofficial armed formations? Finally, what about the fact that, being a subunit of the Ministry of Defense, the republic military commissariat is not authorized to conscript servicemen into any structure other than the Soviet Army. And a last point. In the newly-fledged law it is written in black and white: "The Internal Troops-National Guard is to be used only on the decision of the chairman of the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet." Under the conditions of the potentially explosive interethnic situation in Georgia, the "guard," by being subordinate to the leader of the republic is potentially a very dangerous element in the complex equation of the events unfolding in the South Ossetia.

NKAO Deputy Welcomes Gorbachev Remarks

NC3012114090 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 28 Dec 90

[Excerpts] Yerevan, 28 Dec (ARMENPRES)—The editorial board of KHORHRDAYIN KARABAKH newspaper has asked USSR People's Deputy Zori Balayan to comment on the peculiar atmosphere at the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies, in which, as you know, the deputies from Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] are not taking part:

[KHORHRDAYIN KARABAKH] Zori Haykovich, you are not taking part in the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies, but no doubt you are keeping your finger on its pulse, so to speak. Can you assess the statements by USSR President Gorbachev and Council of Nationalities Chairman R. Nishanov on the NKAO?

[Balayan] I am unable to follow the deliberations of the congress very closely, as my television cannot pick up the second program. I have studied the statements you mentioned, however, and while I am not ready to comment on them in detail, I would like to stress that what USSR President Gorbachev said about the NKAO was, in my view, dictated by the realities of the situation. The world has finally realized that our problem has nothing to do with infamous extremism or potential separatism. [passage omitted] Thus, Mikhail Sergeyevich simply stated that the problem exists, it has yet to be solved, and it should be taken up by the new USSR Supreme Soviet which will be convened soon after the congress.

As regards the statement of Rafik Nishanov I can say the following: The chairman of the Council of Nationalities had Nagorno-Karabakh in mind when he spoke about the problems of all autonomous formations and he had the fate of all autonomous formations in mind when he spoke about Nagorno-Karabakh. No one can accept the idea that anyone can be allowed to implement a racist policy of controlling another people with impunity and yet remain true to the greatest humanistic tenet: "Each human life has inherent value." We are proceeding toward the realization of this tenet by putting the ideas of restructuring into effect, ideas which, consciously or unconsciously, we associate with their initiator, Gorbachev; we are proceeding toward the realization of this tenet.

New Armenian Party First Secretary Views Role

91US0176A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Dec 90 Second Edition p 3

[Interview with Stepan Karapetovich Pogosyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee and Politburo member of the CPSU Central Committee, by B. Kyufaryan, Armenian Press Agency-TASS correspondent, specially for PRAVDA; place and date not given: "Endless Debate Means Indifference to the People's Destiny—Reflections Following the 29th Armenian Communist Party Congress"]

[Text] **We present Stepan Karapetovich Pogosyan, 58 years old, new leader of the 200,000 strong Armenian Communist Party. A historian by education, he is the author of many books. He served in the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], then in his rural raykom [rayon party committee]. He has headed state committees on radio and television broadcasting and the press, the Armenian Press Agency, and the Yerevan City Gorkom [city party committee]. He is a member of the CPSU Central Committee. He was elected a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee at its December Plenum.**

[Kyufaryan] As an eyewitness to what took place at the 29th Armenian Communist Party Congress, I can assert that you were not prepared to be nominated to such a responsible position. But your attempt to remove yourself from consideration was not accepted by the delegates. Discussion of your candidacy showed that Communists see in you an individual capable of consolidating party forces to eliminate the crisis not only in the party itself, but in the republic as well.

[Pogosyan] I wanted to remove myself from consideration not out of a desire to live in peace and quiet, but in order to give way to our younger people. The list of contenders was pretty long. Many were sincere in advancing their candidacies, not falling into ambitious arrogance. But apparently my platform seemed to be more constructive to the participants. I would call it a platform of national accord in this critical period for Armenia, whose economy was destroyed not only by the earthquake. Almost a million citizens are without shelter this winter. To engage in endless discourse on the subject of power is simply immoral, in my view. The people will not forgive us for this. The time for mass-meeting democracy has ended. What remains now is utter disorder and empty shelves. Unemployment and emigration are increasing. To point the finger at one another and engage in endless debate means being indifferent to the people's destiny.

True, the legislature of our republic does not have it easy today. But do the Communist deputies, of whom there are dozens, have to gloat over the misfortunes of others on every score? Or keep silent at the sessions? No, to the first, and no, to the second. But the trust of the electorate and the cares of simple people—can it be these are not incentives for honest dialogue in the Supreme Soviet? Or on any other level for that matter...? Enough "fighting." Enough looking for the enemy where he is not. It is naive in fact to pose the question—do I like Levon Ter-Petrosyan personally, or he me? We are the children of a single people, and pinning narrow-minded labels on ourselves—who is the greater and who is the lesser patriot—is disgraceful in my view. It serves the purposes of certain circles in Armenia who see in the shift of power the loss of their personal position and well being.

In essence, nothing terrible has occurred except for the earthquake. We recall that, under a single-party system, Yerevan was transformed from a small adobe town of 80,000 into a developed center important to the country, with its own original look and culture, and a modern industry. In fact, following the tragedy of 1915, our people were on the edge of extinction or assimilation. Only a blind person sees nothing. To slander our past, even a severe past, is greatly unjust—we do not have that right. Otherwise, we will not be safeguarded from repeating our errors.. For a vine to grow and produce, it has to be affixed to its support each spring. You do not saw off the bough you are sitting on....

[Kyufaryan] Alas, some people continue to saw through it. Today, for example, it is being said of the Communist Party that it is just "changing colors," while its substance, work style, and form remain as before. That its goal is restoration of its former self.

[Pogosyan] The ones who say that do not understand that perestroyka is not just a slogan, but a historical necessity. Monopolistic power exercised by the Communist Party exhausted its capabilities and put social development at an impasse. A return to the previous system is impossible. It is a shame that negative trends of the past "quietly" endured for another two decades—until the time came for M.S. Gorbachev and his adherents, who were unafraid to tell the whole truth for all to hear. I am proud, too, that the Armenian Communist Party has come out categorically opposed to any sort of "restoration." For this would lead to final collapse. Nor are Armenian Communists raising the question of changing state power in the Republic. The danger of political changes issues from the right, when forces may come to power that in all likelihood will pursue a hard extremist policy. They will take a more negative position regarding Communists.

[Kyufaryan] Many people today are interested in the status of the Armenian Communist Party.

[Pogosyan] It states in the charter adopted at the Armenian Communist Party Congress that the party is an independent political organization that unites citizens of the Republic on a voluntary basis in the interests of establishing republic independence and sovereignty, spiritual and economic development. The Communist Party has its own program and is guided by its own decisions. Operating within the framework of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Armenia, it structures its relations with the CPSU on the basis of principles of independence, equal rights, and mutual accord. The Armenian Communist Party will also have its own membership cards. This is not "apparatus games," as our opponents believe, but inevitable reality.

It is our deep conviction that under conditions in which the Republic continues to be a part of the USSR, when its economic life is paralyzed, when we acquire the overwhelming mass of our food produce reserve stock through the Union supply system, it would be irrational—putting it mildly—to create new forms of confrontation. This is why the Communist Party is obliged to render assistance to the republic leadership in resolving pressing issues. Such situations are not isolated instances in the history of our people, unfortunately, when Armenian political figures anticipate events and promote appeals and declarations that bring only misfortune to our people. And I ask—how long must we suffer the plague of conducting a "revolutionary" show? How long will we continue to flout objective, even elementary, laws of politics, and subject the nation to new ordeals? We, therefore, repudiate decisions that run counter to the interests of our people, no matter where they originate, and we will not implement them. We are in favor of a union or confederation of national sovereign parties. Only in such a context does the Armenian Communist Party see its relationship with the CPSU and the communist parties of other republics. In light of what has been said, our Central Committee will conduct negotiations over the next two months and conclude agreements with the leadership of communist parties of other republics.

[Kyufaryan] And how do you relate, Stepan Karapetovich, to "black pages" in the history of the Armenian Communist Party?

[Pogosyan] "Black spots," if I may state it briefly, are basically related to the slogan "In the name of world revolution," when in 1918-1922 the rights of peoples small in number—including the Armenian people—were ignored. There is no need to hide it—the signatures of Bolshevik leaders are also to be found at the bottom of documents based on erroneous theory and false orientation. This then cleared the way for thrusting the Stalinist model of a "socialist society" upon Armenia. This is how the national-territorial structure of Armenia was roughly trampled upon. We also condemn and repudiate completely definitively the violation of moral norms and human rights that took place in 1970-1980 in the country and in the Republic, which led to the deformation and decomposition of society. Unfortunately, some of the authors of such "ideological innovations" remain to this day in the ranks of the party. We want to cleanse ourselves of them as quickly as possible.

It would hardly be honest or wise today, however, not to see the forest for the trees. In pointing out our mistakes, we must not blacken out the entire course of development of our republic or again plow up the history of our people. How especially sinful it is to use "writers for hire" for one's own purposes, to raise objection to national values and things sacred. The authors of such articles even try to create for the uninitiated reader the impression that Armenia is being built on practically barren ground. As if there were not an entire 70-year period during which our republic flourished on its stony wasteland thanks to the toil of its people. Prior to the tragic earthquake, our republic had a high standard of living and culture among the Union republics. As a historian, I will say that those who are striving today to throw the Soviet period of formation and development of our people on the scrap heap are rendering a disservice—to the very birth of an independent Armenian Republic. Again people's national psychology undergoes deformation and the patriotic feelings of the rising generation are subject to ordeal.

[Kyufaryan] As we know, the Communist Party leadership was completely replaced at the Congress. Did you play a role in selecting the "team" during the conduct of your first plenum?

[Pogosyan] Absolutely not. The plenum participants themselves supported the candidacies to Central Committee secretary of Yelena Ananova and Arkadiy Sarkisyan, who headed rayon party committees, and that of Aram Sarkisyan, PRAVDA's staff correspondent for Armenia. With respect to former Central Committee Second Secretary Lobov, Oleg Ivanovich's prestige can be seen in the fact of his being nominated to the position of first secretary, and only after persistent attempts on his part to remove himself from consideration in connection with his departure abroad was his request fulfilled. Let me take this opportunity to say that USSR People's Deputy from Armenia O. Lobov is well remembered in the Republic.

[Kyufaryan] You returned from Moscow, from the December Central Committee Plenum, as a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. How do you see your participation in the work of the highest political leadership?

[Pogosyan] The present leadership of the CPSU, the Politburo, has become more representative. And I see my role in it as defending the interests and point of view of the Armenian Communist Party. I will also facilitate, to the point my strengths and capabilities will allow, the rebirth of our Union on a new, democratic basis.

[Kyufaryan] One final question, Stepan Karapetovich. As opposed to your three predecessors—K. Demirchyan, S. Arutyunyan, and V. Movsisyan—who replaced one another in less than three years and almost never met with journalists, you have already managed to hold two press conferences for representatives of the republic mass media. And here you are giving an interview for the central press. What is this—a genuine adherence to glasnost, or is it tribute to fashion, a striving to gain popularity?

[Pogosyan] Today in the Central Committee we see truly democratic operating principles in effect. Any of the secretaries may, whenever he desires, without any kind of "coordination," arrange a meeting with members of the Soviet or foreign press on any matter of interest to them. We are not going to hide anything from anybody. Let people know the truth—whatever it is. Incidentally, we will soon be extending another invitation to journalists to explain and propound the concept now being drawn up for establishing the Soviet of National Accord. This is an initiative of the Armenian Communist Party.

New Armenian Government Appointments Reported

NC0201104591 Yerevan HAYASTAN in Armenian 8 Dec 90 p 1

[Unattributed report; dates of appointments not given: "Armenian Republic Council of Ministers has appointed new members of Government"]

[Text] Vardan Sumbatovich Amirbekyan has been appointed deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers; Vilik Margarovich Arutyunyan, chairman of the State Committee for Higher Education and Science; Areg Khachikovich Grigoryan, minister of enlightenment; Miran Kostantinovich Nazaretyan, minister of health; Perch Armenakovich Zeytuntsyan, minister of culture; Vram Vardanovich Tevosyan, chairman of the State Committee for the Preservation of the Environment; and Viktor Khachaturovich Virabyan, acting chairman of the State Committee for Material-Technical Supply.

Azerbaijan KGB Chief on Economic Sabotage

91UF0273A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 52, 26 Dec 90 p 3

[Report on interview with Vagif Guseynov, chairman of the Azerbaijan KGB, by Azerbaijan correspondent for LITERATURNAYA GAZETA E. Akhundova; place and date not given: "The KGB Is Fighting Against Sabotage"]

[Text] Baku was one of the last bastions to fall under the pressure of economic sabotage. Until late autumn, coupons were accurately exchanged for meat, butter, and sugar, there was a brisk trade in cereals and macaroni, there was an appetizing aroma of flat cakes from the cooperative bakeries, and the bazaars were overflowing with an abundance of vegetables and fruit. Guests to the capital sighed enviously: "You do live well!" The situation was somewhat worse with industrial commodities—mother says that the postwar stores appeared to be much richer. It is already two months since the trade mafia, arguing justifiably that it is bad for it to "lag" behind its colleagues, switched over exclusively to trade "from under the counter." For example, a kilogram of rice goes for 6 rubles [R] and butter for R8, and a bag of flour costs R50-60 (although previously cooperatives were buying it for R27). So that you cannot in any way find unleavened wheat bread and flat cakes in Baku now—almost all private bakeries are closed. The counters have only state bread, biscuits, and margarine. But there are no problems with vodka or cognac.

The republic's KGB operational staff has begun resolutely to bring order to the consumer market in the fight against economic sabotage. The entire technical chain for receiving commodities in the republic—transportation, storage, and distribution—has been put under control. The dismal stores were revived, and lines have appeared once again.

After the press conference for journalists in the KGB, I had an interview for "LG" [LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] with .

[Akhundova] Vagif Aliyevich, what are the first results of the work of the operational staff? Did cases of mass economic sabotage really take place?

[Guseynov] Judge for yourself. We found about 300 freight cars with various cargoes at railroad stations and lines, including food products, that were waiting for a long time to be unloaded. At the Khyrdalan station alone, near Baku, we found more than 300 20-ton containers with food, medicines, and first aid items. Some of them have been there since the month of August. And as a result of a check of the interrayon base Azerittifak [Azerbaijan Union of Consumer Cooperatives] in the city of Gyandzha, it was disclosed that a large amount of food products and industrial commodities were concealed from sale. Judging from the documents, a part of the commodities were sent for sale to other rayons of the republic, but, in fact, they were sold in Gyandzha through speculators.

[Akhundova] What does the population of the republic think about the work being conducted by KGB organs in the fight against economic sabotage?

[Guseynov] On the whole, the citizens of Azerbaijan express support. A "confidential line" has been set up in the committee, and we have already received about 100 cases from the population that deserve our attention. However, our activity is getting strong resistance from various kinds of operators and plunderers. Attempts are being made to discredit state security employees. For example, some rayon consumer associations refused to issue products to residents for conducting weddings, funerals, and other ceremonies, referring to alleged instructions from us. The managers of a number of enterprises are attempting to prevent financial checks and are even trying to persuade workers to strike.

[Akhundova] What do you personally think of the fact that Chekists have to engage in work that is not typical for them?

[Guseynov] I believe that we again are trying to cure the effect and not the cause. Well, we will bring order to trade, we will disclose the entire secreted shortage, and we will take the "dealers in the shadow economy" in hand, but the problems will remain. It is not just that we have exposed the operators in the shadow economy. In recent years, another problem has been revealed—the violation of horizontal relations between enterprises and the failure to comply with mutually contracted obligations. It is a kind of vicious circle—if it is not one thing, it is another.

We have not been given appropriate authorities, and we do not have the legal levers of influence on economic managers. And the activity of some of them, in a situation where the country is under the threat of a complete collapse of the economic system, cannot be called anything other than hostile.

Of course, there are many other problems; however, we, unquestionably, will carry the assignment through to its conclusion, and we are hoping for all-round support, including that of the mass media.

Azerbaijan Legislative Election Results Released

LD2812090890 Moscow TASS in English 0857 GMT 28 Dec 90

[By Azerinform-TASS correspondents Aflatun Amashov and Gekchekhanum Tagiyeva]

[Text] Baku December 28 TASS—The names of another 37 members of the newly-elected parliament of Azerbaijan were announced today through the local media by the Central Commission for the Election of People's Deputies in this Transcaucasian republic.

Although elections were held on December 16, the results of the polling are only now being announced, in accordance with the Azerbaijan law on elections. Final election results will become known after New Year's day.

In a number of districts, where several candidates ran for parliament, a run-off will be held on December 30. In those districts where less than 50 per cent of the electorate went to the polls, the elections were declared invalid and a new election will be held under the republican electoral law.

At present 325 out of 360 seats have been filled in the republican parliament. The Azerbaijan Parliament now includes members of the party and local government bodies, law enforcement agencies, directors of large amalgamations, enterprises and organisations, scientists and cultural figures. The elections were held without regimentation from higher authorities for the first time.

The number of workers and farmers among members of parliament has shrunk to a third of its former size, and that of women and young people decreased as well.

Nakhichevan Supreme Assembly Meeting Detailed

NC1612194190 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 12 Dec 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic Supreme Assembly's current session has been meeting for nearly a month now. The question of organization has been debated. Gasanov has been elected as the first deputy chairman and Seferov as the deputy chairman of the Supreme Assembly. The deputies established the permanent committees of the Supreme Assembly and elected their chairmen.

The main issue of the speeches during the meetings held in a number of establishments and organizations in the autonomous republic was related to the outcome of the latest session of the Supreme Assembly. The participants of these meetings, which were called due to an initiative by the Popular Front of Azerbaijan, have expressed dissatisfaction with the progress of the Supreme Assembly's work, which is of historic importance for the people of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. The deputies who have been elected from the Popular Front have demanded that the results of the elections for the deputy chairmen of the Supreme Assembly be declared null and void, because there was no quorum when they were elected.

The other deputies have a similar opinion. Deputy Kuliyev has informed an Azerinform correspondent that although the assembly began its work in a very democratic way, its procedure has changed (?during the) past few days. The deputies of the Supreme Assembly have been elected when the required number of deputies were not present to adopt decisions. This has created [words indistinct]. Deputy Kuliyev said: Two scholars said on local television that the deputies reportedly raised the question of removing the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic from the framework of Azerbaijan. Article 64, however, of our constitution, which has been unanimously adopted, says that the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic is a state within the framework of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic.

Deputy Kuliyev asserted that those kinds of remarks have angered the people of the autonomous republic. You can read an Azerinform report on all this in the KOMMUNIST and BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY today.

Central Asia

Turgay Oblast Soviet Meets, Elects Leaders

LD2812213590 Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Kazakh 1500 GMT 27 Dec 90

[Text] A session of the people's deputies of Turgay Oblast Soviet was held on organizational matter. Ukin, first secretary of the oblast committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, was elected chairman of the oblast soviet. Kulagin was elected first deputy chairman of the oblast soviet and chairman of the oblast executive committee.

Dzhezkazgan Obkom Elects New First Secretary

LD2912143890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 29 Dec 90

[Text] A plenum was held by the Dzhezkazgan Oblast Communist Party Committee. It considered the organizational issue. Following contestable elections, Comrade Gruzdev was elected first secretary of the oblast committee. He used to be the first deputy head of the Department for the Organizational Party and Cadre Policy of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee.

Kazakhstan TV To Begin Satellite Transmissions

LD2912121290 Moscow TASS in English 1145 GMT 29 Dec 90

[Text] Alma-Ata December 29 TASS—The new transmitting equipment installed in Soviet Kazakhstan and a communication satellite leased by the republican government from the USSR Communications Ministry will enable millions of people in the Soviet Union and other countries to watch Kazakh television programmes in the new year. The republican satellite television programme is called Zharyk (light).

Kazakh Prime Minister Uzakbai Karamanov told TASS that the programme would be beamed to every part of Kazakhstan and considerable territories in Russia, Mongolia and China were numerous ethnic Kazakhs live.

Government To Lift Dushanbe Curfew 1 Jan

LD3012110190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 30 Dec 90

[Text] The curfew in Dushanbe is to be lifted in the new year. An order by interior troops Major General (?Navzhuvanov), the commandant of the Tajikistan capital, says that the curfew in the City of Dushanbe will be lifted from 0001 on 1 January 1991 in view of some stabilization in the sociopolitical situation.

Tajik President Signs Leasing Law

LD2712133290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 27 Dec 90

[Text] The law of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] on leasing in the republic has been signed by Tajikistan's President Kakhar Makhkamov and published in the republican newspapers. The law will come into force on 1 January next year. The document obliges the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers and oblast and town and rayon soviets of people's deputies to offer all forms of assistance in the transfer of state enterprises to leasing and also to adopt all measures to explain the advantages of leasing.

Tajik Law on Associations Valid 1 Jan

LD2812155190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 28 Dec 90

[Text] The Law of the Tajik SSR [soviet socialist republic] on Public Associations comes into force on 1 January 1991. It was adopted by the republican Supreme Soviet and has been published in the republican press. The Tajik SSR Council of Ministers has been instructed to issue and publish in the press the rules for considering applications for registration of the charters of republican branches of public associations, and also of inter-republican, republican, and local public associations, in accordance with the new law.

Background to Legislative Elections Reviewed

PM1712142590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Dec 90 Second Edition p 6

[Report by correspondent Yu. Razgulyayev: "Step Toward Consolidation"]

[Text] Frunze, 11 Dec—Following a lengthy, tumultuous debate the Kirghiz SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet session adopted a declaration on state sovereignty. It recognizes political pluralism and the people's inalienable right to own, use, and dispose of all the resources on the territory of their own sovereign state, which has been given a new name—the Republic of Kirghizia.

This was preceded by an election marathon that lasted nearly two days. Immediately after the session opened A. Masaliyev, chairman of the Supreme Soviet and first secretary of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee, resigned. This was to some extent forced on him by the deputies' severe criticism at the last session and the demands made by the students, many of whom were on hunger strike.

The first round, when three candidates ran, produced no result. The vote was split among regional groups that were doing their utmost to get their "own man" in power. The situation could have been repeated the next day. But the sides compromised and M. Sherimkulov, secretary of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee, emerged the winner.

Another important outcome of the election battle was that political forces and deputies groups took an appreciable step toward consolidation. Faced with a real threat of a legislative crisis, they held a number of meetings and consultations at which they decided to set all regional and local interests aside and work together to strengthen the area's economy and improve people's lives.